JUDGMENT S.K. Singh, J.
1.Challenged in this petition is the order dated 27.6.2002 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No. 1 in exercise of powers as conferred under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act for holding elections to elect office bearers of the society.
2. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at admission stage.
3. There is a society known as Shiksha Prasar Samiti registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 at Mohammadabad Gohna. district Mau. It has its registered bye laws which govern the management of the society. Under the bye laws the terms of the Committee of Management of the society is provided. The aforesaid society runs an institution known as National Inter College, Mohammadabad Gohna, district Mau. It is claimed that renewal of the society has taken place for a period of five years w.e.f. 10.10.2000. It appears that on 6.11.2001 respondent No. 2 made a complaint before the Deputy Registrar Firms, Societies and Chits to the effect that the petitioner has obtained the renewal certificate by placing forged papers and incorrect list of members. It is in pursuance of the aforesaid complaint made by the respondent No. 2 that the matter was examined with the result the impugned order came to be passed by the respondent No. 1, which is the subject-matter of challenge before this Court, in this petition.
4. Sri S. D. Shukla, learned advocate who appears on behalf of the petitioner submits that respondent No. 1 has passed the impugned order without affording adequate opportunity in the matter. It has been further submitted that the petitioner lodged protest before the Registrar, U. P.. Lucknow, directing the transfer of the matter before some other authority upon which no orders were passed and inspite thereof respondent No. 1 has taken the impugned decision. Lastly, it has been submitted that there appears to be a dispute of election which could not have been decided by the respondent No. 1 and therefore, the order is without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submits that by the impugned decision the term of the Committee has been cut short which is illegal and impermissible. In support, of the aforesaid contention about want of jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 to pass the impugned order and term of the committee cannot be cut short, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on the decision in AIR 1998 All 236 and 1996 (1) UPLBEC 413, respectively.
5. Sri V. K. Shukla learned advocate who appears on behalf of the respondent No. 2 in response to the aforesaid submission argues that petitioner was given full opportunity and after giving cogent reasons the decision has been taken by the respondent No. 1 in which finding of fact has been recorded and therefore, no interference is required by this Court. Learned counsel submits that in fact no election has taken place and it was all a forged affair and therefore, after recording aforesaid finding, respondent No. 1 has properly exercised the jurisdiction as vested in him and required direction has been issued. It has been further submitted that the list of 12 members which is being relied upon by the petitioner, though being incomplete and incorrect, nevertheless six members out of the aforesaid list of 12 members have filed affidavit stating that no election has taken place and they are not elected office bearers. Learned counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid, claim of the petitioners of their being valid election and that the respondent No. 1 has no jurisdiction to adjudicate, cannot be accepted. In view of the aforesaid, learned counsel submits that the order of the respondent No. 1 being perfectly just and proper, no interference is required.
6. Learned standing counsel who appears in the matter also supported the order of the respondent No. 1 placing reliance on the findings so recorded in the impugned order.
7. On perusal of the impugned order of the respondent No. 1 it is clear that petitioner has been given opportunity at fullest length but he has not been able to produce any of the original document concerning the list of members, original register, cash book etc. It has been mentioned in the order of the respondent No. 1 that by letter dated 22.11.2001 petitioner was called upon to furnish all the original documents referred above on the date so fixed, i.e., 4.12.2001. On the date fixed, from the side of the petitioner there was an application for adjournment along with medical certificate upon which 28.12.2001 was fixed. On that date again application was moved on behalf of the petitioner that further time may be allowed for producing evidence. This request was again accepted by the respondent No. 1 and 17.1.2002 was fixed. Respondent No. 1 has mentioned in his order that petitioner has been changing counsel from time to time and moving application for the purpose of adjournment instead of producing required documents. It has been mentioned that after 17.1.2002 again dates were fixed as 31.1.2002, 12.2.2002 and 2.3.2002. It appears that at this stage petitioner moved application/complaint to the Registrar, U. P., Lucknow. for transferring the matter from the respondent No. 1, upon which, as submitted by the learned counsel Sri V. K. Shukla, comment was sent by the respondent No. 1 in which he clearly stated that he has no objection whatsoever for shifting of the matter to any other authority. It appears from the record that the application/complaint of the petitioner was duly attended by the Registrar who by order dated 6.5.2002, after repelling petitioner's contentions directed respondent No. 1, being competent authority to decide the matter. Respondent No. 1, being fair enough, again issued notice to both the parties by letter dated 8.5.2002 fixing 18.5.2002 and thereafter again to enable the petitioner to get further opportunity dates were fixed as 3.6.2002, 12.6.2002, 22.6.2002, 25.6.2002 and finally 26.6.2002, but as order states petitioner has not produced any of the documents, i.e., the proceeding register, information register, membership register, receipt book etc. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that right from 4.12.2001 upto 26.6.2002, petitioner has been just seeking time by changing counsel and no steps were taken on his behalf to place before respondent No. 1, the documents justifying his claim. It is commonly said that a person who sleeps about his rights or if he is not vigilant then he is not entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction as it is equity jurisdiction. A party has no right to keep the matter lingering or choose the authority before whom matter is to be heard. Facts of present case, disclose that petitioner has tried to adopt both the aforesaid things. He tried to linger on the proceeding and also tried to get the matter shifted to other authority but when Registrar refused to accept prayer of petitioner, it was obligatory on his part to cooperate in the proceeding but this Court feels there was complete lack of bona fide on the part of petitioner.
8. In view of the aforesaid, respondent No. 1 came to the conclusion that petitioner is not possessed with any of the record or for the reason best known to him he does not want to produce the same. A further finding has been given that list of 12 members have been given out of which six members have filed their affidavits stating that no election has taken place and they are not elected office bearers and petitioner has got renewal of the society by placing wrong facts. The finding so recorded by the respondent No. 1 as referred in this judgment is finding of fact, which on the facts of the present case this Court feels, requires no interference.
9. The law is well-settled that fraud vitiates most solemn proceeding and as and when it is brought to the notice of any authority, the benefit derived by any party can be always recalled. Reference in this respect can be made to the decision in Chet Ram v. D.D.C. and Ors., 1970 AWR 775. The observation as made in para 6 of aforesaid judgment will be useful to be quoted :
"It is well-settled that fraud vitiates all solemn proceeding. If a decree is obtained by fraud, even though from a competent court, is not binding between parties. The question of fraud can be raised in any proceeding where-so-ever a decree is sought to be relied on as a good decree."
10. Reference can be made to another decision given by this Court in Baliram v. Board of Revenue, 1993 (1) AWC 398 : 1993 ACJ 152 . Para 17 of aforesaid decision is hereby quoted :
"When the Court finds that there is a miscarriage of justice on account of fraud practiced upon the Court, they cannot place an embargo of limitation upon it. It is the duty of the Court to see that no miscarriage of justice takes place on account of any fraud practiced by any party upon the Court. Whenever it comes to the light of the Court, it is under a duty to set aside such fraudulent decree. The Court cannot be used as a tool in fraudulent schemes of a party. It is settled principle that fraud vitiates all proceedings."
11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of obtaining orders/admission by fraud has further permitted the authority to withdraw the benefit even without giving any opportunity and it has been said that rules of principle of natural justice will not apply. Reference in this connection is to be made to decision given in case of U. P. Junior Doctors' Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, AIR 1991 SC 909. Observation as made in para 5 is hereby quoted :
"The circumstances in which such benefit has been taken by the candidates concerned do not justify attraction of the application of rules of natural justice of being provided an opportunity to be heard."
12. As respondent No. 1 has passed impugned order after recording clear finding that petitioner has succeeded in obtaining renewal certificate after concealing the fact and by playing fraud in the matter, this Court feels that respondent No. 1 is well within his jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. In view of the aforesaid findings, the submission as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner about want of Jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 and curtailment of the period of committee, deserves rejection.
13. In view of the aforesaid analysis, it appears to be not a fit case for interference in the writ jurisdiction. Writ petition is thus dismissed at admission stage.