JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the year 1987. By an order dated 12-12-1997 the petitioner was suspended pending contemplated enquiry. The reason for suspending the petitioner was that he was found asleep during duty hours and on medical examination it was found that the smell of alcohol was coming' from his mouth. The doctor opined that even though the petitioner had consumed alcohol, he was not intoxicated and that he did not require any medical aid. Subsequently, by an order dated 31-12-1997, the suspension order was revoked and on the next day, i.e., 1-1-1998 his services were terminated by invoking the proviso to Sub-clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of The Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as Rules). The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal, which was also rejected by an order dated 6-3-1998. The petitioner has now filed the present writ petition assailing the aforesaid orders.
2. Heard Sri Siddheshwari Prasad, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Sri S.C. Srivastava, Advocate and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under the proviso to clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8, the services could be dispensed with where the disciplinary authority was satisfied that for some reasons to be recorded by that authority in writing, it was not reasonably practicable to hold such an enquiry. He further submitted, that in the instant case the services of the petitioner had been dispensed with without holding an enquiry as contemplated in Sub-rule (2) of Rule
8. According to Sri Siddheshwari Prasad, the learned Senior Counsel, the disciplinary authority had dispensed with the enquiry on irrelevant grounds. The decision to dispense with the enquiry rested solely on the ipse dixit of the disciplinary authority, i.e., on the whim or caprice of the concerned authority.
4. In the instant case the order of termination indicates that the petitioner while on duty was found sleeping in a state of inebriation and that his rifle was found next to him. The order also indicated that on various occasions he had found in the state of intoxication and he associates himself with unwanted elements and for this reason his continuance in service was not in public interest. On these grounds, the disciplinary authority found it appropriate to dispense with the enquiry.
5. The services of the petitioner had been terminated under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, Rule 8(2)(b) reads as under:
"8. (2)(b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry."
6. The language of the aforesaid rule is similar to the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. In Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, the Supreme Court held :
"The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311........"
"............... Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability, which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation."
"............... The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority."
"............... A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail."
7. In Tulsiram Patel's case (supra) the Supreme Court further held :
"The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty."
8. The Supreme Court further went on to say :
"If the Court finds that the reasons arc irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated."
9. In Chief Security Officer and Ors. v. Singasan Rabi Das, 1991 (1) SCC 729, the Supreme Court held that there was a total absence of sufficient material or good ground for dispensing with the inquiry and accordingly held that the order of termination dispensing with the inquiry was illegal.
10. In Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., (1991) I SCC 362, the Supreme Court held :
"It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry."
11. The Supreme Court further held :
"The decision to dispense with the departmental inquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of Law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer."
12. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the impugned order of termination does not contain sufficient reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. The charges so levelled are such that it can easily be enquired through a departmental enquiry. It is not a case where it could be held that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. Further, once the petitioner was suspended pending contemplated inquiry, there was no reason to pass the order of termination after revoking the suspension order. In my opinion, the decision of the disciplinary authority was arbitrary and motivated. The reasons for dispensing with the enquiry was wholly irrelevant and the disciplinary authority has misused the power that was conferred upon him.
13. Accordingly, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Thus, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 1-1-1998 and 6-3-1998 are quashed. The respondents arc directed to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and with full back wages. It is, however, open to the disciplinary authority to initiate a departmental inquiry after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner under Rule 8 of The Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991.