JUDGMENT P.C. Banerji, J.
1. The plaintiff-respondent granted a perpetual least to the appellant in respect of fourteen plots of land covering an area of 12.54 acres. The appellant sublet two of these plots, the area of which is 1.58 acres, to the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for the purpose of rim king bricks and setting up brick-kilns. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 converted these plots into a brick-field, and thereupon the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiff against all the defendants for their ejectment from the entire holding, on the ground that the defendants had done an act detrimental to the land in the holding and inconsistent with the purpose For which it had been let. The suit purported to be one under Section 57, Clause (b), of the Agra Tenancy Act. The Court of first instance decreed the claim for ejectment, but ordered the defendant-appellant to pay compensation to the plaintiff and directed that upon payment of compensation ejectment shall not take place. On appeal the learned District Judge affirmed tins decree for ejectment, but gave the defendant-appellant liberty to remove the brick-kilns, and restore the land to the condition in which it was before it had been converted into a brick-field. The defendant No. 1 has preferred this appeal. The first contention put forward on his behalf is that the appeal from the decree of the Court, of first instance did not lie to the District Judge but lay to the Commissioner. This contention is, in my opinion, untenable. As I have said above, the suit was brought on the ground that by reason of the defendant having done an act detrimental to the land in his holding and inconsistent with the purpose for which it was let, he had rendered himself liable to ejectment under Section 57, Clause (b), A suit for ejectment on one of the grounds specified in Clause (b) of Section 57 is one of the suits mentioned in group B of the fourth Schedule to the Tenancy Act and an appeal from the decree in such a suit lies to the District Judge. In a suit of this description the sub-lessees from the tenant should, as provided in Section 64 of the Act, be joined as parties, so that the circumstance of the sub-lessees being made defendants to the suit did not alter its nature. It was not a suit on the ground that the tenant had sub-let in contravention of the provisions of the Act and did not come within the purview of Clause (d) of Section 57. The learned Vakil for the appellant has referred to the ruling in Lachman Das v. Nabi Bax 1 Ind. Cas. 161 : 6 A.L.J. 39 : 31 A. 190 That case has, in my opinion, no application to the present, inasmuch as it was hold in that case that it was a suit in which the land-holder sued for ejectment of the tenant and his sub-tenants on the ground mentioned in Clause (d) of Section 57 and was a suit under Section 31(2), an appeal from a decree in which lay to the Commissioner. The present case, as I have said above, is a case in which the plaintiff sought to eject the defendants on the ground that they had committed the acts mentioned in clause by of Section 57. The appeal, therefore, lay to the District Judge.
2. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that the defendants have done nothing detrimental to the holding or inconsistent with the purpose for which the land was let and that the lease granted to the defendant-appellant was not a lease for agricultural purposes but permitted the defendant to build on the land and do any other act he liked in regard to it. This contention, which was also raised in the Court below, has, in my opinion, been rightly repelled by that Court. From the terms of the lease it appears that it was taken for agricultural purposes. In the preamble of the lease it is stated that the defendant had asked that he should be given a right to cultivate the land, so that the main object of the letting was agricultural. No doubt the tenant was permitted to Kink-wells or make constructions on the land, but these apparently wore ancillary to the main object of the tenancy, viz. agriculture. The buildings which might be erected were apparently buildings for keeping cattle or implements of husbandry. Using a part of the land as a brick-field was clearly an act detrimental to the land for agricultural purposes and was inconsistent with the purpose for which the land was let. The appellant, therefore, in grinding a sub-lease for the making of bricks committed an act detrimental to the land leased out to him and became liable to ejectment from his holding. The learned Judge has allowed the defendant to restore the land to its original condition and has provided in the decree that if this be done, the decree shall not be executed for his ejectment. This he has done in exercise of the powers vested in him by Section 65. It is urged that the omission to restore the land sub-let to the defendants Nos. 2 and 8 to its former condition should entail the ejectment of the appellant from that portion of his holding only and not from the entire holding. I cannot agree with this contention. Under Section 57, Clause (b), a tenant is liable to ejectment from his holding on the ground of any act or omission detrimental to the land in that holding. If any such act is done in respect of a part of the holding, he is liable to ejectment from the entire holding and not from flint portion only. As the holding was one entire holding for which a lump sum was to be paid as rent, the Court could not order the appellant's ejectment from a portion only of the holding and apportion the rent, thereby substituting a different contract of tenancy for that into which the parties had entered. I accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale, but, extend the time for restoring the land to its former condition to four months from this date.