This second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, on the file of the first Additional District Court, Salem, reversing the judgment and decree, dated 11.11.1992, made in O.S.No.1606 of 1987, on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Salem.
2. The plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.1606 of 1987 is the appellant in the present second appeal. The defendants in the suit are the respondents herein. The plaintiff had filed the suit, in O.S.No.1606 of 1987, praying for a declaration to declare that the resignation of the plaintiff was not voluntary and that it is illegal and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff in service, with retrospective effect and for costs.
3. The plaintiff had stated that he was an officer under the defendant management. He was working as an Assistant Manager, Electrical, in the Salem Steel Plant, having joined in service, on 1.1.1979, as a Junior Manager. Thereafter, on 1.1.1983, he was promoted as an Assistant Manager. Even though the plaintiff was due for a promotion some of the executives of the first defendant were given promotion, overlooking the claim of the plaintiff. On enquiry, the plaintiff had been informed that the cut off date for eligibility for promotion had been fixed as 30.12.1985. Whereas the plaintiff had become eligible only on 1.1.1986.
4. The plaintiff had further stated that he was assured of his promotion in the month of June, 1986. However, he was not called for the interview when certain others were given the promotions, in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had done more commendable work than those who had been promoted. In spite of his attempts to meet the executive director, to make a personal representation, he was not permitted to do so. However, by a well calculated and pre-planned move, he was victimized and the details of the episode had been given in the letter, dated 1.5.1987, sent to the second defendant.
5. While so, on 13.9.1986, the plaintiff was compelled, coerced and threatened to write a letter which, the plaintiff had found, to his dismay, was treated as a resignation letter. The obtaining of the letter from the plaintiff was in gross violation of the service rules and the principles of natural justice and therefore, it has no legal validity. The resignation letter, said to have been written by the plaintiff, was not voluntary, as it had been written under coercion from the defendants and their officers. In the terms and conditions of service it had been clearly mentioned that three months notice is to be given, by either party, before the termination of the service or three months pay, in lieu thereof, was to be paid by the employer to the employee before such termination could take effect. Since such a procedure had not been followed, the alleged resignation by the plaintiff is non est in law.
6. In the written statement filed by the first defendant it has been stated that it is not correct on the part of the plaintiff to claim that he was given an opportunity for undergoing a special training in appreciation of his hard and honest work. In fact, the management had deputed the plaintiff for training in the usual course. He was given the promotion, as an Assistant Manager, in the normal course, as per the rules applicable to his service. It is factually not correct on the part of the plaintiff to state that he was to be promoted as a Deputy Manager, on 1.1.1986. Some of the executives working under the first defendant had been given promotions, based on their merit. The cut off date for being eligible for promotion had been correctly fixed by the defendants, contrary to the allegations made by the plaintiff. The promotion from the post of Assistant Manager to the post of Deputy Manager is given only as per the existing rules.
7. The claim that the plaintiff had been assured of his promotion in the month of June, 1986, is not true. It is also incorrect to allege that certain others had been given their promotion even though there was no vacancy. No pre-planned conspiracy had taken place to victimize the plaintiff, as alleged by him, in his letter, dated 1.5.1987, addressed to the second defendant. The said letter is a concocted document created to suit the convenience of the plaintiff. It is false to allege that the general manager of the Salem Steel Plant had coerced the plaintiff to sign the resignation letter. In fact the plaintiff had submitted his resignation letter, voluntarily, on his own free will. There was no compulsion or coercion, as alleged by the plaintiff. If the allegations made by the plaintiff were true he could have withdrawn his resignation letter, on 14.9.1986. In fact, in his letter, dated 17.9.1986, the plaintiff had mentioned about the mode of settlement of his dues by the defendant company.
8. The allegation of the plaintiff that three months notice ought to have been given to him, before the defendant management had accepted the resignation letter of the plaintiff, cannot be accepted. In fact, it had been made clear, in W.P.No.2564 of 1987, that the defendant management had waived the notice period. As such, if an employee resigns from his post or from his job it could be accepted, with immediate effect. As a consequence of his resignation, the plaintiff had been asked to vacate his quarters and his car loan account had been foreclosed. The defendants had followed all procedures prescribed by law, while accepting the resignation of the plaintiff and in initiating the consequential actions, thereafter. In such circumstances, the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable in law.
9. In view of the averments made on behalf of the plaintiff, as well as the defendants, the trial Court had framed the following issues for consideration:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit?
2. Whether the suit is maintainable before this Court?
3. What other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?
10. Before the trial Court the plaintiff had examined himself as P.W.1. Exs.A-1 to A-10 had been marked on behalf of the plaintiff. Exs.B-1 to B-6 had been marked on behalf of the defendants. No witness was examined on the side of the defendants.
11. The trial Court had noted that the main contention of the plaintiff is that the alleged resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, was not submitted, voluntarily, by the plaintiff, as it had been obtained by threat and coercion by the defendants and their officers. The plaintiff had also contended that the condition that three months notice or three months pay in lieu of the notice had to be given, by either party, before the termination of the service of an employee of the first defendant company, had not been followed even though it was part of the terms and conditions in the order of appointment of the plaintiff, dated 11.12.1978, marked as Ex.A-1. Therefore, the alleged resignation letter is not valid.
12. With regard to the issue as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable, the trial Court had concluded that the suit is maintainable since the issue does not relate to removal of the plaintiff from service. The question as to whether the resignation letter, said to have been submitted by the plaintiff to the defendants, is voluntary or that it has been given under threat and coercion is an issue that could be decided in the present civil proceedings. The trial Court had found that the defendants had not produced any evidence to show that the resignation of the plaintiff from his service was due to his personal reasons. According to the appointment order, dated 11.12.1978, marked as Ex.A-1, it is clear that three months notice ought to have been given, by either party, before the service of an employee could be terminated. Further, it had been seen that the pre-conditions prescribed for such termination had not been waived before the resignation letter submitted by the plaintiff had been accepted by the defendants.
13. The trial Court had also found that the resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, had been handwritten by the plaintiff in his own handwriting. No reason has been shown by the defendants to show as to why it had been handwritten even though the plaintiff is a highly placed official. Further, the defendants had not given any reason, as to why the resignation submitted by the plaintiff had been accepted by them, at once. The unusual speed in which the letter had been accepted would show that the said letter could not have been submitted by the petitioner, voluntarily. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff that he had submitted his letter, dated 13.9.1986, due to threat and coercion by the defendants and their officials could be believed.
14. Further, no evidence is available, with regard to the time when the resignation letter had been written. In fact, there is no specific denial of the claims made by the plaintiff, by way of evidence. Since the plaintiff had been compelled to submit his resignation letter, under coercion, in the presence of the defendants and their officers, there could not have been any independent witness to support the claims made by the plaintiff. The officials who have been present at the relevant point of time had not subjected themselves to cross examination. In the absence of sufficient evidence to show that the defendants had followed the procedure, as per the terms and conditions and the rules applicable to the service in accepting the resignation letter submitted by the plaintiff and when no reason has been given as to why the plaintiff had come forward to submit his resignation letter, the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the resignation letter obtained from the plaintiff was under threat and coercion. In such circumstances, the trial Court had held that the claims made by the plaintiff are valid and sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, by its judgment and decree, dated 11.11.1992, made in O.S.No.1606 of 1987.
15. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 11.11.1992, made in O.S.No.1606 of 1987, the defendants had filed an appeal, on the file of the First Additional District Court, Salem, in A.S.No.24 of 1993. The first Appellate Court had framed the following point for consideration:
Whether the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction, as prayed for by the plaintiff, in the appeal?
16. The first Appellate Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court stating that the reasons cited by the plaintiff for submitting his resignation letter are unacceptable, as he had failed to prove that the letter of resignation, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, had been obtained from him under coercion. The first Appellate Court had also come to the conclusion that the resignation letter would come into force from the moment it was accepted, irrespective of the terms and conditions found in the order of appointment, dated 11.12.1978, marked as Ex.A-1. The first Appellate Court had also found that if the claim of the plaintiff that his resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, had been obtained under coercion is true, then there would have been no necessity for the plaintiff to have written a letter, dated 17.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-2, requesting the defendants to pay his retiral benefits due to him.
17. The first Appellate Court had come to the conclusion that since the letter of resignation had been sent by the plaintiff to the General Manager of the first defendant company it need not have been sent through any other proper channel, as stated by the plaintiff. Further, it had been noted that by a letter, dated 3.10.1986, marked as Ex.A-2, the plaintiff had requested the defendant management to reinstate him in service. In the reply sent by the first defendant, dated 13.10.1986, marked as Ex.A-3, it had been stated that the plaintiff had been relieved from service, as he had, submitted a letter of resignation, voluntarily. Further, from Ex.B-2, dated 17.9.1986, it was found that the plaintiff had requested the first defendant to adjust the car loan and the other loans availed by the plaintiff, with the gratuity and the provident fund amounts due to him.
18. The first Appellate Court had also found that the plaintiff had not stated clearly as to why there was a necessity for the defendants to obtain a letter of resignation from the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff had not produced any evidence to show that the defendant management had acted in a mala fide manner to deny promotion to the plaintiff, even though certain other persons had been promoted, over looking the claims of the plaintiff. The first Appellate Court had also found that there was no substance in the allegation made by the plaintiff in his reply statement that the personal assistant of the first defendant had demanded money for considering the plaintiff for promotion. There is nothing stated on behalf of the plaintiff as to who had acted against him to deny him the promotion that he was eligible to get on merit.
19. Based on the oral, as well as the documentary evidence available on record, the first Appellate Court had found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had been coerced by the officers to submit the resignation letter, marked as Ex.B-1. In fact the resignation letter had been handwritten by the plaintiff and there was nothing to show that the said letter had been written, under threat or coercion. As such, the first Appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the claim of the plaintiff that he had submitted his resignation under coercion cannot be accepted. In such view of the matter, the first Appellate Court had reversed the findings of the trial Court, by its judgment and decree, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993.
20. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, the plaintiff had filed the present second appeal. This Court had admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law:
"1) Whether the resignation letter (Ex.B1) was obtained from the appellant/plaintiff under threat and coercion and so it is vitiated and cannot be acted upon?
2) Whether the acceptance of the resignation on the very date of the resignation itself and relieving the appellant/plaintiff from service on the same date, without stipulating three months notice or three months pay in lieu of notice, offends condition No.12(b) of the appointment order (Ex.A.1) is vitiated?"
21. The learned counsel for the appellant had submitted that the first Appellate Court had erred in reversing the well considered judgment of the trial Court, without properly appreciating the pleadings and the evidence on record. The learned counsel had also submitted that the first Appellate Court ought to have accepted the interpretation of the trial Court, with regard to condition No.12(b) of the appointment order, according to which three months notice ought to have been given by either party, in writing, before the service of an employee could be terminated. Therefore, the acceptance of the resignation letter of the plaintiff, dated 13.9.1986, by the defendant management, without giving three months time, is arbitrary and illegal and contrary to condition No.12(b) of the appointment order. The first Appellate Court ought to have held that the resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, submitted by the plaintiff had been obtained by threat and coercion and therefore, it is inoperative and invalid in the eye of law.
22. The learned counsel had further submitted that there was no proper explanation from the respondents as to why the resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, submitted by the appellant, marked as Ex.B-1, had been accepted by the Chief Personnel Manager of the first respondent company, with such great urgency. From the order of acceptance, marked as Ex.B-6, it is clear that it had not been issued by the competent authority. It was also clear that the resignation of the appellant had not been given effect to in letter and spirit, as it was subject to the clearance of all payments due from the appellant to various agencies. As such, the respondent management ought to have accepted the letter of the appellant, dated 3.10.1986, marked as Ex.A-2, withdrawing his earlier letter of resignation, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, when the service of the appellant had been terminated by the respondents by accepting his letter of resignation, without following condition No.12(b) of the appointment order, dated 11.12.1978, according to which three months notice ought to have been given before terminating the service of the appellant. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, is liable to be set aside.
23. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:
1. J.N.Srivastava Vs. Union of India (1998(9) SCC 559)
2. Kulwant Kaur V. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001(4) SCC 262)
3. Shambhu Murari Sinha V. Project and Development India Ltd. (AIR 2002 SC 1341)
24. Per contra the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents had submitted that the letter of resignation, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, submitted by the appellant, had been accepted by the respondent management, as requested by the appellant, with immediate effect. The contention that three months notice ought to have been given to him before accepting his letter of resignation cannot be countenanced, as the said issue had already been decided, in W.P.No.2564 of 1987, by an order, dated 6.4.1987. The main issue that had to be decided is with regard to the claim of the appellant that he had submitted his letter of resignation due to the coercion by the defendants and the officers. The first Appellate Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had submitted the resignation letter, voluntarily and that it was not due to coercion or threat by the defendants and their officers. The first Appellate Court had found that there was no evidence shown by the appellant to substantiate his claim. Since there is no substantial question of law to be decided by this Court, in the present second appeal, the second appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed, as devoid of merits.
25. The learned counsel for the respondent had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions.
26. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the appellant, as well as the respondents, and on a perusal of the evidence available on record and in view of the decisions cited before this Court it is clear that the appellant has not shown sufficient cause or reason to interfere with the findings of the first Appellate Court, in its judgment and decree, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993. The first Appellate Court had found that the appellant had not adduced any evidence, either oral or documentary, in support of his contention that the resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, had been submitted by the appellant due to coercion from the respondents and their officers. The appellant had also failed to show that the respondent management ought to have given 30 days notice to the appellant before accepting the resignation letter submitted by the appellant. In fact, the appellant had requested the defendant management to accept his resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, with immediate effect. While so, it would not be open to the appellant to state that the defendant management had accepted the resignation letter of the appellant, with undue haste and that it was obtained under threat or coercion. Further, from the contentions raised by the learned counsels appearing for the parties concerned, this Court is not convinced that substantial questions of law have arisen for consideration in the present second appeal, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in Gurdev Kaur and others Vs. Kaki and others (2007 (1) CTC 334).
27. In such view of the matter, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, is confirmed. Accordingly, the second appeal stands dismissed. No costs.
csh To
1) The I Additional District Judge, Salem
2) The Additional District Munsif, Salem