JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. Challenging the election of the Committee of Management held in 1997, the opposite party No. 6 had filed Original Suit No. 62 of 1998. In connection therewith, an application for injunction was filed. The said application for injunction was rejected by an order dated 23.12.1998, Against the said order, the opposite party had preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 5 of 1999. The said appeal was allowed by order dated 29.5.1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court. Mau. It is this order which has since been challenged in this writ petition.
2. Dr. R. G, Padia. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the grant of injunction had virtually decreed the suit itself. Therefore, such an Interim injunction cannot be granted. He further contended that the application for Injunction was not supported by any affidavit, whereas Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure require such an application to be supported by affidavit. He had also raised various other points about the merit of the case which is not necessary to be gone into at this stage.
3. Shri A. P. Sahi. learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand contends that the question can very well be gone into inasmuch as it is a question as to the person managing affairs of the institution after having been validly elected. He had also contended that the election that was alleged to have been held by the petitioner was not on the basis of general members of the society though according to the scheme of administration all members of the society shall participate in the election. These are all question of disputed facts which cannot be gone into at this stage, which can very well be decided in the suit itself on the materials that might be produced by the respective parties.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
5. It appears that Section 16A (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act provides for determination of dispute with regard to the right to manage the affairs of an educational institution recognized under the said Act. The scope of Section 16A (7) of the Intermediate Education Act is to find out who is in effective control. Whether such effective control is by valid general election or not is immaterial since such decision under Section 16A (7) of the Act is subject-matter of determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, if the party aggrieved approaches the civil court. Therefore, the provision of Section 16A (7) has been introduced only to safeguard the management of the institution and not to point all kinds of problems between parties to be raised and decided. Therefore, in my opinion, the civil court should be slow in interfering with the management by interim injunction. On the other hand, the civil court should endeavour to decide such dispute at the earliest on merits and arrive at a final decision instead of granting injunction. In case injunctions are granted during the life of the Committee of Management, parties by delaying decision in the suit would frustrate. The whole scheme of the 1921 Act provided in Section 16A (7) and there would be complete anarchy in the administration of schools. After the decision under Section 16A (7) of the Act, if a party approaches the Court, it would be open to the Court to grant Injunction on the basis of merit of the case after a prima Jade case is made out. But without exhausting the remedy under Article 16A (7), if a person approaches the civil court, in that event, it would not be open to the civil court to usurp the power under Section 16A (7) of the Act in the form of granting Injunction.
6. Be that as it may, prima facie it appears that by virtue of earlier decision, Shiv Nand Mall was held to be in the management till 1991 election was held and 1994 election, though, was challenged, but Shiv Nand Mall had continued as Manager. Vishnu Shankar claimed to have held election in the year 1997. Parallel election was held by the petitioner. But the appellate court had found that the election held by the petitioner was not on the basis of the general members and that was the reason why injunction was granted. But these are questions, on merit of the case which are to be decided on the basis of material that might be produced before the Court below. In such circumstances, in my view the impugned order dated 29.5.1999 cannot be sustained and is, accordingly, hereby set aside.
7. However, this order will not prevent the opposite party from resorting to Section 16A (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act by means of appropriate application before the District Inspector of Schools. If such an application is made, the District Inspector of Schools shall forward the same to the Joint Director of Education within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of such application. The petitioner shall submit his objection within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order to the District Inspector of Schools, who will forward the same along with the objection of the opposite party to the Joint Director of Education. The Joint Director of Education shall decide the same within a period of one week.
8. At the same time it is observed that the learned trial court shall decide the suit as early as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date a copy of this order is produced before the learned trial court. It is submitted by Dr. Padia that written statement has already been filed. The issue should be suggested within a period of two weeks from date and same should be settled within one week thereafter. All documents should be disclosed within one month from the settlement of the issues. Thereafter the matter should be taken up for hearing on day-to-day basis and the parties shall not take any adjournment. If any Interlocutory application is filed, the same should be decided immediately or along with the suit itself.
9. The writ petition is thus disposed of. However, there will be no order as to cost.