JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. The order dated 9.9.1998. Annexure-24 to the writ petition, passed by Sri Basudev Yadav, respondent No. 7, Joint Director of Education. Varanasi Region. Varanasi by which City Magistrate respondent No. 5 has been appointed Authorised Controller for a period of one year under the provisions of Section 6 (3) of the U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act. 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1971) has come to be challenged by means of this writ petition.
2. Counter, Supplementary counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged.
3. The parties counsel agreed that this writ petition be disposed of finally on merits on the basis of the material available on record.
4. Heard Sri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri A. K. Sinha who appeared on behalf of respondent No. 10, Sahi Nath Tripathi (hereinafter referred to 'as Tripathi").
5. The petitioner-Committee of Management of which Devendra Singh is the Manager is running Tej Bahadur Singh Intermediate College, Nigoh, Jaunpur, which was originally only a High School and was on the list of grants-in-aid to which the provisions of the Act. 1971 were applicable. The said school was upgraded and recognised as Intermediate college but without the grant-in-aid (Vitta Vthin) for Intermediate section. Respondent No. 10 was appointed and absorbed as an Assistant Teacher in L.T. grade and in course of time, he became the Head Master. A requisition was sent to the U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission. Allahabad by the petitioners for appointment of the Head Master/Principal of the college. The applications of Tripathi who was working as Head Master on permanent basis and another teacher Narendra Bahadur Singh (hereinafter referred to as "Singh") were forwarded to the Commission. The Commission selected Tripathi for the post of Head Master/Principal of the institution by order dated 20.1.1989. It appears that the petitioners did not issue appointment letter to Tripathi and since he was not allowed to join in pursuance of the recommendations of the Commission. Regional Deputy Director passed an order dated 13.1.1990 under Section 17 (2) (3) of the U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Sewa Ayog Act. 1982 directing that the petitioners shall allow Tripathi to join by 31.1.1990. On that date Tripathi joined as permanent Head Master/Principal of the institution on the strength of the order dated 13.1.1990.
6. The case of the petitioners is that there were serious charges of bungling and mal- administration against Tripathi and consequently, he was being proceeded against departmentally. According to the petitioners, since Tripathi was not a competent person to join as the Principal of the college, the Committee of Management adopted a resolution to appoint Singh as the Principal of the college on ad hoc basis and was allowed to take over as the Principal of the college on 24.12.1990. on 26.6.1990 an order, Annexure-3 to the writ petition, was passed by the D.I.O.S.. that since Tripathi has joined as Principal, the account of boys fund shall be operated under his signatures. The operation of the order dated 26.6.1990 was stayed by this Court on 19.7.1990 W.P. No. 18147 of 1990. The D.I.O.S. had not granted approval to the ad hoc appointment of Singh, who in his turn, filed Writ Petition No. 14140 of 1992 with the prayer that his salary as officiating Principal be directed to be released. In the said writ petition, an interim order was passed on 21.4.1992 which runs as follows :
".....In the circumstances aforesaid, an interim mandamus will issue directing both the respondents herein to pay salary of the petitioner and such allowances as may by admissible in respect of the post of Head Master, Tej Bahadur Singh Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidya-laya. Nigoh, district Jaunpur, from the date of his appointment, namely, the 24th of December, 1990 upto the 30th of June, 1992 on or before the 6th of July, 1992. or to show cause by the aforesaid date. The respondents aforesaid will also continue to pay the aforesaid salary from month during the pendency of the present writ petition.
It is made clear if under the provisions of law the first respondent is not liable to grant his approval for the purpose of payment, he will be expected to do so by reason of the interim order issued herein."
7. Inspite of the repeated departmental orders, the petitioners did not allow Tripathi to function as Principal of the college. Times out of number, the petitioners were directed to prepare and submit the salary bills of Tripathi but it was not done. Tripathi is being paid his salary as the Principal of the institution under the provisions of Section 3 (3) of the Act, 1971. Ultimately, a notice dated 22.8.1998. Annexure-22, under the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Act, 1971 was served on the petitioners to which they have submitted their reply on 1.9.1998. Annexure-23. After taking into consideration the reply to the notice, the Joint Director of Education, Varanasi Region, Varanasi passed the impugned order dated 9.9.1998, Annexure-24. by which City Magistrate. Jaunpur has been appointed as an Authorised Controller, who has taken over on 16.9.1998 as per charge certificate which is C.A. 2 to the counter-affidavit.
8. Sri Ashok Khare assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that it has been passed to feed fat the grudge on totally insufficient and unjustified grounds. It was pointed out that in view of the stay order of this Court dated 19.7.1990 passed In Writ Petition No. 18147 of 1990 and dated 21.4.1992 in Writ Petition No. 14140 of 1992, petitioners could not prepare salary bills of Tripathi who was, as a matter of fact, not functioning as the Principal of the College. It was urged that two persons at a time cannot be allowed to man a single post and to draw salary and since Singh was found to be entitled for the payment of salary for the post of Principal by order dated 21.4.1992 of this Court, the petitioners were justified in not preparing the bills for payment of salary to Tripathi. The impugned order has further been challenged on the ground that it does not contain reasons for reaching the conclusion that the appointment of an Authorised Controller is necessary.
9. Sri Sinha learned counsel for Tripathi urged that since he had taken over as Permanent Principal of the college after due selection by the Committee and all attempts of the management to oust him from the said office, on one pretext or the other, had failed, Singh could not be appointed as officiating Principal and it was for this reason that the D.I.O.S. had not approved the appointment of Singh. It was also urged that this Court did not prevent Tripathi to function as Principal of the college, and in any case, the said order did not come in the way of the petitioners to make payment of salary to Tripathi.
10. I have given thoughtful consideration to the matter and find that on factual and legal matrix, the petitioners have no case to complain against the impugned order dated 9.9.1998 by which an Authorised Controller has been appointed for a period of one year. It is an indubitable fact that Tripathi who was already working as Head Master of the institution had been finally selected for appointment to the post of the Principal of the College by the Commission. The petitioners wanted Singh to be their Principal but failed in their attempts. Tripathi was harassed and nagged by a number of charges levelled against him with regard to his failure to run the institution and having indulged in financial irregularities and other bunglings. Tripathi was suspended by the petitioner-Committee of Management but the order of suspension was not approved by the D.I.O.S. Not only this, a proposal was submitted by the petitioners to the Commission through D.I.O.S. to approve the termination of the services of Tripathi. This also did not find favour with the Commission. Tripathi, therefore, is the person who had been appointed on permanent basis as Principal of the institution after due selection by the Commission. It did not He in the competence of the petitioners to refuse to allow him to join his duties. Sri Ashok Khare pointed out that in the absence of appointment letter issued by the Committee of Management. Tripathi could not be treated to have been appointed as the Principal of the College and in support of the contention, he placed reliance on Surendra Narain Pandey v.
State of U. P. and others, 1989 (1) UPLBEC 398. This decision is not a direct authority on the point. In case the Manager is recalcitrant and obdurate enough to disobey all the orders of the statutory authorities, in that event the compliance of the order may be ensured by invoking the provisions of Section 17 (2), (3) of the U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Sewa Ayog Act, 1982. The Management cannot thwart or render otiose the selection of an incumbent on the post of the Principal by the Commission. If the Management is given such a long handle, the entire scheme of the Act of 1982 as well as Act of 1971 would stand nullified leading to disastrous results. In reality, as well as in law. Tripathi had assumed the office of Principal. Since the petitioners were not prepared to pay heed to the departmental Instructions and orders, they took a rigid and foolish stand not to pay the salary to him. They in their own wisdom adopted a totally illegal course by appointing Singh on ad hoc basis. The D.I.O.S. had rightly refused to approve the appointment of Singh obviously for the reason that on the post on which Tripathi had been appointed as Principal on permanent basis and during his continuance as such another person could not be inducted. The department, therefore, has been directing the petitioners-Committee of Management to see to reason by allowing Tripathi to function as Principal and to draw his salary. All the departmental Instructions fell on the deaf ears of the Committee of Management and the Manager stubborn as he appeared to be paid no respect or adherence to the departmental orders of the statutory authorities.
11. The lame excuse of the petitioners that on account of the stay order of this Court in Writ Petition Nos. 18147 of 1990 and 14140 of 1992 Tripathi could not be treated as the Principal of the College and Singh was directed to be paid salary as Principal of the College is nothing but a subterfuge. By order dated 19.7.1990 in Writ Petition No. 18147 of 1990, the order of the D.I.O.S. dated 26.6.1990 was stayed.
The effect of this order is that though Tripathi shall continue to function as Principal of the College, he would not operate the boys fund. This order does not say that Tripathi's appointment as Principal has been stayed or he would not function as such. The stay order was operative only with regard to one of the functions of the Principal. As regards the second order of this Court dated 21.4.1992 passed on the Writ Petition No. 14140 of 1992 filed by Singh, it may be pointed out that it was not a blanket order to pay salary to Singh. The interim order quoted above indicates that the respondent concerned was directed to pay the salary to Singh for the period 24th December. 1990 upto 30th June. 1992 on or before 6th July, 1992 or to show cause by the aforesaid date. In pursuance of the stay order, the District Inspector of Schools filed a counter-affidavit in the said writ petition on 25.6.1992 to make it clear that Slngh was not entitled for payment of salary for the post of Head Master because Tripathi was working on the said post and due to the said reason, there was no vacancy. A copy of the counter-affidavit filed by the D.I.O.S. in Writ Petition No. 14140 of 1992 has been filed as Annexure 5 to the supplementary counter-affidavit in the present writ petition. After the passing of the order dated 21.4.1992 in Writ Petition No. 14140 of 1992. the D.I.O.S. as was expected had considered the question of approval or otherwise of the proposal of the Committee of Management to appoint Singh on ad hoc basis as Principal of the College. The D.I.O.S. disapproved the proposal on 30.4.1992 on the ground that Tripathi was duly appointed and legally recognised Principal of the institution. Smt. Mamta Devi who happens to be the President of the Committee of Management also informed her Manager Devendra Slngh that the Principal of the college was being unnecessarily harassed.
12. The two interim stay orders of this Court which have been made the sheet anchor to challenge the order or appointment of an Authorised Controller are of no avail. On the other hand, the weighty material available on record indicates that Tripathi was the duly appointed permanent Principal of the college who was being kept at bay in an unlawful manner by the Committee of Management for the reasons, which are hidden in the penumbral zone far away from judicial scrutiny.
13. Section 6 of the Act. 1971 makes a provision for enforcement of the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 and directions given under Section 4. If the D.I.O.S. finds that the directions have not been complied with and the provisions have not been followed, he may recommend to the Regional Deputy Director of Education for action under subsection (2) of Section 6. Under subsection (2), the Deputy Director of Education is required to issue a notice to the Management to show cause and after recording the finding that the Management has failed to comply his orders, the Deputy Director after considering the show cause may supersede the Management for a period not exceeding one year under sub-section (3) of Section 6. The Deputy Director had issued notice, Annexure-22, on 22.8.1998 to which a reply dated 1.9.1998 Annexure-23 was submitted by the petitioner. The Deputy Director In the impugned order has considered the reply to the show cause notice and passed the order for appointment of the Authorised Controller for a period of one year and during this period of one year, the Committee of Management shall stand superseded. Sri Ashok Khare appearing on behalf of the petitioners urged that the order passed by the Deputy Director is vitiated on account of the fact that he has jumped to the conclusion to appoint the Authorised Controller without recording the reasons therefor. It is true that reasons are the link between the material on which certain conclusions are based. The reasons disclose how mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They would reveal nexus between the facts considered and the conclusion reached. On this point, there ts a oft-quoted celebrated decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Kapoor, (1973) 2 SCO 836. The view taken in the said case was reiterated in Ourdial Singh Fijjt v. State of Punjab, (1979) 2 SCO 368. In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K. S. Gandhi and others, (1991) 2 SCO 716, the Apex Court in para 21 of the report observed as follows :
"21. Thus, it is settled law that the reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the order to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. It also excludes the chances to reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious decision or conclusion. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion/decision reached. The order when it affects the right of a citizen or a person. Irrespective of the fact, whether it is quasi-judicial or administrative fair play requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons. The recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned consciously applied its mind to the facts on record.........."
The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to Indicate that the authority has given the consideration to the points in controversy. In M. J. Sivani and others v. State of Kamataka and others, AIR 1995 SC 1770, it has been observed in para 32 of the report, as under:
"32. It is also settled law that the order need not contain detailed reasons like Court order. Administrative order itself may contain reasons or the file may disclose reasons to arrive at the decision showing application of mind to the facts in issue. It would be discernible from the reasons stated in the order or the contemporaneous record contained. Reasons are the link between the order and the mind of its maker. When rules direct to record reasons, it is a sine qua non and condition precedent for valid order. Appropriate brief reasons, through not like a judgment, are necessary concomitant for a valid order in support of the action or decision taken by the authority or its instrumentality or the State."
14. One cannot, therefore, escape from the conclusion that it is imperative on the concerned authority to inform its order by recording reasons to reach a particular conclusion. With this caution in mind, and in the perspective of the law, as mentioned above, the question is whether the impugned order withstands the test of security at the alter of the principles of natural justice or not and if it is found that the reasons are conspicuously missing to arrive at the conclusion, a further question would be whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the petitioners were given notice as required under subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Act, 1971. They submitted a reply which was duly considered by the Deputy Director. The conclusion that the petitioners have been persistently flouting and disobeying the orders of the statutory authorities was writ large. The submission of Sri Ashok Khare is hyper-technical as the principles of natural justice cannot be made fetish or phantom. The application of the principles of natural justice depends on the nature of the proceedings and the procedure to be adopted by the Court. Tribunal or Administrative Authority. In Managing Director, E.S.I.L., Hyderabad v. B. Karunakaran, JT 1993 (6) SC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :
".......The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice has been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all the sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case......."
15. The impugned order is clearly in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The said order cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.
16. In the result. I find that the impugned order appointing the Authorised Controller for a period of one year in the circumstances of the case was quite eminently suited and, therefore, it was rightly passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. This order does not call for any interference by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17. Accordingly, the writ petition which turns out to be devoid of any merits, is dismissed. No order as to costs is made.