Heard learned counsel for the applicants.
At the very outset, learned counsel for the applicants, submits that on the similar facts and circumstances, this Court has passed an order on 01.10.2019 in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6496 of 2019 to the following effect:-
"Heard learned counsel for the applicants.
By order dated 23.5.2019 passed in Writ A No.38992 of 2017 filed by the applicants connected with several other writ petitions, the Court directed as under:
"Conclusions:
A. An order of attachment has not been established to have any statutory backing. At least no provision, statutory or otherwise, has been referred to evidence a legal imperative of such an order existing in favour of an institution as a pre condition for it being viewed as one unit.
B. Whether a particular institution fulfills the tests formulated in Vinod Sharma-I would be an issue of fact to be determined in respect of each individual institution. While an institution may be made up of various sections or compartments its oneness would have to be tested on the principles of composite integrality as evolved in this decision. In order to meet the test of composite integrality, it must be established that the institution exists as an amalgam of various components indelibly fused together to constitute a singular whole. The requirement of a common campus cannot be recognised as a determinative factor. The issue of composite integrality would have to be answered upon a cumulative consideration of all relevant factors.
C. Clause 1 of the Government Order dated 27 October 2016 of the State restricting the grant of financial aid to 2055 localities which remain unserviced in the first instance is not found to be arbitrary or irrational. However, the further condition imposed along with the above stipulation and restricting financial aid only to such institutions in these localities which were established prior to 21 June 1973 is irrational and unsustainable.
D. Both Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 of the Government Order dated 27 October 2016 are liable to be struck down as being wholly perverse and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
E. Vinod Sharma-I, II, III and Pawan Kumar Dwivedi do not principally rest upon a construction of the provisions of the statutory enactments applicable. The core principle deducible from these decisions is that all teachers of an attached primary section which constitutes an integral and composite component of the institution as a whole cannot be discriminated against or denied the protection of the 1971 and 1978 Acts per se. These decisions recognised the rights of such teachers traceable to Article 14 of the Constitution.
F. The expression "institution" as defined under the 1971 Act does not exclude a primary section which meets the test of composite integrality with a High School or Intermediate college. The contention that the benefit of the 1971 Act can only apply if all sections of a composite institution are in receipt of financial aid is negated. Teachers of primary sections attached to High Schools and Intermediate colleges, notwithstanding the fact that the said section is not in receipt of financial aid, would be entitled to the benefit of the 1971 Act.
G. In light of the 2017 amendments in the 1972 and 1978 Acts, the expression "institution" has undergone a transformative change. Since primary sections comprising of classes I to V have been statutorily deleted from the definition of an institution they would not be entitled to the benefits of the 1978 Act. Consequently, unaided primary educational institutions having classes I to V ["junior basic schools" as now defined] and those which may be attached to junior high schools would per se not be covered under the provisions of the 1978 Act.
H. The 2017 amendments to the 1972 and 1978 enactments only partially remove the basis on which Vinod Sharma-I, II, III and Pawan Kumar Dwivedi were decided. They do not appear to have removed the basis on which the Courts in the judgments aforementioned had observed that if so implemented the provisions of the statute would be viewed as discriminatory and unconstitutional. The 2017 Amendments would appear to usher in provisions of a character which were disapproved and understood to be potentially discriminatory.
I. However, no provision akin to those introduced by virtue of the 2017 amendments existed when the judgments were pronounced in Vinod Sharma-I, II, III and Pawan Kumar Dwivedi. As long as these provisions remain on the statute book, teachers of junior basic schools and primary sections attached to junior high schools would stand excluded from the coverage of the 1978 Act. However it is not in the province of this Court to rule on the validity of the amendments or enter a declaration of invalidity. It is consequently left open to parties to assail these amendments in accordance with law, if so chosen and desired.
Accordingly and for the reasons aforementioned, these petitions stand disposed of on the following terms:-
Clause 1 of the Government Order dated 27 October 2016 to the extent of prescribing the cut off date of 21 June 1973 as well as Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 thereof are struck down as being as arbitrary and wholly irrational. The State shall in consequence revisit and reframe the impugned Policy in light of the observations made in this judgment. The orders of 13 July 2017 insofar as they defer reconsideration for a period of five years consequentially stand set aside to that extent.
Writ Petitions in Group A insofar as they relate to primary sections attached to recognised and aided high schools or intermediate colleges covered by the provisions of the 1971 Act cannot be denied the protection of that statute. The petitions in this group falling under the aforesaid class shall stand allowed. The State is consequently directed to bring teachers falling in this class within the ambit of the 1971 Act subject to the requisite exercise being undertaken to assess that they satisfy the test of composite integrality.
Writ Petitions in Group A relating to primary sections attached to junior high schools are not covered under the provisions of the 1978 Act. No relief can be granted to them in light of the 2017 Amendments. The petitions preferred at their instance shall stand disposed of subject to liberty being reserved to challenge the 2017 Amendments as introduced in the 1972 and 1978 Acts, if so chosen and advised.
Writ Petitions falling in Group B are allowed. The State shall in consequence reconsider their claims for grant in aid in light of the policy that may be framed in light of the directions issued herein above.
While Writ Petitions falling in Group C to the extent that they assailed the Government Order dated 27 October 2016 are disposed of in light of the directions issued above, no further consequential relief can be granted presently in their favour in the absence of a challenge to the 2017 Amendments introduced in the 1972 and 1978 Acts. Their right to assail these amendments is preserved to be raised in independent proceedings. Similarly writ petitions falling in group 'D' stand disposed of insofar as the challenge to the impugned Government Orders are concerned. The unaided primary sections thereof cannot be granted any relief in the absence of a challenge to the 2017 Amending Acts. Their right to assail the same is preserved. The junior high schools in this group shall however be entitled to assert their claims afresh for grant in aid in light of the conclusions recorded in the body of the judgment."
Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the cases of the applicants are covered in Group 'B' matters relating to primary sections attached to recognized and aided high schools or intermediate colleges covered by the provisions of the Act of 1971. A certified copy of the aforesaid judgement and order was submitted for compliance before the opposite party but the opposite party has wilfully not complied with the order and, thus, has committed civil contempt liable for punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Prima facie a case of contempt has been made out. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, one more opportunity is afforded to the opposite party to comply with the aforesaid order of the Court within six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.
The applicant shall supply a duly stamped registered envelope addressed to the opposite party and another self-addressed stamped envelope to the office within one week from today. The office shall send a copy of this order along with the self-addressed envelope of the applicant with a copy of contempt application to the opposite party within one week thereafter and keep a recorded thereof.
The opposite party shall comply with the directions of the writ court and intimate him of the order through the self-addressed envelop within a week thereafter.
With the aforesaid observations, this application is disposed of at this stage with liberty to the applicant to move a fresh application, if the order is not complied with by the opposite party within the stipulated time as aforementioned. "
Accordingly, the benefit of the order, extended above, is also extended to the applicants herein.
With the aforesaid observations, this contempt application also stands disposed of at this stage with a liberty to the applicant to move a fresh application, if the order is not complied with by the opposite party within the stipulated time, as aforesaid.
Order Date :- 29.11.2019 Amit Mishra