Petitioner Counsel :- B.D. Pandey Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,Anuj Kumar,B.D.Pandey,S.S.Nigam Hon. B.K.Narayana J Heard Sri R.N Singh learned Senior counsel assisted by Sri S.S. Nigam and learned standing counsel for the respondents no.1 to 5. None appears on behalf of the respondent no.6.
The relevant facts of the case as stated in the writ petition are that M/s Dhanpur Sugar Mills is a public Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956 with the object of establishing an industrial unit in village Asmauli for providing employment as well as other facilities including education to the local inhabitants of Tehsil Sambhal.
With the aforesaid motive the petitioner purchased 130 acres of land through 62 sale deeds executed in its favour by different tenure holders of village Asmauli, Tehsil Sambhal, District Moradabad, after the said land had been declared to be used for industrial purpose under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Since the village in which the land in question is situated was under the consolidation operation, the petitioner company applied for mutation of its name over the land so purchased by it through 62 sale deeds, before the consolidation officer Madhan Sirsi, Tehsil Sambhal District Moradabad, respondent no.5. The applications so moved by the petitioner for mutation were registered as case numbers 339/1581 to 51. The aforesaid cases were decided by the consolidation officer by different orders passed on different dates between 31.10.93 and 11.3.04 by which the petitioner's name was directed to be mutated over the land purchased by the petitioner from different tenure holders. Pursuant to the orders of the consolidation officer, the name of the petitioner was recorded as Bhumidhar and the requisite entry in this regard was made in CH form 23.
The orders passed by the consolidation officer directing the mutation of petitioner's name were challenged by the State Government in 62 appeals filed under section 11 sub section (i) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Settlement Officer Consolidation respondent No.2, on the ground that the land purchased by the petitioners being in excess of 12.5 acres and the transfer in excess of 12,5 acres having been made without seeking necessary authorization of the State government under Section 154 sub section (2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') the same was void under Section 166 of the Act and the land which was subject matter of the sale transaction stood vested in the state government free from all encumbrances under Section 167 sub section (i)(a) of the Act and the petitioner's name was not liable to be mutated in the revenue records as the owner of the transferred land. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeals the petitioner applied and obtained necessary authorization from the Commissioner Moradabad Division, Moradabad who had been delegated the power by the State government to grant necessary authorization for transfer of land in excess of the limit prescribed in sub section (i) of Section 154 of the Act , authorizing the petitioner to acquire 129.95 acres of land by his order dated 26.12.2000 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition). The said authorization was filed by the petitioner before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, who by his common order dated 27.12.2001 dismissed all the 62 appeals of the State government holding that the Commissioner Moradabad Division, having granted the necessary authorization to the petitioner to acquire 129.95 acres of land by his order dated 26.12.2000, the orders passed by the consolidation officer directing mutation of the petitioner's name were not liable to be interfered with. Thereafter 62 highly time barred revisions were preferred by the state government under Section 48(i) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before the respondent no.1against the orders passed by the consolidation officer and the settlement officer consolidation, supported by applications for condonation of delay. The respondent no.1 clubbed all the revisions of the state government and after condoning the delay allowed the same by a common order dated 15.9.2003 holding that the entire land measuring 130 acres which had been purchased by the petitioner through different sale deeds except 12.5 acres stood vested in the state government as the land in question had been purchased by the petitioner in excess of 12.5 acres without obtaining prior authorization /permission from the state government as required under section 154(2) of the Act , By means of present writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated15.9.03 passed by respondent no.1 (annexure 11 to the writ petition).
In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been stated that the petitioner is a person and therefore was not entitled to purchase land beyond 12.5 acres without the necessary permission under Section 154(2) of the Act and the sale deeds having been obtained by the petitioner in its favour in excess of the permissible limit of 12.5 acres provided under Section 154(1) of the Act, in contravention of section 154(2) of the Act , the sale deeds being void under Section 166, the subject matter of the sale deeds stood vested in the state government under section 167 of the Act. It was also alleged in the counter affidavit that under section 154(2) it is the state government alone which is competent to authorize transfer in excess of the limit prescribed under Section 154 (i) of the Act by a general or special order and the commissioner had no power to authorize any transfer in excess of the prescribed limit under section 154(1) of the Act and the permission granted to the petitioner by the commissioner in the matter being post facto was no permission in the eyes of law. The allegations regarding collusion between the petitioner and the settlement officer consolidation and the DGC(civil) were also made in the counter affidavit.
The main ground on which the impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner is that the respondent no.1 committed a patent illegally in allowing the revisions of the state government on the ground that the permission to purchase land in excess of the limit prescribed under section 154(1) of the Act having been obtained after the purchase of the land, such permission did not cure the illegality which had been committed by the petitioner while purchasing the land in excess of the prescribed limit without obtaining prior permission / authorization from the state government under Section 154(2) of the Act and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer directing mutation of petitioner's name on the strength of the sale deeds in question and the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation affirming the order of the Consolidation Officer were not sustainable in the eyes of law. Sri R.N. Singh submitted that the view taken by the respondent no.1 that Section 154(2) of the Act does not provide for post facto authorization of transfer is erroneous as the legislature where-ever it felt necessary provided for prior permission / sanction whereas in section 154 sub section (2) of the Act words used are " by general or special order" and not prior permission as used in Sections 154 (a) and 157(a) and that sub section (2) of section 154 itself provides that transfer in favour of registered co-operative society or an institution established for a charitable purpose in excess of prescribed limit in sub section (1) , can be authorized if state government is satisfied that such society / institution does not have sufficient land for its need or that the transfer is in the interest of general public.
Sri R.N. Singh further submitted that respondent no.1 has totally failed to examine sub section (2) of Section 154 of the Act.
Sri R.N.Singh lastly submitted that the issue whether the post facto permission under section 154 sub section (2) of the Act can be granted by the state government or not, was examined by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of vs State of U.P. and another reported in 1999(1) AWC 574 and this Court held that post facto permission under section 154(2) of the Act can be granted.
Learned standing counsel made his submissions in support of the impugned order and vehemently urged that the transfer on the basis of which the petitioner is seeking mutation being clearly in contravention of Section 154 sub section (2) of the Act are void and the post facto permission/ authorization granted by the commissioner shall not validate the previous illegal act. The respondent no.1 did not commit any error or illegality in allowing the revision and in setting aside the orders passed by consolidation officer and settlement officer consolidation.
Learned standing counsel next submitted that the petitioner should have been obtained prior permission to purchase land in excess of 12.5 acres and the transfers in question being void, the land which was the subject matter of the transfer stood vested in the state government.
I have examined the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned order.
It is not in dispute that 130 acres of land was purchased by the petitioner from different tenure holders of village Asmauli through 62 sale deeds with the object of carrying on activities aimed at providing avenues of employment as well as other facilities including education to the local inhabitants of village Asmauli Tehsil Sambhal District Moradabad. After purchasing the aforesaid land , the petitioner applied for mutation before the consolidation officer and the consolidation officer by different orders passed between 31.10.93 and 11.3.04 allowed the mutation applications of the petitioner and directed recording of petitioner's name over the land so purchased.
The orders passed by the consolidation officer were challenged by the state government in 62 appeals. It is also undisputed that during the pendency of the appeal before the settlement officer consolidation the petitioner obtained authorization from the Commissioner Moradabad division, Moradabad under section 154(2) of the Act to purchase 129.95 acres of land in village Asmauli, Tehsil Sambhal, District Moradabad. The respondents do not dispute that the order authorizing to purchase the land in excess of the prescribed limit under section 154(1) of the Act, in favour of the petitioner is still subsisting and the validity thereof has not been challenged by the respondents before any court. The settlement officer consolidation after taking into consideration the post facto authorization under section 154(2) of the Act granted by the Commissioner Moradabad division Moradabad in favour of the petitioner copy whereof has been filed as Annexure No.12 to the writ petition dismissed the appeals of the state government by a common order dated 27.12.2001. The Deputy Director of Consolidation respondent no.1 however, took the view that the transfer of land made by the tenure holders in favour of the petitioner in excess 12.50 acres of land being without prior permission of the state government as envisaged under section 154(2) of the Act and the post facto permission/ authorisation granted granted by the commissioner in respect of the transfers in question did not validate the previous illegality, the sale transactions were void under Section 166 of the Act and the land so transferred in excess of 12.50 acres vested in the state government free from all encumbrances and accordingly allowed the revisions of the state government setting aside the orders passed by settlement officer consolidation and the consolidation officer . The Deputy Director of Consolidation was also of the view that the conduct of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the District Government Counsel (Civil) was not above board and gave rise to strong suspicion that there was a collusion between the petitioner, Settlement Officer Consolidation and the District Government Counsel (Civil). The first question, therefore, which arises for consideration in this writ petition is that whether post facto permission under Section 154 (2) of the Act could be granted by the state government and whether such post facto permission validated the previous illegality resulting due to the petitioner's purchasing land in excess of 12.50 acres of land, without necessary authorisation under Section 154(2) of the Act.
The first part of the question formulated herein above i. e. whether post facto permission under section 154(2) of the Act could be granted by the state government or not is no longer res-integra but stands finally concluded by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the Case of Vayu Sena Hindon Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited ( Supra). This Court while examining the aforesaid issue in the case of Vayu Sena Hindon Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited Supra), in paragraphs 8,9 ,10 ,11, 12 and 13 of the aforesaid judgement held as herein under:
8. Before we proceed to consider the rival arguments , it is necessary to have a look on the various provisions of the Act which have been referred by the learned counsel for the parties. Sections 154,154A,157 A, 166 and 167 are reproduced below:
"154. Restriction on transfer by a bhumidhar-(1) Save as provided in sub section (2), no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift , any land other than tea gardens to any person where the transferee shall , as a result of such sale or gift become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by his family will in the aggregate will exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) in Uttar Pradesh.
(2)Subject to the provisions of any other law relating to the land tenures for the time being in force, the State Government may, by general or special order, authorise transfer in excess of the limit prescribed in sub- section (1) if it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered Co-operative Society or an institution established for a charitable purpose , which does not have land sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the interest of general public.
Explanation: For the purposes of this Section, the expression 'family' shall mean the transferee, his or her wife or husband ( as the case may be ) and minor children and where the transferee is a minor also his or her parents.
154A. Foreign national not to acquire land-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this act or any other law for the time being in force, no foreign national shall acquire any land by sale or gift without prior permission in writing from the State Governent.
(2) no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer any land to any person in contravention of sub section (1).
(3) Every transfer made in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be void.
157A. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Castes-(1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sections 153 to 157, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste shall have the right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Caste, except with the previous approval of the Collector.
Provided that no such approval shall be given by the Collector, in case where the land held in Uttar Pradesh by the transfer on the date of application under this Section is less than 1.26 hectares or where the area of land so held in Uttar Pradesh by the transfer on the said date is after such transfer, likely to be reduced to less than 1.26 hectares.
(2) The Collector shall, on an application made in that behalf in the prescribed manner, make such inquiry as may be prescribed.
166. Every transfer made in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be void.
167(1) The following consequences shall ensure in respect of every transfer which is void by virtue of Section 166, namely-
(a) the subject -matter of transfer shall with effect from the date of transfer be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
(b) the trees, crops and wells existing on the land on the date of transfer shall , with effect from the said date, be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
(c) The transferee may remove other movable property or the materials of any immovable property existing on such land on the date of transfer within such time as may be prescribed.
(2)Where any land or other property has vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) , it shall be lawful for the Collector to take over possession over such land or other property and to direct that any person occupying such land or property be evicted therefrom. For the purposes of taking over such unauthorised occupants , the Collector may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary."
9. Admittedly the petitioner society had purchased total 31.5 acres of land from time to time before the date of notice i. e.
7.5.1988.The case of the petitioner is that it had sold the land after carving out small residential plots to various members numbering 476. Annexure 2 filed with the writ petition shows that around 250 members were sold small plots between 100 sq Meters to 550 sq Meters various members in the the year 1987-88. There is no material as to whether at a particular time, the total land acquired by the petitioner exceeded the limit of 12.5 acres as provided under Section 154(1) of the Z.A. and L. R. Act. There is no doubt that if at any point of time, the Society had acquired more than 12.5 acres of land, then such transfers in favour of the Society exceeding 12.5 acres of land would be void in view of the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act. The consequences which will follow to such transfer would be that the land acquired in excess of the limit under Section 154 (1) shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government free from all encumbrances and the Collector shall be entitled to take over possession over such land. Sub section (2) of Section 154 of the Act, however, permits transfer of land in excess of the limit provided under Section 154(1) of the Act if the State Government by general or special order authorises such transfer and it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered Co-operative Society or an institution established for a charitable purpose which does not have land sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the interest of general public. There is no dispute that the petitioner applied to the State Government for grant of permission under Section 154(2) claiming to be a registered Co -operative Society , which does not have land sufficient for its need and also claiming that the transfer is in the interest of its members. The State Government rejected such a representation on the sole ground that the permission is sought after transfer of the land was effected in favour of the Society. The main question which arises for determination is whether in view of the various provisions of the Act as reproduced above, the order of the state Government refusing to grant permission was in accordance with law and justified.
10. Sri Hasnain, Additional Chief Standing Counsel , vehemently argued that the permission should have been obtained prior to the the transfer and in case the transfer is void in view of the provisions contained under Section 166 of the Act, the land stood vested in the State Government and grant of permission would amount to divesting the State Government. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that such permission can be granted after such sale deed is effected since sub section (2) of Section 154 does not specifically provide for prior sanction . He further submits that where-ever prior sanction is deemed necessary by the Legislature, it has so provided in the various provisions of the Act. Learned counsel has referred to Section 154A(1) which speaks that no foreign national shall acquire any land by sale or gift without prior permission in writing from the State Government. Likewise, in Section 157 A it is provided that no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste shall have the right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift , mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste, except with the previous approval of the Collector. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court, L.I.C.V Escorts Ltd and others AIR 1986SC 1370. This case related to Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973. Section 29 of the said Act provided as follows:
"29(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 28 and Section 47 and notwithstanding any thing contained in any other provision of this Act or the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, a person resident outside India( whether a citizen of India or not) or a person who is not a citizen of India but is a resident in India, or a company ( other than a banking company) which is not incorporated under any law in force in India or in which the non-resident, interest is more than forty per cent, or any branch of such company, shall not, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank.
(a) carry on in India, or establish in India a branch, office or other place of business for carrying on any activity of a trading commercial or industrial nature, other than an activity for the carrying on of which permission of the Reserve Bank has been obtained under Section 28, or
(b) acquire the whole or any part of any undertaking in India of any person or company carrying on any trade, commerce or industry or purpose the shares in India in any such company."
The said section prohibited without general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of carrying on in India, or establishing in India a branch, office or other place of business for carrying on any activity of a trading,commercial or industrial nature, other than an activity for the carrying on of which permission of the Reserve Bank has been obtained under Section 28 of acquisition of whole or any part of an undertaking in India carrying on trade or business of sale and purchase of shares in India. The question that had cropped up before the Apex Court was whether the special or general permission of the Reserve Bank envisaged under Section 29 of the Act was prior permission or could be subsequent permission also....
11. After discussing the object of the enactment and other provisions of the enactment and other provisions contained in the Act, the Apex Court held as follows:
"We have already extracted Section 29(1) and we notice that the expression used is "general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India" and that the expression is not qualified by the word"previous" or "prior" while we are conscious that the word "prior" or "previous" may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling circumstances justifying reading any such implication into Section 29(1). On the other hand, the indications are all to the contrary. We find, on a perusal of the several , different sections of the very Act, that the Parliament has not been unmindful of the need to clearly express its intention by using the expression "previous permission" whenever it was though that "previous permission " was necessary. In Sections 27(1) and 30, we find that the expression 'permission' is qualified by the word 'previous' and in Section 8(1) , 8(2) and 31, the expression 'general or special permission' remain unqualified........... The significance of the use of the qualifying word in one provision and its non- use in another provision may not be disregarded. In our view , the Parliament deliberately avoided the qualifying word 'previous' in Section 29(1) so as to invest the Reserve Bank of India with a certain degree of elasticity in the matter of to non-resident companies to purchase shares in Indian companies . The object of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, as already explained by us, undoubtedly, is to earn, conserve, regulate and store foreign exchange. The entire scheme and design of the Act is directed towards that end..... The foreign Exchange Regulation Act is, therefore, clearly a statute enacted in the national economic interest. When construing statutes enacted in the national interest , we have necessarily to take the broad factual situations contemplated by the Act and interpret its provisions so as to advance and not to thwart the particular national interest whose advancement is proposed by the legislation. Traditional norms of statutory interpretation must yield to broader notions of the national interest. If the legislation is viewed and construed from that perspective, as indeed it is imperative that we do, we find no difficulty in interpreting 'permission' to mean 'permission' previous or subsequent, and we find no justification whatsoever for limiting the expression 'permission' to 'previous permission' only. In our view , what is necessary is that the permission of the Reserve Bank of India should be obtained at some stage for the purchase of shares by non-resident companies.
......... The Reserve Bank of India is not bound to give ex post facto permission whenever it is found that business has been started or shares have been purchased without its previous permission. In such cases wherever the Reserve Bank of India suspects an oblique motive, we presume that the Reserve Bank of India will not only refuse permission but will further resort to action under Sections 50,61 and 63, not merely punish the offender but also confiscate the property involved. We do not think that the scheme of the Act makes previous permission imperative under Section 29(1) though the failure to obtain prior permission may expose the foreign investor to prosecution, penalty, conviction and confiscation if permission is ultimately refused. Even if permission is granted, it may be made conditional. The expression 'special permission' is wide enough to take within its stride a 'conditional permission' ....... we do not think that the Parliament intended to lay down in absolute terms that the permission contemplated by section 29(1) had necessarily to be previous permission. The principal object of Section 29 is to regulate and not altogether to ban the carrying on in India of the activity contemplated by clause (a) and the acquisition of an undertaking or shares in India of the character mentioned in clause (b) . The ultimate object is to attract and regulate the flow of Foreign Exchange into India. If that much is obvious, it becomes evident that the Parliament did not intend to adopt too rigid an attitude in the matter and it was, therefore, left to the Reserve Bank of India , than whom there could be no safer authority in whom the power may be vested, to grant permission, previous or ex post facto, conditional or unconditional.
12. In the case before us, we do find that permission under Section 154(2) can be granted by the State Government by general or special order if(i) it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered Co-operative Society or an institution established for a charitable purpose: (ii) which does not have land sufficient for its need or (iii) that athe transfer is in the interest of general public. We have already seen above that the Legislature, wherever it thought necessary , it has provided for prior permission or previous approval as in Section 154A and Section 157A. From reading of Section 154(2) we find that the purpose of granting permission for acquisition of land in contravention of the provisions contained in sub section (1) of Section 154 is a public purpose and in the interest of the public at laarge. Therefore, in our view, post fact permission can be granted if the conditions contained in Section 154(2), as stated above, are satisfied.
13. There is no doubt that the consequences of transfer of land without obtaining permission and in contravention of the provisions of Section 154(1) of the Act are of far reaching effect in as much as such transfer is void and the transferred land stands vested in the State Government from the date of such transfers. But, in our view , such consequences do not to lead to the inevitable conclusion that post facto permission is not permissible under Section 154(2) of the Act. We may point out here that by grant of such post facto permission , no third party is going to be adversely affected. The land vests in the State Government in case the transfer is in contravention of the provisions of Section 154(1) and the State Government can divest itself of the land so long as the State Government has not transferred the land to some third party. In the LIC case (Supra), the Apex Court had observed "It is true that the consequences of not obtaining the requisite permission where permission is prescribed are serious and even severe. It is also true that the burden of proof is on the person proceeded against and that mens rea may consequently be interpreted as ruled out. But that cannot lead to the inevitable conclusion that the permission contemplated by Section 29 is necessarily previous permission"
Learned standing counsel has failed to cite any decision either of this Court or of Apex Court to the contrary hence in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vayu Sena Hindon Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited (Supra) I have no hesitation in holding that permission envisaged or contemplated under Section 154(2) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act can be both prior or ex post facto permission as Section 154(2) does not specifically provide for prior sanction. In view of the finding on the first part of the question formulated by me the second part of the question also stands decided against the respondents, as admittedly the Commissioner by his order dated 26.12.2000 granted permission to the petitioner to acquire 129.95 acres of land for being utilised for industrial purposes.
In taking the aforesaid view I stand fully fortified by the observations made by this Court in the Case of Shakir Husain Vs Chandu Lal AIR 1931, Allahabad page 567 which were approved by the Apex Court in LIC V Scorts Ltd and others reported in AIR 1986, Supreme Court page 1370 . This Court in the case of Shakir Husain (Supra) observed as under: "Ordinarily the difference between approval and permission is that in the first the act holds good until disapproved, while in the other case, it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently obtained may all the same validate the previous Act."
It is not the case of the respondents that the aforesaid authorisation/ permission has been canceled , revoked or modified in any manner or that any proceeding against the same is pending before any higher authority or court.
The only objection raised on behalf of the respondents is that the Commissioner had no authority to grant an authorization under Section 154(2) of the Act as it is the State Government alone which is competent to grant permission or authority under the aforesaid Section. The argument raised in this regard on behalf of the respondents in my opinion has no force at all. The Secretary of State of U.P. (Administration) by his order dated 30.5.1994 had delegated the authority of the state government to grant permission/authorisation under Section 154(2) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R.Act to transfer in excess of 12.50 acres of land for industrial purpose only to the Commissioner Bareilly division Bareilly.* Copy of the said order has been filed by the petitioner as Annexure 14 to the writ petition and the respondents neither in the counter affidavit nor during the course of their arguments have disputed its authenticity or genuineness hence the submission made by the learned standing counsel that the authorisation granted by the Commissioner is without any authority of law, has no merit and is liable to be rejected forthwith.
The last question which arises for consideration before this Court is that whether the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dismissing the appeal of the State Government was vitiated by any collusion between the District Government Counsel (Civil ) and the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the petitioner or not.
Despite advancing elaborate arguments learned standing counsel has failed to bring to the notice of this Court any material which may indicate that the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation was a collusive order . In my opinion the inference raised by the Deputy Director of Consolidation respondent no.1 in the impugned order that the District Government Counsel (Civil ) , Settlement Officer Consolidation and the petitioner were in collusion before the appellate court is not warranted by any material on record. The petitioner having been granted post facto permission under Section 154(2) of the Act authorising transfer in excess of the 12.50 acres limit prescribed under sub section (1) for purchasing 129.95 acres of land and it not being the case of the respondents that the transfers in respect of which post facto authorisation was granted by the Commissioner were not in the interest of the general public or that the petitioner was not eligible for being granted authorisation 154(2) of the Act, the previous illegality in the transactions stood validated with the grant of permission by the Commissioner under Section 154(2) of the Act and the respondent No.1 Deputy Director of Consolidation manifestly erred in law in allowing the revisions preferred by the State and in setting aside the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer Consolidation. The ground on which the respondent had allowed the revision preferred by the State Government are totally untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of law.
For the aforesaid reasons the writ petition is allowed. The order dated passed by the respondent No.1 is quashed.
It shall however be open to the respondents , if so advised to move an application to institute appropriate proceedings for revocation of the post facto permission/ authorisation granted by the Commissioner Bareilly Division, Bareilly, in favour of the petitioner in case the respondents feel that the said authorisation/ permission has been wrongly granted. There shall be however no orders as to costs.
Order Date :- 11.1.2010 cps