JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner was recruited as a constable in 1979. In February, 1993 he was posted as a Constable Driver. On 17.3.1993 the petitioner was charge-sheeted on the ground that he was found drunk during duty hours and that in the state of intoxication, he entered the living room of the Commandant Officer unauthorisedly at around 8.30 p.m. and used abusive and unparliamentary language. On the aforesaid charges, an inquiry was conducted and full opportunity was given to the petitioner. Based on the enquiry report, the petitioner was removed from the service with effect from 15.7.1993. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal. The Appellate Authority by an order dated 30.11.1993 allowed the appeal of the petitioner and quashed the order of the removal of the services of the petitioner as well as the enquiry proceedings and directed the Disciplinary Authority to conduct a de-novo inquiry against the appellant. Based on the directions of the Appellate Authority, a fresh inquiry was conducted and thereafter in April, 1994 a fresh charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply which was not found satisfactory and thereafter an Inquiry Officer was appointed who conducted the inquiry and gave fill opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself Based on the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order of removal on 10.10.1994. The petitioner filed an appeal which was rejected by an order dated 17.5.1995. The petitioner has now filed the present writ petition for the quashing of the aforesaid orders.
2. Heard Sri P.C. Srivastava, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Aradhana Chauhan, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the inquiry had been initiated and the order of removal was set aside, it was no longer open to the Disciplinary Authority to hold a fresh inquiry and remove the petitioner from the service on the same charges. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that having been acquitted, the petitioner should not be removed from the service on the same charges. In support of his submission the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Assam and Anr. v. J.N. Roy Biswas, A.I.R. 1975 SC 2277, in which it was held.
"No rule of double jeopardy bars but absence of power under a rule inhibits a second inquiry by the Disciplinary Authority after the delinquent had once been absolved."
4. In my view, the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the judgment cited by him are not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. As per the order of the Appellate Authority, the inquiry proceedings were set aside, as there was a procedural defect in it and, on the basis, the Appellate Authority directed the Disciplinary Authority to conduct de-novo a fresh inquiry. The petitioner was not absolved of the charges framed against him. The order of removal was set-aside on the ground of procedural defect and, therefore, in order to remove the vice of arbitrariness, the Appellate Authority directed the Disciplinary Authority to inquire into the matter afresh.
5. In Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2000) 1 UPLBFC 23, it was held that a disciplinary inquiry on the same charges and material was not barred where the earlier inquiry was vitiated on account of certain technical and procedural flaws and that the employer would be at a liberty to get the matter re-examined on merity by initiating a second inquiry.
6. In the present case, the Appellate Authority found that the inquiry proceedings were vitiated on account of technical and procedural flaws and, therefore, directed the Disciplinary Authority to conduct a fresh inquiry on the same charges. In my view, there is no defect in the order of the Appellate Authority directing the Disciplinary Authority to hold a fresh inquiry.
7. In Anand Narain Shukla v. State of M.P., AIR 1979 SC 1923, the order of reversion was quashed and the person was reinstated. Subsequently a second inquiry on the same charges was initiated. The Supreme Court held that a second inquiry could be held. Similar view was again held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M.B. Patnayak, AIR 1981 SC 858. In Nahar Singh v. Union of India and Ors., 1992 (2) LLJ 573, the Inquiry Officer found that the charges was not correctly framed on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority ordered a de-novo inquiry. The Court held that the direction to hold a fresh inquiry was permissible.
8. Apart from the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the principles enshrined in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable which gives power to the authority to rescind, amend or revoke an order passed by it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Disciplinary Authority could not act in the manner in which he did. In view of the aforesaid, I find no infirmity in the action of the Disciplinary Authority to hold a fresh inquiry. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, devoid of any merit and is accordingly rejected.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the impugned order had been passed under Section 11 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act and submitted that only a minor punishment could be imposed under Section 11 and that the punishment of removal being a major punishment, could not be passed under Section 11 of the Act. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit. This controversy has already been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in Madan Tiwari v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, (1999) 2 UPLBEC 1494, in which it was held.
"To conclude it may be repeated that Section 11 provides that punishments delineated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 may be awarded "in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal" which words clearly carry intention of the Legislature that the authorities mentioned in Section 11 are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and punishments in (a) to (e) may be in addition to or in lieu thereof. From the provisions contained in Section 12 it is obvious that the punishment of dismissal may be given to the delinquent in addition to the sentence of imprisonment awardable to him under the law. If the authority proceeds under Section 12, it may not be necessary to observe the formalities of a regular disciplinary enquiry/proceedings and action may be taken on the person's conviction and punishment of imprisonment under the Act. Neither the provisions of Section 12 nor Section 11 convey that a person may not be liable to dismissal if he is not convicted or sentenced under the Act. The provisions make it absolutely clear that a punishment of dismissal can be awarded under Section 11 even if delinquent is not prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 or Section 10. The aforesaid view finds support from the reported Division Bench decision in Shyam Singh v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, AIR 1965 Rajasthan 140."
10. Similar view was also laid in Deen Dayal Yadav v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, 1974 LIC 929.
11. In view of the aforesaid it is clear that the punishment of dismissal can be issued under Section 11 of the Act.
12. In view of the aforesaid, there is no infirmity in the impugned orders. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.