ORDER
1. Present petition is directed against the judgment and orders dated 12-3-1992 and 20-11-1992 passed by Settlement Officer, Consolidation Ghazipur and Dy. Director of Consolidation Ghazipur respectively, the genesis of which is owed to the proceedings for allotment of Chak under Section 20 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short the 'Act'). It would transpire that the respondent No. 4-Rishikesh was not provided with the facility of a Chak road to facilitate his access to his chak and accordingly, on publication of statement of proposal, he filed objection under Section 20 of the Act staking demand to the facility of a Chak road and upon the objection, being rejected by the Consolidation Officer, the respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 21 of the Act reiterating his demand which has been summed in the appellate order in the following words:--
"Appealkarta Ki Mang Hci Ki Gata Sankhiya 466 Jis Per Appealkarta Ka Chak Bana Hei Tettia Ye Gata Uski Abadi Ke Sameep He Vahaan So Gata Sankhiya 600 Tak Jahaan Tak Appealkarta Ka Chak Bana Hai, Nali Ke Saath Saath Chak Road Prastavit Kiya Jave."
2. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation undertook a local inspection and ordered that -- "Appealkarta Ko Chak Road Gata Sankhiya 466 Se Gata Sankhiya 480 Ke Dakkin Medh Tak Nali Ke Kinare Kinare Chak Road Dekar Gata Sankhtya 646 Me Jane Wali Chak Se Milaya Jata Hai.--" The appeal was accordingly allowed vide order dated 12-3-1992 and necessary modifications were effectuated in terms of the order in related Chaks including Chak No. 109, which belongs to the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved against the appellate order dated 12-3-1992, the petitioner went up in revision under Section 48 of the Act. The Deputy Director of Consolida-
tion found that Chak Road was righlly provided by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Seeing no justification to upset the application order he dismissed the revision, vide order dated 20-11-1992 as having no force. Hence the instant petition.
3. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed the impugned orders on the solitary ground that Chak roads in the Unit having already been provided for, in the statement of principles prepared by the Asstt. Consolidation Officer, in consultation with the Consolidation Committee under Section 8A of the Act and the location of the same having not been demurred to under Section 9 of the Act. the matter attained finality under sub-section (3) of Section 9B and any demand under Section 28 for any other Chak road not already provided for in the statement of principles, being not comprehended by the Act, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation acted illegally and without jurisdiction in making provision for a chak Road while deciding the appeal under Section 21 of the Act preferred by respondent No. 4. Elaborating his submissions, Sri Sankath Rai urged that the Consolidation authorities, while entertaining objection, appeal or revision in respect of allotment of Chaks, have, in fact, no jurisdiction to make provision for a Chak Road not already provided for, in that, the claim if any, for a Chak road is entertainable only in proceeding under Section 9 read with Section 9B of the Act and if no objection is filed under Section 9(2) against the statement of principles drawn under Section 8A, the same becomes final under Section 9B(3) of the Act; not open to challenge at the stage of disposal of objection, appeal or revision arising out of proceeding for allotment of Chak.
4. The submission afore-stated, have been made with vehemence, but to be rejected as untenable in law and devoid of merits. The statement of principles prepared under Sec-lion 8A inter alia, contained details of areas, as far as they can be determined at that stage, to be earmarked for extension of 'abadi' including areas for 'abadi site' for Harijans and Landless persons in the Unit and for such other public purposes as may be prescribed. Rule 24A of the rules made under the Act provides explicitly that the statement of principles shall, inter alia, show the area to be earmarked for extension of abadi, including areas for abadi sites for Harijans and Landless Persons in the Unit for present and future needs; for Roads village and inter-village Rasta; and for water channels (Gools or Nalis) for irrigation purposes, amongst other public purposes enumerated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 24A which in my opinion, is not an exhaustive list of public purposes as would-be evident from the expression "areas to be earmaked for any other public purposes" used in Rule 24A(1)(iv) of the Rule. The Act has been enacted with the avowed object of providing for the consolidation of agricultural holding in Uttar Pradesh for the development of agriculture, and to achieve that objective, the Act aims to allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to a tenure holder so that large scale cultivation may pursued with its attending advantages. In my opinion, it would be a set back to overall development of the agriculture, if tenure holders are not provided with the factility of Chak Road to enable them to have access to their Chaks. It is unnecessary to emphasise the importance of Chak roads in rural areas. Suffice it to say that proper development and growth of agro-industrial activities are not feasible in absence of proper facility of transportation of agro-industrial goods produced by farmers. It is, no doubt, true that on a conjoint reading of Sections 9 and 9B of the Act, one may come to the conclusion that if no objection is filed against the statement of principles under Section 9 and the Consolidation Officer, does not suo motu make any modification or alteration in the statement of principles, the same would become final as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 9B, but the finality so given to the statement of principles is qualified with the expression "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, "occurring in sub-sec. (3) of S. 9B. A conspectus of Ss. 19(1)(d), 19A and 20(3) read with Rules 46(1A) and 47(3) of the Rules would indicate that the tenure holders may file objection in respect of location of any Chak road shown in the statement of principles and may also claim for chak Roads not already provided for. These provisions and Section 48 of the Act provide "otherwise" within the meaning of Section 9B(3) of the Act. The purpose of explicitly stating the land earmarked for public purpose including chak road etc. in the provisional consolidation scheme drawn in C.H. form 23 and if its publication is intended to enable the tenure holders to know, inter alia, whether the Chaks allotted to them, have the facility of Chak fyoad and water channels etc. and to file objection if necessary, under Section 20(3) of the Act. The finality of statement of principles under Section 9B(3) is subject to the condition that there is no provision "otherwise" in the Act. The provision discussed above, in my opinion, provide for 'otherwise' and therefore the submission that a tenure holder cannot make a claim in his objections, appeal or revision arising out of Section 20 proceeding for a Chak Road not already provided for in the statement of principle, cannot be counternanced. In fact, it is on publication of the provisional consolidation scheme under Section 20 of the Act that a tenure holder comes to know for the first time the actual location of the Chaks allotted to him as also the location of Chak road and water channel and, therefore, it is at this stage, that he gets an effective opportunity to file objections in respect of availability or otherwise of the facility of the Chak and water channel. If such facilities are not available vis-a-vis the chak allotted to a tenure holder, he will have every right to file an objection under Section 20 of the Act claiming for the facility of chak road and water channel and consolidation officer and thereafter, the settlement officer, consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation, shall be well within their jurisdiction to allow the claim for chak road or water channel even in proceedings arising out of Section 20 of the Act whereupon provisional consolidation scheme shall stand amended accordingly. The submission of the counsel is liable to be rejected, yet on another ground i.e. doctrine of 'implied power'. The power to provide chak roads and water channels at the behest of a tenure holder in proceeding under Section 20 of the Act is impliedly conferred upon the consolidation Authorities to be exercised, in furtherance of the objects of the Act, as a power ancillary or incidental to main power that is to say, the power to allot chaks and earmark land for public purposes under Section 9 A read with Section 9B of the Act. In Rajpati Tewari v.
Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1981 AWC 833 : (1982 All LJ 59) K. P. Singh, J.
held as under:--
"..... It is not correct to contend that the Consolidation Authorities have no jurisdiction to allot a chak road to an individual tenure holder ..... The purposes of the U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act is to allot compact area to individual tenure holders. Even if there are no provisions under the Act to to provide road to an individual tenure holder, incidental powers of providing Chak Road, and palh etc. to an individual tenure holder, is inherent in the Consolidation Authorities. If they are debarred from providing a Chak Road to an individual tenure holder, more harm is likely to occur than they may have jurisdiction to provide such roads to an individual tenure holder .... in my opinion, it is a necessary power in the Consolidation authorities to provide a path road etc. to a tenure holder with a view to carry out the purpose of the Act."
5. In Rishi Narain v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1983 RD 22: (1982 All LJ 494) the same learned Judge after quoting the afore-extracted passage from Rajpati Tiwari (supra), has held as under :
"According to me, unless there are prohibitions for not allotting road, path and Nali etc. to a tenure holder, the Consolidation authorities have inherent jurisdiction to allot same to an individual tenure holder with a view to carry out the purpose of the Act."
I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in Rajpati Tiwari and Rishi Narain (supra).
6. Sri Sankatha Rai, vehemently relied on decisions in Ram Murat v. Mata Saran, 1982 A WC 160 : (1982 All LJ 394) and in Sri Pat v. Haridwar, 1980 AWC 146. In the first case, K. N. Mishra, J. held that application of an individual tenure holder wherein he prayed for providing Rasta to Chak of his father from village Abadi, was not at all maintainable nor such request could be considered by the Asstt. Settlement Officer, Consolidation in exercise of his powers under Section 42 A of the Act. In the second case, R. S. Singh, J. held that no provision has been pointed out under the Act or the Rules framed under the Act for providing a Rasta and Nali to a private tenure holder. In the absence of any specific provision under the Act or the Rules framed under the Act for anything to be done by any authority, nothing can be done by the Dy. Director of Consolidation in exercise of his powers under Section 40(3) of the Act. In this view of the matter, the application of the petitioner for providing Rasta and Nali from one Chak to the other where he had got his pumping set was not maintainable."
7. This conclusion ws arrived at by R. S. Singh, J. on the assumption that "the provisions for providing Rasta and Nali A (Gool) is provided in Section 8 A of the Act read with Rule 24A of the Rules framed under the Act, "at the stage of the preparation of statement of principles and in case of unit in relations is which a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 has been issued before the commencement of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1970, the Collector has been given the power to provide Chak Roads and Chak Cools, if he is of opinion that there exists no provision or inadequate provision of Chak Roads or Chak Gools in the unit. But these provisions, according to the learned Judge, "are applicable in the case of village path or Nali (Gool) for public purposes."
8. In my opinion, wherever, Chak Road or Chak Gool is provided, keeping in view the problems of individual tenure holders, such provision subserves public purpose as well besides serving the purpose of individual tenure holders. Chak Roads or Chak Gool so provided does not cease to subserve public purpose merely because it has been provided on consideration of application filed by the individual tenure holder vis-a-vis his difficul-
ties. As discussed above the object of advancement of Agriculture would be frustrated if the tenure holders are not given proper and adequate facilities of Chak roads and Chak gools. Both the decisions aforesaid have been considered by K. P. Singh, J. in Rishi Narain (supra). The decisions in the aforesaid two cases relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner, are in my opinion, per incuriam having been rendered without discussing the related provisions discussed hereinbefore. The decisions rendered in ignorance of the relevant statutory provisions are cited but to be avoided and ignored on the doctrine of per incuriam as explained by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. M/ s. Synthetic & Chemical Ltd., TT 1991 (3) 268. That apart, a decision being abstraction of the principle from the facts and arguments of the case what is quotable as binding authority is the principle upon which the case was decided; In the words of Sri George Jessal in Asborne v. Rowlatt, (1980) 3 Ch D 774 at p. 714, the only thing which makes a decision binding as an authority upon subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. In this regard, Lord Halsbury's dicta in Quinn v. Leatham, (1981 AC 495 at p. 506) may also be usefully quoted as under:
"..... every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides."
In Reg. v. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Khawaja, 1984 AC 74 (HL) it was said at page 84 -