JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. On 26.4.2003 the petitioner was placed under suspension on the charges of bigamy. The petitioner challenged the suspension order which was stayed in a writ jurisdiction. On the basis of the preliminary inquiry conducted by the department, the petitioner was charge-sheeted on 16.6.2004 on the charges of bigamy. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the quashing of the charge-sheet dated 16.6.2004 issued by the disciplinary authority on the ground that the same was based on a criminal complaint filed in the year 2000 which is pending in the court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, Meerut under Sections 420, 494, 406 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The petitioner alleges that the subject matter of the charge-sheet in the domestic inquiry proceedings and that pending before the Criminal Court is one and the same and further contended that the evidence in both the proceedings would be the same and that if the departmental proceedings are allowed to continue he would be prejudiced in the proceedings before the Criminal Court.
3. Heard Sri S.P.Pandey, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri V.K.Rai, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and that the documents relied upon would be the same, it would be appropriate that the departmental proceedings be kept in abeyance till the decision of the criminal court.
5. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the criminal proceedings are entirely different from the domestic proceedings and that the purpose of the departmental inquiry was merely to help the department to come to a definite conclusion regarding the conduct of the delinquent and the penalty that could be imposed upon him if the charges were found to be correct. The respondents further submitted that there was no bar for holding the departmental proceedings during the pendency of the criminal trial and it was for the disciplinary authority to decide whether in a given case it should keep a domestic inquiry pending till the outcome of the criminal trial or not. In the present case the petitioner has not approached the disciplinary authority and has straight away come to this Court.
6. It is a well settled principle of law that the degree of proof required in a departmental inquiry is vastly different than the degree of proof required to prove a criminal charge. In the departmental inquiry the finding can be recorded in preponderance of probabilities and it is not necessary that the charge must be proved to the hilt. The departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings are entirely different in nature. They operate in different fields and they have different objectives. The materials or the evidence in the two proceedings may or may not be the same and, in some cases, at least, materials or evidence which would be relevant or open for consideration in the departmental proceeding, may be irrelevant in the criminal proceeding. The Rules relating to the appreciation of the evidence in the two inquiries may also be different. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and the trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different.
7. The law is well settled that the inquiry officer can come to a different conclusion than arrived at by a criminal court and that it is immaterial whether the charges were identical or the witnesses were the same, as long as the power exercised by the criminal court and the inquiry under the relevant law and the service law was distinct and separate. There is no bar for holding a disciplinary proceeding during the pendency of the trial though the basis may be one and the same. It is for the disciplinary authority to decide as to whether in a given case it should keep the domestic inquiry pending till the outcome of the criminal trial or not.
8. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, A.I.R. 1960 SC 806, the Supreme Court held:-
"It is true that very often employers, stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee."
9. and again held-
"We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced."
10. Similar view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills' Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen, A.I.R. 1965 SC 155; Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, A.I.R. 1969 SC 30, Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2118.
11. In Kushewar Dubey's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that there was no legal bar to simultaneous proceedings being taken against an employee even though there may be cases where it may be appropriate to defer the disciplinary proceedings awaiting the disposal of the criminal case. The Supreme Court held that it was neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast straight-jacket formula and that in cases where the charge against the employee was of a grave nature and involved complex questions of law and fact, in that event the disciplinary proceedings could be deferred till the decision of the criminal trial.
12. In Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, A.I.R. 1969 SC 30, the legal position was summed up by the Supreme Court as under:-
"The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the employee is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed to take action against him. The same issue may arise for decision in a civil or criminal proceeding pending in a court. But the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar the taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking such action is vested in the disciplinary authority. The civil or criminal court has no such power. The initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice in the pending court proceeding. The employee is free to move the court for an order restraining the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. If he obtains a stay order, a willful violation of the order would of course amount to contempt of court. In the absence of a stay order the disciplinary authority is free to exercise its lawful powers."
13. In State of Rajasthan v. B.K.Mena and Ors., 1996(74) FLR 2550(SC), the entire case law on this issue was reviewed and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held-
"It would be evident from the above decisions that each of them starts with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain situations, it may not be 'desirable' 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no hard and fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested in the above decisions as constituting a valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceeding is "that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced". This ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the case may be, has to be determined in each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. The ground indicated in D.C.M. and Tata Oil Mills is not also an invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales while judging the advisability or desirability of staying the disciplinary proceedings. One of the contending consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be- and should not be- delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well-known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion. That is the reality inspite of repeated advice and admonitions from this Court and the High Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage, the interests of administration and good Government demand that these proceeding are concluded expeditiously, It must be remembered that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanor is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of had elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. It is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is not possible to enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasise some of the important considerations in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above."
14. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., 1999(82)FLR 627, the Supreme Court after considering all the judgments held-
"The conclusions which are deductible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are:-
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest.
15. In State Bank of India and Ors. v. R.B. Sharma, 2004 LLR 950, the Supreme Court held-
"It is fairly well-settled position in law that on basic principles proceedings in criminal case and departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously, except where departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common.
The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him or his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what ZX is required to be seen is whether the department enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances."
16. From the aforesaid it is clear that there is no bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken against the petitioner in the form of criminal action and also the disciplinary proceedings unless the charges are extremely serious requiring judicial determination in preference to the verdict in the domestic proceedings.
17. In my view, in the present case, the criminal proceedings and the domestic proceedings are not based on the same set of facts. Even otherwise, assuming that both the proceedings are based on same sets of fact, in my view, there is no provision of law empowering the Court to stay the departmental proceedings merely because criminal proceedings are pending in a criminal court.
18. In my opinion, the purpose of the two proceedings are quite different. The object of the departmental proceedings is to ascertain whether the delinquent is required to be retained in service or not. On the other hand the object of criminal prosecution is to find out whether the offence in the penal statute has been made out or not. Therefore, the area covered by the two proceedings are not identical. The object in both the proceedings are different. Whereas the departmental proceedings are taken to maintain the discipline and the efficiency in the service, the criminal proceedings are initiated to punish a person for committing an offence violating any public duty.
19. In my view, no complicated questions of fact or law are involved which requires the employee to await the decision of the criminal court nor any evidence has been led by the petitioner to show as to how he would be prejudiced in the continuance of the departmental proceedings.
20. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find it to be a fit case for interference in the domestic inquiry proceedings. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition and is dismissed without any order as to cost.