JUDGMENT Poonam Srivastava, J.
1. Heard Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla and Sri J.C. Bharadwaj Advocates for the applicants and learned A.G.A. for the State. Sri Anil Kumar Singh has put in appearance on behalf of the complainant and has filed counter affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the applicants. List is revised.
2. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. invoking inherent jurisdiction has been filed on behalf of the applicants with prayer to quash the complaint case No. 1007 of 1990-V.K. Taneja v. Deena Nath Arora and Ors., pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly and also to quash the order dated 9.10.1998, Annexure-4 to the affidavit. The facts giving rise to the dispute is that the applicant No. 9 Sanjeev Kumar Taneja is the son of opposite party No. 2, complainant and applicant No. 10 Smt. Asha Taneja alias Ruchita Taneja is wife of applicant No. 9 (daughter-in-law of the complainant). The other applicants are close relatives of Smt. Asha Taneja. The complaint is annexed as Annexure-1 to the affidavit filed in support of this application which was filed on 31.3.1990 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 420, 452, 504, 506, 323 I.P.C. and the same was numbered as Criminal Case No. 1007 of 1990. After lapse of 8 years, statements of Govind Raman Taneja was recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C. which is annexed as Annexure-2 to the affidavit. Smt, Subodh Kumari Taneja, wife of the complainant was also examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. on the same day i.e. 21.8.98. [The learned Magistrate summoned the applicants vide order dated 9.10.1998 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 504, 506, 452, 323 I.P.C. It is brought to my notice that while summoning the applicants the learned Magistrate did not summon the applicants under Section 406 and 120 I.P.C. The applicants filed a protest petition challenging the summoning order which was rejected vide order dated 9.2.1999 by the learned Sessions Judge, Bareilly stating therein that in view of the various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court summoning order is an interlocutory order and is not maintainable. In the circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge rejected the application as not maintainable without giving any opinion on merits. This order is also under challenge. The applicants have filed a copy of an application given by the complainant prior to institution of the complaint case on 26,3,1990 wherein it has been stated that the family members of the daughter-in-law, applicant No. 10, in absence of the complainant somehow managed to instigate his son (applicant No. 9) to leave his parent's house and finally the son and daughter-in-law left the house of the complainant. The complainant alleged in the said application that he apprehends that the family members of the applicant No. 10 may lodge false report or implicate them in some frivolous case. The allegation made in that application to the extent that they are likely to be blackmailed by the complainant and his family members. This application has been annexed as Annexure-6 to the affidavit and has not been denied by the contesting opposite parties in their counter affidavit. The applicants have prayed for quashing the complaint on the ground that; (1) it is frivolous in nature, (2) the complaint was registered in the year 1990 whereas the summoning order has been passed after lapse of 8 years and (3) the application dated 26.3.1990 moved before the Additional District Judge 1 (Administration) was prior to the lodging of the complaint expressing his apprehension, only because his son applicant No. 10 had left his father's house with his wife and the complaint is only an abuse of the process of the court.
3. Before I proceed to decide whether the instant criminal complaint can be quashed or not, it is necessary to decide the question as to whether the order dated 9.2.1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 57 of 1999 calls for any interference. I have gone through the entire judgment and do not find any illegality. The learned Sessions Judge declined to give any opinion on merit but rejected the revision as not maintainable. The Apex Court has also ruled in the case of Adalat Prasad v. Rood Lal Jindal and Ors., 2004 (50), A.C.C., 924 that the learned Magistrate could not review its earlier order as the Criminal Procedure Code do not contemplate such a situation. In the instant case the revisional court declined to interfere for the reason that the order summoning the accused is an interlocutory order and not maintainable placing reliance on a number of decisions. In the circumstances. I do not find any illegality in the order dated 9,2,1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bareilly.
4. Now the prayer for quashing of the complaint on the ground that it is only as a means of harassment and specially in view of the fact that on 26.3.1990 a somewhat similar application was filed before the Additional District Judge and subsequently the criminal complaint was filed. Besides, almost forty cases are going on between the parties, it is to be examined whether the summoning of the applicants under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 504, 506, 323 I.P.C. warrants quashing of the proceedings. It is apparent that the date of occurrence as mentioned in the criminal complaint is 28.2.1990. Almost 15 years have gone by and there has been no outcome of the so called threat extended to the complainant and his family members by the applicants. In fact after filing of the complaint, the matter was left in cold storage continuously for the period of 8 years and thereafter summoning order has been filed after lapse of very long time. It is apparent that the complaint was instituted only because the son and daughter-in-law separated from the complainant and left the house. It is only a pressurizing tactics to get back the son and daughter-in-law. It is also noteworthy that though the applicants have been summoned under Section 323 I.P.C. but there appears to be no allegation of causing physical assault and in absence of any injury report, there is apparently nothing in the complaint to show that they were injured or their injuries were ever examined. The matter is pending since the year 1990. Almost 15 years have gone by and continuation of the criminal proceedings on the basis of criminal complaint sought to be quashed is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The Apex Court has categorically ruled that the criminal cases should be concluded expeditiously and delay of more than l0-12 years has been held to be fatal to the trial. In the case of Santoshi De v. Archana Guha and Ors., , the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings where the delay was 14 years and there was no explanation why delay was caused by the prosecution and it was held that it infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In the instant case the complaint was lodged in the year 1990 and [he witnesses were examined under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. after lapse of 8 years i.e. in the year 1998 and thereafter the summoning order was passed. A bare reading of the entire paper book, it is evident that the criminal proceedings were initialed only as a pressurising tactics. There is no explanation whatsoever in the summoning order regarding delay and lapse of 8 years between the period when the complaint was lodged and the witnesses were examined under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, The Apex Court in the case of Santosh De (Supra) declined to interfere in the order of the High Court where the proceeding was quashed on account of delay of 8 years. For ready reference paragraph 12 of the said judgment is quoted below:-
"We are not satisfied that there are any valid grounds for interference with the order of the High Court. 'The most glaring circumstance in the case is the delay in commencing the trial. The case was committed to sessions court on July 15. 1974 and the charges came to he framed by the sessions court only on April 13.1983 i.e., after a lapse of about eight years. The appellant is not in a position to explain the reasons for this delay. In the order under appeal, the High Court has stated that this delay is entirely on account of the default of the prosecution. This is not a case of what is called 'systennic delays' as explained in A.R. Antulay, . In our opinion, this unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In absence of any material to the contrary, we accept the finding of the High Court that this delay of eight years is entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution. Once that is so there is no occasion for interference in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
5. Similar view has been voiced by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Kapil Deo Shukla, and A.A. Mulla and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., 1997 J.I.C. 212 (S.C.). In the said cases reliance was placed on a number of decisions of the Apex Court. A perusal of the entire paper book shows that the identical allegations were levelled against the applicants four days prior to the lodging of the instant complaint. The application before the Additional District Magistrate dated 26.3.1990, Annexure-6 to the affidavit, it is only narration which has been given out in the instant complaint which is Annexure-1 to the affidavit. It is thus evident that repeated allegations at the instance of the complainant is nothing short of an abuse of the process of the court, specially when the complainant has only narrated his apprehensions on the basis of the so called threat said to have been extended by the applicants, such a long period has gone by and nothing has come out, therefore, mere threat to cause the injury to his person and property is sheer imagination of the complainant. It is not a case where serious criminal offences are alleged in the complaint and the applicants have been kept on waiting for the outcome of the complainant, specially the summoning order has been passed after lapse of 8 years which cam not be overlooked by this Court. It is not a case where inherent powers have been invoked immediately after lodging of the complaint but they have been summoned after a considerable long span of eight years.
6. A bare reading of the complaint in the present case makes it clear that only certain apprehensions against the applicants have been voiced by the complainant for the reason that his son and daughter-in-law had left his house and started living separately. After lapse of 15 years nothing has happened in between and it is apparent that continuation of the criminal proceedings on the basis of impugned complaint will only amount to an abuse of the process of the court and therefore, 1 therefore quash the complaint which is registered as Complaint Case No. 1007 of 1990-V.K. Taneja v. Deena Nath Arora and Ors., pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly. This application is accordingly allowed.