1. Heard Sri P.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants in First Appeal Nos. 757 of 2012 and 749 of 2012 and Sri Ashwani Kumar Srivastava, holding brief of Sri M.D. Singh 'Shekhar', learned counsel for the appellants in connected First Appeal No. 576 of 2008, Sri Shivam Yadav and Sri Amit Manohar, learned counsels for NOIDA.
2. Undisputed facts are that First Appeal Nos. 757 and 749 both of 2012 arose from a common judgment dated 28.09.2002 in Land Acquisition Reference Nos. 509, 510 and 511 all of 1991 passed by the Court of District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar. First Appeal No. 576 of 2008 arise from the judgment dated 15.11.1988 passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in Land Acquisition Reference No. 149 of 1985.
3. By notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred as the 'Act') made on 14.03.1980 certain land of village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar was acquired. Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 21.03.1980. Possession was taken on 02.05.1980. Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 17.03.1982 offering compensation @ Rs. 4.13 per square yard (equivalent to Rs. 12,497.74 per bigha). Before the reference court the claimants-appellants have claimed compensation @ Rs. 40/- per square yard, however, by the impugned judgments the reference court awarded compensation @ Rs.63,525/- per bigha which is about Rs. 21/- per square yard.
4. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgments of the reference court, the above noted first appeals have been filed by the claimants.
Submissions of Appellants:
5. Learned counsels for the appellants submit that the controversy involved in these appeals is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in the case of Genda and others Vs. State of U.P. (First Appeal No. 1228 of 1990 decided on 16.02.2015) whereby the High Court has determined market value of the similar acquired land under the same acquisition @ Rs. 297/- per square yard and therefore, the claimants-appellants are also entitled for compensation at the same rate. The judgment in the case of Genda and others (supra) is reproduced below:
"Heard Sri S.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Sri Shivam Yadav, learned Counsel for the respondent-authority, and learned Standing Counsel.
This first appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 15.11.1988 passed by the District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar in Land Acquisition Reference No. 154 of 1985, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the "Act").
In the present case, the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 14th March, 1980 for acquisition of the land situated in Village Chhalera Khadar, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad for New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA), followed by declaration under Section 6 of the Act, and possession was taken on 12th May, 1980. The Special Land Acquisition Officer gave an award dated 17th March, 1982 in respect of the entire acquired land at the rate of Rs. 17,676.36/- per bigha which works out to about Rs.8/- per square yard. On reference, the District Judge, Ghaziabad vide impugned judgement and order dated 15th November, 1988 has enhanced the rate of compensation from Rs. 8/- to Rs.10/- per square yard, which comes to Rs. 18,475/- per bigha. Dissatisfied with the order of the Court of Reference, this appeal has been filed.
Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that in respect of the land of adjoining villages Nagla Charandas, Chhalera Bangar, Geha Tilapatabagh and Bhangel Begumpur, with regard to which notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued sometimes in 1982, 1983, 1986 and 1988, the rate of compensation, as awarded by the Court of Reference, has been enhanced by this Court in the appeals to Rs.297/- per square yard. Therefore, in the present appeal also which is in respect of the land of Village Chhalera Khadar, adjoining to the aforesaid four village, similar rate of compensation may also be awarded. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 564 of 1997 (Khazam and others v. State of U.P.), decided on 11th October, 2012.
Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that in similar appeal for the same land acquisition reference, order has been passed by another Bench of this Court dated 24.7.2014 passed in first appeal no. 326 of 2009, photocopy of which has been produced, which is taken on record.
Learned Counsel for the respondents do not dispute the said fact.
From the judgement of the Court of Reference, we find that Village Chhalera Khadar is adjacent to Village Chhalera Bangar. The Court of reference has recorded in the order that "Village Chhalera Bangar is just adjacent to village Chhalera khadar.".
Relevant portion of the order of the Division Bench in Khazan and others (supra) reads as under:
"Most of the first appeals and cross appeals are related to the enhancement of compensation in respect of village Bhangel Begumpur. In one of such cases, i.e. First Appeal No. 1056 of 1999 (Raghuraj Singh & others Vs. State of U.P. & others), the Division Bench of this Court held that the compensation will be enhanced upto Rs.297/-per square yard. The Division Bench following the principle laid down in the earlier order of a Division Bench order presided over by one of us (Amitava Lala, J), has passed an order of enhancement of compensation reported in 2008 (1) ADJ, 253 (D.B.) (Jagdish Chandra & others Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development).
According to us, since the compensation has already been enhanced and no such challenge has been found with regard to such enhancement, we are of the view that similar compensation would be paid to the appellants whose cases are pending before this Court in relation to same village.
The cases before us which relates to village Bhangel Begumpur notifications were issued in the years, 1983, 1986 and 1988 and possession was also taken in the years, 1983, 1987 and 1989 So far as other three villages Nagla Charandas, Geha Tilapatabagh and Chhalera Bangar, notifications were issued in the years 1982, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1992 and possession was also taken in the years, 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1995 and the compensation was determined and ultimately under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994 by the Reference Court in the year, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2010 All the four villages are adjacent to each other. The Reference Court ultimately granted similar relief in respect of the matter of Raghuraj Singh (supra). Hence we quantify the rate of compensation as above, the same will be paid following the directions as we have given in the case of Raghuraj Singh (supra).
At the time of reversal of the decree, the Reference Court will take into account the deficiency in court fee, if any and pass an appropriate order at the time of final order."
Same rate of compensation has also been awarded by another Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal Defective No. 773 of 2000 (Mahaveer v. The Chairman, Industrial Development Authorities & others), First Appeal No. 814 of 2005 (Jagram v. The Chairman, Industrial Development Authorities & others), and First Appeal No. 385 of 2006 (Mangat Ram v. The Chairman, Industrial Development Authorities and others)First Appeal No. 1056 of 1990 (Raghuraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others) dated 19th May, 2010, and Khazan and others (supra). In all these first appeals, the notifications were issued in the year 1983, 1986 and 1988 and the possession was also taken in the year 1983, 1987 and 1989. The operative portion of the order of the Division Bench dated 13th March, 2014 passed in First Appeal Defective No. 773 of 2000, which is relevant for the present first appeal, reads as under:
"Thus the Division Bench affirmed the rate of Rs.297 per sq. yard to be awarded as market value of the land acquired in respect of village Nagla Charandas. The market value of the land for the purpose of computing the compensation to be paid to the claimants in respect of village Nagla Charandas having been determined as Rs.297/- per sq. yard, the same is also liable to be paid in the case of appellant-claimant in these appeals along with other statutory dues and we see no reason to take a different view in this matter, particularly when the notifications in the present cases are very proximate to that in the case of Raghuraj Singh (Supra).
Accordingly, the present appeal stands allowed and the appellants are held entitled for payment of compensation @ Rs.297/- per sq. yard along with 30% solatium, interest and other Statutory benefits as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."
Accordingly, this first appeal stands allowed in terms of the order extracted herein-above.
No order as to costs."
Submissions of Respondents:
6. Learned counsels for respondent-Noida submit that the aforesaid judgment is without consideration to the law settled by Hon'ble SupremeCourt in various judgments with respect to the applicable unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act which provides for admissibility of maximum compensation as has been claimed before the Special Land Acquisition Officer pursuant to notice under Section 9 of the Act. They further submit that the compensation of Rs. 297/- per square yard was determined with respect to land of some other villages which were acquired in the year 1989 or 1990 and therefore, the same rate of compensation cannot be applied with respect to the acquired land.
Discussion:
7. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. With great respect, I find myself in disagreement with the judgment of Hon'ble Single Judge in the case of Genda and others (supra) for the reasons being stated below.
8. Undisputedly the land in question was acquired by notification under Section 4 of the Act published on 14.03.1980 followed by notification under Section 6 of the Act published on 21.03.1980. Possession was taken on 12.05.1980. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 17.03.1982. Thus at the time acquisition and till passing of the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act were applicable. The provisions of Section 25 of the Act as it existed prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984 and Section 25 as amended by the aforesaid amending Act are reproduced below:
Section 25, prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984:
"25. Rules as to amount of Compensation- (1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11.
(2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector.
(3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than, and may exceed the amount awarded by the Collector."
Section 25 after the amendment:-
"Section 25. Amount of compensation by Court not be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector:- The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11."
9. The facts as extracted above, leaves no manner of doubt that unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act are applicable on the facts of the present case. The said unamended provision was also applicable in the case of Genda and others (supra) as evident from the facts noted in the said judgment itself. However, it appears that the said provision was not brought to the notice of the Court.
10. The law with respect to the applicability of the unamended provision of Section 25 of the Act has been well settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer-cum-DSWO, A.P. Vs. B.V. Reddy and Sons (2002) 3 SCC 463 (Paras 5, 6 & 8) as under:
5. When these appeals had been listed before a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court, the decision of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 2000 (7) SCC 756, had been placed before the Bench and it was contended that since the award in the case in hand is between 30th of September, 1982 and 24th of September, 1984, the compensation could be awarded under the amended provisions of Section 25. Since that decision prima facie supported the contention of the claimants-respondents and the Bench was of the view that the said decision requires re-consideration, the matter had been referred to a Bench of three learned Judges and that is how the matter has been placed before us. On the rival submissions made by the counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for our consideration:
(1) Can the provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act be construed to be procedural in nature or is substantive?
(2) If it is held to be substantive in nature, then can the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act would apply to a case where the award of the Land Acquisition Collector had been made much prior to the amendment in question?
(3) Whether the Judgment of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti's case can be held to be correctly decided?
(4) Whether at all it would be appropriate for this Court to lay down the law and yet not to interfere with the judgment of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded?
(5) Whether the petition under Article 32 can be entertained for deciding the validity of un-amended provisions of Section 25?
So far as the first question is concerned, on a plain reading of the same, it is difficult for us to hold that it is procedural in nature. On the other hand, it unequivocally limits the power of the Court on a reference being made to award compensation, more than the amount claimed by the claimants and less than the amount awarded by the Collector. In other words, the substantive right of a claimant who has made a claim to the compensation, pursuant to a notice under Section 9, cannot be more than the amount claimed and under any circumstances, would not be less than the amount which the Land Acquisition Collector has awarded under Section 11, since that award of the Collector is the offer that is made to the claimant. In course of the arguments, Mr. Rao, the learned counsel for the claimants submitted before us that sub-section (5) of Section 25, as it stood prior to its amendment gives sufficient power to the reference Court to entertain a claim if the claimant had omitted to make such claim pursuant to notice issued under Section 9 and determine the compensation on that. Consequently, Mr. Rao contends that there should not be any embargo on the power of the Court even if the claimant makes a claim pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9. We are unable to accept this submission inasmuch as sub-section (5) of Section 25 contemplates a situation where the claimant for sufficient reason had omitted to make a claim and the reference Court on being satisfied about the same may permit the claimant to make a claim. But the unambiguous and clear language of sub-section (1) of Section 25, as it stood prior to the amendment, makes it explicitly clear that if the claimant has made a claim pursuant to a notice under Section 9, then the Court would be incompetent to award any amount exceeding the said claim. In our considered opinion, sub-section (5) of Section 25 will be of no assistance to the claimants-respondents in the present case. Incidently, we may deal with the submission of Mr. Rao that the amount claimed was by the lawyer and not by the claimant himself and therefore, cannot be held to be claim by the claimants, pursuant to notice under Section 9 of the Act. On examining the records of the case, we do not find any justification to entertain this submission, inasmuch even in the application made for reference under Section 18, the claimant had not taken such a stand. It would, therefore, be futile for us to entertain this contention and hold that the claim made by the claimants through his lawyer cannot be held to be a claim by the claimants. This Court in the very case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 2000(7) SCC 756, on which the learned counsel for the respondents had placed reliance, considered the provisions of Section 25 and held that the said provision can never be held to be procedural and it is substantive in nature. We approve of the said conclusion and hold that the provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act is substantive in nature.
6. Coming to the second question, it is a well settled principle of construction that a substantive provision cannot be retrospective in nature unless the provision itself indicates the same. The amended provision of Section 25 nowhere indicates that the same would have any retrospective effect. Consequently, therefore, it would apply to all acquisitions made subsequent to 24.9.84, the date on which Act 68/1984 came into force. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill of 1982 was introduced in Parliament on 30th of April, 1982 and came into operation with effect from 24th of September, 1984. Under the amendment in question, the provisions of Section 23(2) dealing with solatium was amended and Section 30(2) of the amended Act provided that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Principal Act as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act, after the 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Act. It is because of the aforesaid provision, the question cropped up as to whether in respect of an award passed by the Collector between the two dates, the amended provision will have an application or not and that question has been answered by this Court in the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India and anr. Vs. Raghubir Singh, 1989(2) S.C.C. 754. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 has at all no reference to the provisions of Section 25 of the Act. In that view of the matter, question of applicability of the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act to an award of the Collector made earlier to the amendment and the matter was pending in appeal, does not arise. In our considered opinion, the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, not being retrospective in nature, the case in hand would be governed by the unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act."
8. Coming to the next question as to whether this Court would interfere with the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court or not, the answer would depend on the provision of law which was under consideration and whether there was any ambiguity in the law which is being decided for the first time. It is no doubt true that in Teherakhatoon vs. Salambin Mohammad, 1999(2) S.C.C. 635, this Court has held that even if the special leave has been granted under Article 136, unless and until, it is shown that a substantial and grave injustice will be caused if no interference is made out, the Court may refuse to interfere with the judgment under challenge. This principle would mainly depend upon the facts of each case which comes up for decision before the Court. To the case in hand, it is difficult for us to apply the aforesaid principle. On the date the land was notified for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Act, the un-amended provision of Section 25 was in force and it was made known to all concerned that the reference Court will have no power to award the amount in excess of the amount claimed by the claimants. Not only the language of the Statute was clear and unambiguous, but also the question was not res- integra, in view of the decision of this Court in Dadoo Yogendrenath Singh vs. The Collector, AIR 1977 SC 1128. Until the statutory rigour contained in sub-section (1) of Section 25 stood obliterated by the amended provisions of Section 25 and until all restraints and embargoes placed for the Court stood totally liberated, the reference Court had no jurisdiction to award the amount in excess of the amount claimed by the claimant. Such being the position of law, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Rao to hold that it would not be in the interest of justice to interfere with the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In our considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction on the law as it stood, to award any amount in excess of the amount claimed and in the case in hand in excess of Rs.30,000/- per acre and, therefore, the principles enunciated in the decision of this Court in Teherakhatoon vs. Salambin Mohammad, 1999(2) S.C.C. 635, cannot be applied to the case in hand.
(Emphasis supplied by me)
11. Similar view has also been taken by me in a recent judgment dated 13.12.2016 in First Appeal No. 690 of 1994 (Horam Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. And another)
12. Thus, in my opinion in view of unamended provision of Section 25 of the Act as it stood till amendment by Act 68 of 1984, this Court has no jurisdiction in law to award any amount in excess of the amount claimed by the appellants before the Special Land Acquisition Officer pursuant to a notice under Section 9 of the Act.
13. The other point on which I respectfully disagree with the judgment in the case of Genda and others (supra) is that for the acquisition in question dated 14.03.1980 it relied the Division Bench judgment dated 11.10.2012 in First Appeal No. 564 of 1997 (Khazan Vs. State of U.P.) wherein the market value determined by another Division Bench in the case of Raghuraj Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. And Another (First Appeal No. 1056 of 1999) @ Rs. 297/- per square yard was followed. The judgment in the case of Raghuraj Singh (supra) was with respect to land of another village acquired by notification dated 24.03.1988. The acquisition involved in Khazan case (supra) was of lands of a different village acquired thrice in the year 1983, 1986 and 1988. As per provision of Section 23 of the Act and the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments, the first principle is that market value of acquired land shall be determined as prevailing on the date of publication of acquisition notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.
14. In the case of Bhupal Singh and others Vs. State of Haryana (2015) 5 SCC 801 Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically considered similar question of determination of market value under Section 23 of the Act and held that fair market value of the acquired land is required to be determined on the basis of market rate of the adjacent lands similarly situated to the acquired lands prevailing on the date of acquisition or/ and prior to acquisition but not subsequent to the date of acquisition. Para 27 of the judgment in the case of Bhupal Singh and others (supra) is reproduced below:
"27. As rightly argued by learned counsel for the respondent, the fair market value of the acquired land is required to be determined under Section 23 of the Act on the basis of the market rate of the adjacent lands similarly situated to the acquired lands prevailing on the date of acquisition or/and prior to acquisition but not subsequent to the date of acquisition. In appropriate cases, addition of 10% per annum escalation in the prices specified in the sale deeds (if filed and relied on) in relation to adjacent similarly situated lands for fixing the market value of the acquired land may be permitted. Such is, however, not the case in hand. Here is the case where firstly, no sale deeds were filed by the appellants to prove the fair market value of the acquired land and secondly, what they now want this Court to do is to take into consideration the rate of those lands which were acquired ten years after the date of acquisition in question and then reduce the value of such land by 10% every year so as to determine the fair market value of the acquired land in question. In our view, such procedure for determination is not provided in the Act."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
15. In the case of Union of India and another Vs. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. Etc. (1989) 2 SCC 754 (para-33), Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 23 and Section 11 of the Act and and held as under:
"33. We find substance in the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, as he says, the terms in which Section 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of Section 30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium. The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior Courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory enhancement. It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1), and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium. Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on that date, and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
16. In the case of of Ashok Kumar and another Vs. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 544 (Para-12), Hon'ble Supreme Court considered situation of two acquired lands and held as under:
"In the case of the appellants herein, it is an admitted position that the properties do not abut the national highway. Admittedly, it is situated about 375 yards away from the national highway and it appears that there is only the narrow Nahan Kothi Road connecting the properties of the appellants to the national highway. Therefore, it will not be just and proper to award land value of Rs.250/- per square yard, which is granted to the property in adjoining village. Having regard to the factual and legal position obtained above, we are of the considered view that the just and fair compensation in the case of appellants would be Rs.200/- per square yard."
17. In view of provision of Section 23 of the Act and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhupal Singh (supra) and Raghubir Singh (supra), the market value of the acquired land in the present set of facts; cannot be determined at the rate of compensation determined in the case of Khajan and others (supra) and Raghuraj Singh and others (supra).
18. In the case of State of Orrisa Vs. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 (para-55), Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the law that pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted." Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. While laying down the above noted principles Hon'ble Supreme Court also referred to the judgments in the case of Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195 (PC), Trojan and Co. Vs. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235, Ishwar Dutt Vs. Collector (LA), 2005 (7) SCC 190 and State of Maharashtra Vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., 2010 (4) SCC 518.
19. In view of the above discussion, the market value of the acquired land has to be determined as on the date of acquisition, i.e. 14.03.1980. Even the High Court cannot determine the market value ignoring the principles of determination as provided in Section 23(1) of the Act. High Court can enhance the compensation but the enhancement must be within the four corners of provision of Section 23 of the Act and based on evidences on record.
20. For the reasons stated above, matter is referred to a larger Bench on the following questions:
(i) Whether in view of the applicable unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, this Court has jurisdiction to award compensation in excess of the amount claimed by the appellants pursuant to notice under Section 9 of the Act?
(ii) Whether market value determined in another case with respect to land of the same or a different village acquired under a much subsequent acquisition notification under Section 4 of the Act entitles in law to a claimant/ tenure holder for compensation at the same rate whose land was acquired several years ago?
(iii) Whether the judgment in the case of Genda and others Vs. State of U.P. in First Appeal No.1228 of 1990 decided on 16.02.2015 and judgment dated 11.03.2015 in First Appeal Defective No. 198 of 1989 (Basanta and another Vs. State of U.P. Through Collector, Ghaziabad are in conflict with the provisions of Section 23 and 25 of the Act and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Land Acquisition Officer-cum-DSWO, A.P. Vs. B.V. Reddy and Sons (2002) 3 SCC 463 (paras 4, 5, 6 & 8), Bhupal Singh and others Vs. State of Haryana (2015) 5 SCC 801 (para 27), Union of India and another Vs. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. Etc. (1989) 2 SCC 754 (para 33).
21. Let records of these first appeals be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench of appropriate strength for authoritative pronouncement on the questions framed above.
22. Lower court record be summoned within two weeks.
23. As jointly prayed, parties may file paper book within two weeks thereafter.
Order Date :- 16.12.2016/IrfanUddin