JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri Arvind Srivastava learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Mukesh Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 and the learned standing counsel. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, by consent of parties the writ petition is being finally decided.
2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 15.12.2004 passed by the respondent No. 1 by which preliminary objections raised against the maintainability of the revision were rejected. The delay in filing the revision by the respondent No. 4 was condoned. Brief facts necessary for deciding the controversy raised in this writ petition are:
The petitioner was granted a mining lease under Chapter II of the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession ) Rules, 1963 ( hereinafter referred to "1963 Rules") in the year 1997 for a period of three years. The renewal for a further period of three years was granted by the order dated 18.2.2000. Another application for renewal of the mining lease was given by the petitioner under Rule 6A of 1963 Rules. The District Magistrate by an order dated 24.11.2003 renewed the lease in favour of the petitioner for a period of three years. A writ petition No. 20846 of 2004 Santosh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. had been filed challenging the renewal of the lease dated 24.11.2003 which writ petition is pending consideration. The respondent No. 4 filed revision under Rule 78 of 1963 Rules before the State Government praying for setting aside the order of the District Magistrate renewing and registering the mining lease in favour of the petitioner. On the revision filed by the respondent No. 4 notices were issued to the petitioner. The revision was filed by the petitioner on 4.6.2004. The petitioner appeared in the revision and raised objection regarding maintainability of the revision. Petitioner raised objections before the revisional authority that the revision is barred by time having not been filed within ninety days from the date of order of the District Magistrate, the same is liable to be dismissed as barred by time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable while hearing the revision under Rule 78 and there being no power of condonation of delay , the revision was liable to be rejected. It was further contended that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order of the District Magistrate renewing the lease in favour of the petitioner. The revision being not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay, the revisional authority could not have condoned the delay in filing the revision. There was no illegality in the renewal of mining lease of the petitioner. The revisional authority without applying its mind to the facts of the case illegally condoned the delay in filing the revision.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court (1996) 9 SCC 414 Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition ) and Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal and Ors. and (2004) 4 Supreme Court Cases 252 Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar.
4. Sri Mukesh Prasad learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 refuting the submission of the counsel for the petitioner contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fully applicable under Rule 78 of the 1963 Rules. The revisional court had jurisdiction to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is further contended that there was no requirement of filing of any formal application for condonation of delay. The respondent No. 4 had locus standi to challenge the renewal of the lease in favour of the petitioner. Sri Mukesh Prasad placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court; (2000) 5 Supreme Court Cases 355 P. Sarthy v. State Bank of India; 2000 (6) Supreme Court Cases 94 Essar Constructions v. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy and 1981 All. L. J. 641 Shiv Charan Sharma v. Union of India and Ors.
5. I have considered the submissions of both the parties and perused the record.
6. The impugned order has been passed by the State Government on a revision filed by the respondent No. 4 under Rule 78 of 1963 Rules. In the impugned order it has been observed by the revisional authority that the revision has been filed with some delay and looking to the facts of the case it is in the interest of justice that the delay in filing the revision be condoned. It has also been observed in the impugned order that the State Government has also jurisdiction to examine the order of the District Magistrate suo moto. The State Government further observed that the revision filed by the respondent No. 4 is maintainable and directed for hearing of the revision on merits.
7. The first question which has arisen for determination is as to whether the revisional authority while hearing the revision filed under Rule 78 of 1963 Rules has jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the revision. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no power under Rule 78 to condone the delay in filing the revision since the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable while hearing the revision under Rule 78. Before proceeding further to examine the contention it is relevant to consider the provisions of the Limitation Act and the provisions of the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession ) Rules, 1963.
8. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that subject to provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitgation has not been set up as a defence. Section 4 provides that where the prescribed period of any suit, appeal or applcition expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Section 5 of the Limitation Act which is relevant in the present case is extracted below :-
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases,_______ Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prscribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation,_________ The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
9. From the perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is clear that any appeal or any application, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed period of limitation for institution of suit, appeal or application in a court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act as noted above clearly indicate that the extension of period shall be allowed when the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause.
10. The provisions of the limitation Act can also be made applicable in any other proceedings by specifically providing under the statute about the application of limitation Act. Even where the limitation Act is not strictly applied the principle contained under the Limitation Act are adopted by various statutes.
11. The question arose as to whether the provisions of the Limitation, 1963 are applicable for filing a revision under Section 10(3) (b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1947. In (1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 22 The Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P. Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur the appeal was filed before the apex Court against the Full Bench judgment of this Court. The majority view of this Court was that time spent in prosecuting the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeal in default, can be excluded for filing the revision by application of principle underlying Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. Minority view of this Court was that the Judge Revision Sales Tax while hearing the revision under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act does not act as a court but only as a revisional Tribunal hence the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act may not apply to proceedings before him. The apex Court held that the appellate authority and Judge Revision Sales Tax are not courts hence Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply. Following was held in paragraphs 8 and 9 :-
"8. Mr. Karkhanis is right that this matter is no longer res integra. In Shrimati Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621 ) Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was ) speaking for the Court, observed :
The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State. They are not a part of the Legislature, nor are they a part of the Judiciary. Their functions are the assessment and collection of taxes and in the process of assessing taxes, they follow a pattern of action which is considered judicial. They are not thereby converted into courts of civil judicature. They still remain the instrumentalities of the State and are within the definition of "State" in Article 12.
9. The above observations were quoted with approval by this Court in Jagannath Prasad's case (supra) , and it was held that a Sales Tax Officer under U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 was not a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure although he is required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions. The decision in Jagannath Prasad's case, it seems, was not brought to the notice of the High Court. In view of these pronouncements of this Court, there is no room for argument that the appellate authority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax exercising jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, are "courts". They are merely administrative tribunals and "not courts". Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore, does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such tribunals."
12. The apex Court while considering the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 again took the view that the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer has no power to condone the delay in making application for reference since they act as statutory authority and not as a court for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Following was held in Paragraph 19 :-
"19. The case in point is Purshottam Das Hussaram v. Impex (India) Ltd. (supra) . In this Bombay case, the question was, whether the suit was barred by limitation. It was not disputed that Article 115 of the Limitation Act governed the limitation and if no other factor was to be taken into consideration, the suit was filed beyond time. But what was relied upon by the plaintiff for the purpose of saving limitation was the fact that there was certain infructuous arbitration proceedings and if the time taken in prosecuting those proceedings was excluded under Section 14, the should would be within limitation. It was held that if Section 14 were to be construed strictly, the plaintiff would not be entitled to exclude the period in question."
13. The recent judgment of the apex Court in (2004) 4 Supreme Court Cases 252 Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar had considered the provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. It was held by the apex Court that in an application under Section 8 of the Act the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. The apex Court also held that the Act is a self contained Code and in various provisions of the Act specially the provisions for appeal Section 5 Limitation Act was made applicable. The non mention of applicability of Section 5 in an application under Section 8 claiming right of pre emption indicate that Section 5 is not applicable in Section 8 proceedings. Following was laid down in paragraph 7:-
"7. .............................. Even otherwise, in our view, the position as regards the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under Section 8 of the Act does not get altered. As already stated above, the Act is a self-contained code inasmuch as the Act provides to enforce the rights of pre-emption, forum is provided, procedure is prescribed, remedies including the appeals and revisions are provided, penalties are indicated for non-compliance with the orders and powers are given for restoration of land. Further period of limitation is also specifically prescribed to make an application under Section 8 of the Act and for preferring appeals or revisions under the provisions of the Act. All these and a few other provisions are clear enough to indicate that the Act is a complete code in itself dealing with the rights of pre-emption. The second proviso to Section 14-H specifically provides for the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of preferring an appeal or revision. Section 14-O (1) specifically enables the Appellate Authority to allow to prefer an appeal even after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed on showing sufficient cause. Similarly , the second proviso to Section 19(2) of the Act expressly provides for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal to be preferred under the said section. Section 51A of the Act deals with preparation and revision of record of rights. Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Act provides that every appeal under Section 51-A of the Act is to be filed within one month from the date of passing of the order appealed against. The proviso to the said Rule stastes that an appeal may be admitted after the said period if the appellant satisfies that he had sufficient reasons for not preferring the appeal within the said period. Thus either Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles have been expressly and specifically incorporated in the various sections aforementioned. In contrast, although Section 8 of the Act prescribes the period of limitation for applying to enforce preemption rights, it does not speak of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles. If in the same Act, consciously and expressly, the legislature has made provision for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles expressly and specifically to other proceedings such as appeal or revision etc. and such a provision is not made for limitation of the proceedings under Section 8 of the act, it necessarily follows that the legislature did not intend to give benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act having regard to the nature of right of pre-emption which is considered a weak right."
14. Coming to the provisions of U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession ) Rules, 1963, the provisions for filing an appeal is provided under Rule 77 and for filign revision is provided under Rule 78. Rule 78 of the Rules is quoted below :-
"78. Revisions, _______ The State Government may either suo moto at any time or on an application made within ninety days from the date of communication of the order, call for an examination of the record relating to any order passed proceeding taken by the District Officer Committee, Director or the Divisional Commissioner under these rules and pass such orders as it may think fit."
15. At this juncture it is also relevant to note Rule 6-A which provides for making an application for renewal of mining lease :-
"6-A. Application fee etc. for renewal of mining lease, _________ (1) An application for renewal of mining lease may be made at least six months before the date of expiry of the mining lease along with four codes of the map of lease hold area showing clearly the area applied for renewal and the provisions of Clause (a) and (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 shall mutatis mutantis apply.
(2) The State Government may condone the delay caused in making the application for renewal of mining lease after the period specified in Sub-rule (1)."
16. The U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession ) Rules, 1963 has been framed in exercise of power under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals ( Regulation and Development ) Act, 1957. From the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 there is no indication that the State Government while hearing revision acts as a court. The State Government while hearing revision under Rule 78 is an statutory authority to hear the revision and does not act as court.
17. At this stage it is also necessary to consider the judgment of the apex Court in P. Sarthy v. State Bank of India (supra) as relied by the counsel for the respondents. In P. Sarthv v. State Bank of India (supra) the apex Court held that any authority or tribunal having the trappings of the court would be a court within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act. Paragraph 12 of the judgment is quoted below :-
12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a "civil court" but speaks only of a "court". It is not necessary that the court spoken of in Section 14 should be a "civil court". Any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court would be a "court" within the meaning of this section."
18. The apex Court in the said judgment had considered Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Rules, 1948 framed under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. After considering the provisions of the said Rules the apex Court held that any authority or Tribunal having the trappings of the court would be a court. In UP. Minor Minerals (Concession ) Rules, 1963 there is no indication that the State Government while hearing the revision acts as an authority or tribunal which have trappings of the court.
19. The State Government while hearing a revision under Rule 78 cannot be held a court nor it can be said that it has trappings of the court while deciding a revision. In this view of the matter Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable ipso facto unless the Limitation Act or any provisions of the Limitation Act is specifically applied. To the contrary under the rules there are provisions in which power to condone the delay in making an application has been specifically provided. As noted above, Rule 6-A (2) specifically empowers the State Government to condone the delay in making application for renewal of the mining lease after the period specified under Sub-rule (1). No such provisions have been made under Rule 78 on which it can be safely inferred that the State Legislature intend applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act under Rule 78 of the Rules.
20. It is further relevant to note that under Rule 78 the State Government has suo moto power to call for and examine the record relating to any order passed, proceedings taken by the district Officer. In appropriate case the State Government can initiate suo moto proceedings. Although in the order impugned in this writ petition it has been observed by the State Government that the State Government has also suo moto power to examine the order of the District Magistrate but from the order it does not appear that the State Government has actually decided to exercise its suo moto power. It is open to the State Government to initiate suo moto proceedings in the event it so decides. It has also been contended by the counsel for the respondents that in fact there is no delay in the revision. The respondent No. 4 had applied for copy of the order which was not made available. It has been stated that the respondent No. 4 having not received copy of the order applied for copy of registered lease which was given on 11.5.2004. On the above submission it cannot be held that the revision application filed by the petitioner was within the period of limitation as prescribed under Rule 78. It is not the case of the petitioner that the order passed by the District Magistrate was ever communicated to the petitioner.
21. From the above discussion it is found that there is no power of condonation of delay under Rule 78 hence the order passed by the State Government condoning the delay in filing the revision by the respondent No. 4 cannot be sustained. In view of this it is not necessary to consider other submissions raised by the counsel for the petitioner. As observed above, it is open to the State Government to exercise its suo moto power. In the result the order of the State Government passed in the revision dated 15.12.2004 condoning the delay in filing the revision and entertaining the revision, is set aside. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Parties shall bear their own costs.