JUDGMENT M. Katju, A.C.J and Umeshwar Pandey, J.
1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan and Ms. Pooja Agrawal, learned Counsel for the appellants and Sri Ashok Khare and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.
2. The facts of the case are that an advertisement was made in the newspaper for one post of Chowkidar and one post of peon belonging to Scheduled Caste/Backward Class. The writ petitioner applied and was selected, but his appointment was not approved by the Regional Higher Education Officer, Agra on the ground that the First Statute of Agra University provides for inviting applications from Employment Exchange and only if the candidates are not available, the advertisement is required to be made in newspapers.
3. The disapproval order of Regional Higher Education Officer, Agra dated 27.9.2002 is Annexure-1 to the Stay Application along with this appeal. A perusal of the order shows that the disapproval has been done because the names of candidates were not called from the District Employment Exchange.
4. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition observing that when advertisement is made in the leading newspaper no objection can be taken that the applications were not invited firstly from the District Employment Exchange. We do not agree with this interpretation.
5. Before dealing with this aspect we may refer to Statute 20.03 (6)(d), of the Agra University, which reads:
"Names of candidates for appointment to a post in class four shall be obtained from the concerned District Employment Officer. In the event of non-availability of suitable candidate in such manner the post may be advertised."
6. The question in this case is about interpretation of the above provision. In Excise Superintendent, Malkapatnam, Krishna District, A.P, v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao and others, (1996) 6 SCC 216, the Supreme Court held that restricting the selection only to the candidates sponsored by Employment Exchange without publicity in the newspapers would be violativc of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. A literal interpretation of Statute 20.03 (6)(d) should hence in our opinion be avoided, as it would make the provision unconstitutional in view of the above Supreme Court decision.
7. It is a settled principle of interpretation that if two interpretations are possible then that interpretation should be preferred which does not to make the statute unconstitutional.
8. On the other hand, a second principle of interpretation is that the Court must not adopt an interpretation which makes any part of the statute redundant.
9. Taking into consideration the above two settled principles of interpretations, in our opinion, the only logical way to interpret Statute 20.03 (6)(d) is that both methods mentioned in clause (d) should be treated as mandatory. In other words, the names must be called from the District Employment Office and there must also be an advertisement in well known newspapers. If we adopt the interpretation canvassed by Sri Khare, learned Counsel for the appellants, that publicity in the newspaper is sufficient compliance of clause (d), in our opinion, such interpretation would make the first part of clause (d) redundant and otiose. That would be inconsistent with the settled principle of interpretation that no interpretation should be adopted, which makes any part of the. statute redundant. On the other hand, a literal interpretation of clause (d) has also to be voided because that would make clause (d) unconstitutional.
10. Hence in our opinion the correct interpretation of clause (d) is that both the methods in clause (d) must be adopted, namely calling the names for the vacancies from the District Employment Office and advertising the vacancies in the well circulated newspapers before the selection is made. No doubt this word would be giving a strained meaning to clause (d) and not a plain and literal meaning, but in our opinion we have to adopt such strained meaning as this is the only logical way of making the provision constitutional as well as avoiding redundancy.
11. Maxwell in the Chapter "Exceptional Construction" in his book "The Interpretation of Statues" writes:
"Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and. even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the Rule of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning."
12. In the same Chapter Maxwell gives several cases where exceptional method has been adopted in construction of statutes in several decisions by the British Courts.
13. In the present case, also we are adopting an exceptional construction of clause (d) as we feel that it is the only way out in the circumstances of the case.
14. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 16.7.2004 are set aside. The respondents may now fill up the vacancies in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.