JUDGMENT S.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners, inter alia, praying for quashing the order dated 3rd June, 2003 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition).
2. From the allegations made in the writ petition, it appears that the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are posted on the post of Fireman at Fire Service Station, Ballia. By the impugned order dated 3rd June, 2003, the petitioner No. 1 has been transferred from Ballia to Sidharthnagar, while the petitioner No. 2 has been transferred from Ballia to Gonda.
3. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in view of the Transfer Policy dated 30th June, 2000 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition), the respondents ought to have considered the personal difficulties of the petitioners while issuing the transfer order. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has referred to Clause 4 of the said Transfer Policy dated 30th June, 2000.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has further referred to Paragraph 8 and Paragraph 9 of the writ petition, wherein various personal difficulties, which would be faced by the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2, respectively on account of transfer have been mentioned.
5. Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioners, I am of the opinion that this writ petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
6. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the transfer order unless the transfer order is shown to have been issued mala fide or in violation of any statutory rules.
7. Reference in this regard may be made to certain judicial decisions.
8. In B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and Ors., AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1955, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 4 of the said AIR):
"4.......................................................................We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges that transfer is always understood and construed as an incident of service. The words 'or other conditions of service' in juxtaposition to the preceding words 'denies or varies to his disadvantage his pay, allowances, pension in Rule 19(l)(a) must be construed ejusdem generis. Any alteration in the conditions of service must result in prejudice to the Government Servant and some disadvantage touching his pay, allowances, pension, seniority, promotion, leave, etc. It is well understood that transfer of a Government Servant who is appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to another is an ordinary incident of service and therefore, does not result in any alteration of any of the conditions of service to his disadvantage. That a Government Servant is liable to be transferred to a similar post in the same cadre is a normal feature and incident of Government Service and no Government Servant can claim to remain in a particular place or in a particular post unless, of course, his appointment itself is to a specified, non-transferable post......................................."
9. In Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1991 Supreme Court 532, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 4 of the said AIR):
"4. In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A Government Servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the Competent Authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer orders is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the Government and its Subordinate Authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders."
10. In Union of India and Anr. v. N. P. Thomas, AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1605, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 8 of the said AIR):
"8. In the present case, it cannot be said that the transfer order of the respondent transferring him out of Kerala Circle is violative of any statutory rule or that the transfer order suffers on the ground of mala fide. The submissions of the respondent that some of his juniors are retained by Kerala Circle and that his transfer is against the Policy of the Government posting the husband and wife in the same station as far as possible cannot be countenanced since the respondent holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain in the Kerala Circle itself and cannot claim, as a matter of right, the posting in that Circle even on promotion."
11. In Union of India and Ors. v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 Supreme Court 2444, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said AIR):
"7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the Appropriate Authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly, if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the Appropriate Authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government Employee a legally enforceable right.
8. The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in service matters. This is evident from a perusal of Article 323A of the Constitution. The constraints and norms which the High Court observes while exercising the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal created under Article 323A. (We find it all the more surprising that the learned Single Member who passed the impugned order is a former Judge of the High Court and is thus aware of the norms and constraints of the writ jurisdiction). The Administrative Tribunal is not an Appellate Authority sitting in judgment over the orders of transfer. It cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Authority Competent to transfer. In this case the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of transfer. The order of the Tribunal reads as if it were sitting in appeal over the order of transfer made by the Senior Administrative Officer (Competent Authority)."
12. In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Joginder Singh Dhatt, AIR 1993 Supreme Court 2486, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 3 of the said AIR):
"3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. This Court has time and again expressed its disapproval of the Courts below interfering with the order of transfer of Public Servant from one place to another. It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a Public Servant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer. The High Court grossly erred in quashing the order of transfer of the respondent from Hoshiarpur to Sangrur. The High Court was not justified in extending' its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter where, on the face of it, no injustice was caused."
13. In N.K. Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 98, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 23 of the said SCC):
"23................................Assessment of worth must be left to the bona fide decision of the superiors in service and their honest assessment accepted as a part of service discipline. Transfer of a Government Servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the Superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. Several imponderables requiring formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of that hierarchical superiors to make that decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinized judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinizing all transfers and the Courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all Government Departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated."
14. In Agbani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa and Ors., 1995 Supp. (4) Supreme Court Cases 169, their Lordships of the Apex Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 10 of the said SCC):
"10. It is settled law that a transfer which is an incident of service is not to be interfered with by the Courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer ; (See N.K. Singh v. Union of India)"
15. In Riaz Ahmad v. Additional Registrar (Administration), Co-operative Societies, U.P., Lucknow and Ors., 2002 (5) ESC 124; (2003) 1 UPLBEC 262 (Alld.), this Court referred to the above decision of the Apex Court. It was laid down as follows (Paragraph 9 of the said ESC):
"9....................................................... Transfer is an incident of service. Normally, transfer orders arc not interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, unless there is violation of statutory rules or there is mala fide in the issuance of transfer order....................."
16. In Pramod Charan Saxena v. Director, Panchayat Raj Lekha Nideshalaya, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and Anr., 2002 (5) ESC 34, this Court held as follows (Paragraph 10 of the said ESC):
"10........................Transfer is an incident of service. No interference is to be made with the transfer order unless there is violation of statutory rules or there is mala fide..................."
17. Neither the impugned transfer order dated 3rd June, 2003 has been shown to have been issued mala fide in respect of any of the petitioners, nor has any violation of any statutory rule been shown in the present case by the issuance of the impugned transfer order dated 3rd June, 2003. No interference is, therefore, called for with the impugned transfer order dated 3rd June, 2003 by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. As regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the respondents have not followed the Transfer Policy dated 30th June, 2000 while issuing the impugned transfer order dated 3rd June, 2003, I am of the opinion that the said Transfer Policy merely provides guide-lines regarding transfer of employees, and the same is not statutory in nature. Hence, even if the respondents are assumed to have deviated from the said Transfer Police, still the same does not entitle the petitioner to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
19. In Lakhan Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1983 AWC 195 (LB), a Division Bench of this Court laid down that even if the transfer order was contrary to the directions of the State Government, the same was not liable to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Apex Court tin Shanti Kumari v. Regional Deputy Director, Health Services, AIR 1981 SC 1577.
20. The said decision of the Division Bench in Lakhan Singh case (supra) was followed by a Division Bench in Bir Pal Singh and Anr. v. U.P. State through Director, National Cadet Corporation Directorate, U.P., Lucknow and Ors., 1983 AWC 165.
21. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, and the same is accordingly dismissed.
22. Learned Counsel for the petitioners then submits that petitioner No. 1 has made a representation dated 13th June, 2003 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) to the respondent No. 2, and the petitioner No. 2 has similarly made a representation dated 13th June, 2003 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) to the respondent No. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent No. 2 may be directed to decide the said representations.
23. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that the respondent No. 2 will decide the said representation of the petitioner No. 1 dated 13th June, 2003 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) and the said representation of the petitioner No. 2 dated 13th June, 2003 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) expeditiously, preferably within a period of four weeks from the respective date of filing of certified copy of this order along with a copy of the said respective representation before the respondent No. 2 by each of the petitioners.
24. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is dismissed.
25. It is made clear that this Court has not considered the merit of the said representations made by the petitioners as it is for the concerned authority to consider the same while deciding the said representations.