Court No. - 80
Reserved on: 10.11.2020 Delivered on 06.01.2021
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 15542 of 2020 Applicant :- Dileep Kumar Tiwari Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Rishi Kant Rai,Sriprakash Rai Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State-respondent and perused material on record.
2. This application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed with the prayer to quash the entire criminal proceedings arising out of charge-sheet dated 22.02.2020 in case crime no. 265 of 2018 (State vs. Dileep Tiwari and others), under Sections 409, 420, 201 IPC, P.S. Kotwali Bansi, District Siddharth Nagar, pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siddharth Nagar.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that allegations made by respondent no.2 are false and fabricated and that applicant has not been assigned any active role and that no prima facie case is made out against him. It was submitted that applicant was working as Village Development Officer, Bisunpur and before one month of his retirement, he was placed under suspension in collusion of one local minister. As per guidelines issued by the Central Government for selection of beneficiaries for ‘Pradhanmantri Awas Yojana’ [PMAY(G)], the said scheme was to be availed by those persons, whose names exist in socio economic and caste census list 2011 and that there were 86 such beneficiaries, who fulfilled all criteria and that they have applied with relevant document. It was further submitted that names of the beneficiaries have been selected in an open meeting of ‘Gram Sabha’ and that applicant, being Village Development Officer, was secretary of the meeting but selection of beneficiaries has to be made by Gram Sabha. In the meeting no objection was raised by any member of ‘Gram Sabha’ and that applicant has verified the site of such persons and they were found eligible for the scheme. It was further submitted that PMAY(G) is a scheme of Central Government to provide houses to such villagers, who are living below the poverty line and the beneficiaries were selected by adopting due procedure and verification. The beneficiaries were selected by Gram Pradhan and members of ‘Gram Sabha’ in an open meeting and that names of all the 66 beneficiaries, who are alleged to be ineligible, exist in SECC-2011 list. It was submitted that one villager has made a complaint against Gram Pradhan and government officials due to political rivalry and that when applicant came to know about the complaint, he immediately moved an application before the Block Development Officer. Thereafter Block Development Officer has sent a letter to applicant on 22.04.2017 and one letter dated 27.04.2017 was sent to concerned branch of State Bank to stop the payment till further orders. The Block Development Officer has made an inquiry and sent a letter to Project Director for approval of payment and Block Development Officer has sent a letter to Branch Manager of concerned bank informing that order of stop payment has been withdrawn and amount can be released in bank accounts of beneficiaries and thus, the Block Development Officer is responsible for release of money, which was stopped on application of applicant. On 25.09.2017, a complaint has been filed by one Ram Karan and some other villagers alleging that benefit of PMAY(G) has been given to ineligible persons and thereafter Chief Development Officer issued an order dated 03.10.2017 and constituted three members committee comprising Block Development Officer, who has released the money without any proper verification. The said committee has submitted report on 01.11.2017 before CDO Siddhartha Nagar. Thereafter the Gram Pradhan has made a complaint on 03.11.2017 against the said inquiry report and after that Chief Development Officer has again constituted a five members inquiry committee, which submitted its report dated 08.08.2018, wherein the beneficiaries have been declared ineligible. Learned counsel submitted that there is contradiction in both the reports and that inquiry was conducted in an arbitrary manner. It has been further submitted that applicant has been retired from service on 31.10.2018 after attaining age of superannuation and there was no provision to continue disciplinary proceedings after retirement. It has been further submitted that the applicant has preferred a Civil Misc. Writ-A No. 5583 of 2020 before this Court and after considering the facts of the case, this Court has stayed the effect and operation of punishment order dated 21.01.2019. Learned counsel further submitted that Investigating Officer did not conduct the investigation properly and charge-sheet was submitted without collecting any evidence. The alleged ineligible beneficiaries have given a joint affidavit that Investigating Officer has not recorded their statements. Further, the Project Director has informed District Magistrate vide letter dated 13.04.2020 that total Rs. 34.50 lakhs out of Rs. 38.40 lakhs have been recovered from the said ineligible beneficiaries. Learned counsel submitted that no offence under Sections 409, 420 and 201 IPC IPC is made out against the applicant and that impugned proceedings are abuse of the process of Court. Learned counsel has also referred certain case law in the affidavit filed in support of application. .
4. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and argued that in the scheme of ‘Pradhanmanti Awas Yojana (G), 84 houses were approved for village Panchayat Bisunpur, which were verified by applicant (V.D.O) and Block Development Officer but later on, in inquiry out of said 84 beneficiaries, 69 beneficiaries were found ineligible and after second inquiry, 66 said beneficiaries were found ineligible and that in account of three beneficiaries no amount was transferred and that the public fund of Rs. 38.40 lakhs was misappropriated. It was alleged that applicant was involved in selection of beneficiaries and he favoured ineligible persons and submitted false report, which has caused loss to public Exchequer. It was submitted that the allegations made against the applicant in first information report and material collected during investigation, makes out a prima facie case against the applicant.
5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.
6. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge- sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. In well celebrated judgement reported in AIR 1992 SC 605 State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, Hon'ble Supreme Court has carved out certain guidelines, wherein FIR or proceedings may be quashed but cautioned that the power to quash FIR or proceedings should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. After noticing various earlier pronouncements, the Court enumerated certain categories of cases by way of illustration where power under 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or secure ends of justice. Paragraph 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are extracted as follows:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
7. It is well settled that inherent jurisdiction under section 482Cr.P.C. though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
8. In case of Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305, the Court observed:
"132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles."
9. In case of Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 SCC 590, it was observed as under:-
"18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482Cr.P.C has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under section 482Cr.P.C.to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice."
10. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 the Court laid down the following principles:
(i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice;
(ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding e.g. want of sanction;
(iii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and
(iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
11. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699, the Court has held as under: (SCC p. 703, para 7) '' In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
12. Recently in case of Rajeev Kourav vs. Bhaisahab & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 2020), decided on 11.02.2020, Hon'ble Apex Court held:
''It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the Court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.''
13. Thus, it may be seen that though the High Court has inherent power and its scope is very wide, but it has to be exercised in exceptional cases. The jurisdiction under Section 482 is discretionary, therefore the High Court may refuse to exercise the discretion if a party has not approached it with clean hands. It is also well settled that the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the ground that civil suit is pending in respect of the subject matter. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also pending. Further, merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. It is also well established that while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court cannot look at the materials furnished by the defence nor it can go into the disputed questions of fact. The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
14. The above stated case laws make it clear that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
15. In the instant case perusal of record shows that there are allegations against the applicant that he, being posted as Village Development Officer, Bisunpur has submitted a false verification report showing 84 person eligible for availing houses under ‘Pradhanmantri Awas Yojana(G)’ but later in an inquiry it was found that out of those beneficiaries, 66 persons were found ineligible. Other irregularities were also found and it was alleged that public fund of Rs. 38.40 lakhs was misappropriated. Even if some of the amount have been recovered, it would not undone the criminal offence committed by applicant. Most of the arguments raised by learned counsel for the applicant relate questions of fact.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred the case of Ashok Basak vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors as well as the case of Binod Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. In case of Ashok Basak vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“20 In the instant case, we are unable to gather from the complaint any averment which may suggest that `5 lakhs was entrusted to the appellant, either in his personal capacity or as the Chairman of MSEB and that he misappropriated it for his own use. The basis of the allegation is that the appellant had caused the MSEB to refuse return of the money to the complainant in order to wilfully and dishonestly deprive the complainant of its use. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to the following observations in S.K. Alagh's case:
"As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the Company, even if the appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a Company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the Company itself."
21. Admittedly, in the present case, the said amount was deposited by the complainant company with MSEB and there is nothing in the complaint which may even remotely suggest that the complainant had entrusted any property to the appellant or that the appellant had dominion over the said money of the complainant, which was dishonestly converted by him to his own use, so as to satisfy the ingredients of Section 405 of the IPC. In the absence of any such specific averment demonstrating the role of the accused in the commission of the offence, we find it difficult to hold that the complaint, even ex-facie, discloses the commission of an offence by the appellant under Section 409 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC.
22. We shall now examine whether the appellant is vicariously liable for the afore-
mentioned offence with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. The essence of liability under Section 34 IPC is the existence of a common intention. A common intention implies pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. In Ramaswami Ayyangar & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1976) 3 SCC 779, this Court had observed that the essence of Section 34 IPC is simultaneous (1976) 3 SCC 779 consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. It is true that to attract Section 34, no overt act is needed on the part of the accused if he shares the common intention with others in respect of the ultimate criminal act, which may be done by any one of the accused sharing such intention. Nonetheless, Section 34 IPC clearly envisages pre-concert or pre- planning, which may even develop at the spur of the moment but such plan must precede the act constituting the offence. It is equally true that it may not be possible in every case to have direct evidence of a common intention and it may have to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.”
17. In case of Binod Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr., relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“9 . In proceedings instituted on criminal complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly invoked with circumspection, it should be exercised to see that the process of law is not abused or misused. The settled principle of law is that at the stage of quashing the complaint/FIR, the High Court is not to embark upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or the genuineness of the allegations made therein. In Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736, this Court enumerated the cases where an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside as under:
“(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complainant does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.” The Supreme Court pointed out that the cases mentioned are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash the proceedings.
10. In Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. And Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 736, this Court has summarized the principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings as under:-
“The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few—Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd (1996) 5 SCC 591; State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla (1996) 8 SCC 164, Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi,(1999) 3 SCC 259; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd(2000) 3 SCC 269 [pic]Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168, M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh (2001) 8 SCC 645 and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque( 2005) 1 SCC 122. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”
11. Referring to the growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases, in paragraphs (13) and (14) of the Indian Oil Corporation’s case (supra), it was held as under:-
“13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, [pic]leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8) “It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may.”
18. In the instant matter the facts of the matter are on different footing and the case laws relied by learned counsel for the applicant do not help in case of applicant. In the instant matter, as noticed above there are allegations against the applicant that he, being posted as Village Development Officer, Bisunpur has submitted a false verification report showing 84 person eligible for availing houses under ‘Pradhanmantri Awas Yojana(G)’ but later on in an inquiry it was found that out of those beneficiaries, 66 persons were found ineligible. Several other irregularities were also found and that public fund of Rs. 38.40 lakhs was misappropriated. Multiple questions of fact are involved in the matter, which can not be adjudicated in these proceedings under section 482 CrPC. Even if some of the amount has been recovered, it would not undone the criminal offence committed by applicant. In fact most of the arguments raised by learned counsel for the applicant relate questions of fact. Considering the matter in its entirety it can not be said that no prima facie is made out. Similarly it can also not be held that the continuance of impugned criminal proceedings against the applicant would amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. Considering submissions of learned counsel for the parties, all attending facts of the matter and also considering the above discussed position of law, this court is of the considered view that matter requires adjudication by trial court and that no case for quashing of the impugned proceedings and charge sheet is made out.
19. In view of aforesaid, the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is hereby dismissed.
Order Date :- 06.01.2021 A.Tripathi