Heard Sri Vikas Budhwar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.R.S. Jadaun, learned counsel for the respondents.
This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order, Annexure-5 to the writ petition as well as the order dated 19.3.2003 which has not been served on the petitioner. It appears that the father of the petitioner was working in the respondent-bank and died in harness and after his voluntary retirement, the petitioner claimed appointment under the Dying in Harness Rules. The application was processed and No Objection Certificate was also submitted but no orders have been passed. Then the petitioner filed a representation to the competent authority to pass appropriate orders. The petitioner submits that an order was communicated to the petitioner on 4.4.2003 by which the claim of the petitioner has been rejected by a non- speaking and unreasoned order. The claim of the petitioner has been rejected only on the basis of a letter dated 19.3.2003 sent by regional office mentioned therein that the claim of the petitioner cannot be considered for the reason that the financial problem of the family is adequate, therefore, as per the guidelines, no appointment can be made. Sri Budhwar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order impugned is an order of non- application of mind without assigning any reason, therefore, is liable to be quashed. He has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in the case of M/S Travancore Rayons Ltd. Vs. The Union of India and others reported in AIR 1971 SC 862 and has relied upon paragraphs 7 and 11 which are quoted below:
"7. The question raised before the Collector of Customs was of a complicated nature and for its proper appreciation required familiarity with the chemical composition and physical properties of nitro-cellulose lacquers and of the substance produced by the appellant Company. The Collector in deciding the appeal wrote an order running into 18 typed pages. There were before the Collector conflicting opinions of the Chemical Examiner and the Silk Mills Research Association, Bombay. The Collector gave two personal hearings to the Appellant Company. No personal hearing was given by the Government of India to the appellant Company even though the matter raised complex questions. It is true that the rules do not require that personal hearing shall be given, but, if in appropriate cases where complex and difficult questions requiring familiarity with technical problems are raised, personal hearing is given it would conduce to better administration and more satisfactory disposal of the grievances of citizens. The order does not disclose the name or designation of the authority of the Government of India who considered "the points made by the applicants", and it is impossible to say whether the officer was familiar with the subject-matter so that he could decide the dispute without elucidation and merely on a perusal of the papers. The form in which the order was communicated is apparently a printed form. There is a bare assertion by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India in his communication that the Government of India had "carefully considered the points made by the applicants", there is no evidence as to who considered the "points" and what was considered. The Central Government is by Section 36 invested with the judicial power of the State. Orders involving important disputes are brought before the Government. The orders made by the Central Government are subject to appeal to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. It would be impossible for this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article l36, to decide the dispute without a speaking order of the authority, setting out the nature of the dispute, the arguments in support thereof raised by the aggrieved party and reasonably disclosing that the matter received due consideration by the authority competent to decide the dispute. Exercise of the right to appeal to this Court would be futile, if the authority chooses not to disclose the reasons in support of the decision reached by it. A party who approaches the Government in exercise of a statutory right, for adjudication of a dispute is entitled to know at least the official designation of the person who has considered the 3 matter, what was considered by him, and the reasons for recording a decision against him. To enable the High Court or this Court to exercise its constitutional powers, not only the decision, but an adequate disclosure of materials justifying an inference that there has been a judicial consideration of the dispute by an authority competent in that behalf in the light of the claim made by the aggrieved party, is necessary. If the Officer acting on behalf of the Government chooses to give no reasons, the right of appeal will be devoid of any substance."
"11. In this case the communication from the Central Government gave no reasons in support of the order; the appellant Company is merely intimated thereby that the Government of India did not see any reasons to interfere "with the order in appeal". The communication does not disclose the "points" which were considered and the reasons for rejecting them. This is a totally unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of the judicial power vested in the Central Government. Necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved, and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached in cases where a non-judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious. When judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, this Court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been reached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of policy or expediency. The Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds: one, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous: the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power."
Learned counsel for the respondent is not able to dispute the said analogy as submitted by Sri Budhwar before this Court.
I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and perused the record. From the perusal of the record it appears that the claim of 4 the petitioner has been rejected in a cryptic manner without assigning any reason. It is well settled in law that the administrative authorities are bound to record reasons while dismissing the claim of a person. If no reason has been recorded , there will be a presumption in law that the order is an order of non- application of mind.
It is well settled that an order having civil consequences even though passed by the administrative authority must contain reasons so as to enable the aggrieved party to challenge the reasoning of the administrative authority. In the absence of reasons no foundation can be laid down by the petitioner and only argument remains is that the order is based upon non-application of mind. In our view if the reasoning of an order passed against the aggrieved person is not communicated and only a communication regarding decision has been communicated it cannot be assailed by the respondents that the grievance of a person has been decided. In our opinion, it is no order in eye of law and it has no legs to stand.
In case of S.N.Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in A.I.R. 1984 the Apex Court has already held as follows:-
"In view of the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest under lying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the 5 reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. Therefore except in cases where the requirement has been disposed with expressly or by necessary implications, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.
The recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. Therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi- judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It is however not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicitly so as to indicate that the authority has been due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.
In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K.S.Gandhi and others reported in 1991 (2) SCC, 716 the Apex Court has held as under:-
The reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the order to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. They also exclude the chances to reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious decision or conclusion. The reasons assure an Inbuilt support to the conclusion/decision reached. When an order affects the right of a citizen or a person, irrespective of the fact whether it is a quasi-judicial or administrative order, and unless the rule expressly or by necessary implication excludes recording of reasons, it is implicit that the principles of natural justice or fair play require recording of germane and precise relevant reasons as a part of fair procedure. In an administrative decision, its order/decision itself may not contain reasons. It may not be the requirement of the rules, but a the least, the record should disclose reasons. It may not be like a judgement. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicitly so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate 6 or revisional authority, of it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons. If the appellate or revisional authority disagrees, the reasons must be contained in the order under challenge. The recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned consciously applied its mind to the facts on record. It also aids the appellate or revisional authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 to see whether the authority concerned acted fairly and justly to mete out justice to the aggrieved person.
In the case of M/s Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & others reported in AIR 1970, SC, 1302, the Apex Court has held as under:-
"The High Court in rejecting the petition filed by the appellants has observed that the District Magistrate in considering the explanation of the appellants had "considered all the materials" and also that "the State Government in considering the appeal had considered all the materials". We have, however, nothing on the record to show what materials if any were considered by the District Magistrate and the State Government. The High Court has also observed that Clause 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order does not require "the State Government to pass a reasoned order. All that is required is to give an aggrieved person an opportunity of being heard." We are of the view that the High court erred in so holding. The appellants have a right not only to have an opportunity to make a representation, but they are entitled to have their representation considered by an Authority unconcerned with the dispute and to be given information which would show the decision was reached on the merits and not on considerations of policy or expency. This is a clear implication of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the appellate authority; it is not required to be expressly mentioned in the statute. There is nothing on the record which shows that the representation made by the appellants was even considered. The fact that Clause 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order to which the High Court has referred does not "require the State Government to pass a reasoned order" is wholly irrelevant. The nature of the proceeding requires that the State Government must give adequate reasons which disclose that an attempt was made to reach a conclusion according to law and justice."
In view of the aforesaid fact, the writ petition is allowed. The order, Annexure-5 to the writ petition communicated to the petitioner on 4.4.2003 as well as the order dated 19.3.2003 is hereby quashed and the matter is remanded back to the appropriate authority i.e. respondent no.2 to pass appropriate orders in view of the observations made above taking into 7 consideration the Apex Court judgment by giving reasons strictly in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of the order.
No order is passed as to costs.
7.1.2010 V.Sri/-