JUDGMENT D.P. Singh, J.
1. Heard Sri S.D. Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri N.A. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5.
Both these parties have exchanged their pleadings. Though, no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 the learned standing counsel has been heard on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. No one appears on behalf of respondent No. 4, even though service is sufficient on him and no counter-affidavit has been filed by him, even though time was granted to file counter-affidavit.
2. Both the parties agree that the writ petition itself may be disposed of under the Rules of the Court.
3. The facts as revealed from perusal of the record, provides a classical example as to how the atmosphere of an educational institution is polluted. A self-righteous Principal and an adamant Manager, put in a political player with an obliging District Inspector of Schools and a Police Officer, the result is catastrophic. Though the interest of the student is supreme, they are not even mentioned. But this Court has to adhere to cold logic of law.
4. Late Lala Ram Kumar Agarwal started a Junior High School on his own land and constructed a building for the aforesaid school. This was Initially recognised as a Junior High School in 1987 but subsequently High School classes were allowed to start in 1990. The aforesaid institution was being run by donations from the family of Late Lala Ram Kumar Agarwal and others. The respondent No. 5 who was the Headmaster appears to have been the de facto Manager during the life time of Late Lal Ram Kumar Agarwal. After his death, his son and grandson started to manage the institution, which till the time of filing this writ petition, it appears, did not receive any grant-in-aid by the State. After 1995, the grandson Ashish Agarwal became the Manager, and, it appears he started curtailing the powers of the Principal. This began a period of chaos and confrontation. Criminal cases were filed. Enquiries Initiated. Visits of police personnel and extraneous pressure, all began. Ultimately the respondent No. 5 was suspended. This, it appears, resulted into a letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 12.12.1998. wherein the Management was cautioned about financial deficiencies in the management of the institution. It was also mentioned that the suspension of the respondent No. 5 was not correct. This letter is under challenge in this writ petition.
5. A perusal of the aforesaid impugned letter shows that the District Inspector of Schools had pointed out certain financial shortcomings. From the perusal of the letter, it appears, a bid was made to restore the financial powers of respondent No. 5. The wordings of the letter are similar to that of a letter written by the respondent No. 4 (who happened to be the Chairman of the Local Principal Association) to the District Inspector of Schools. The impugned letter appears to be more of a warning than a show cause prior to taking any action. But it does not impinge upon the rights of the petitioner. The observation with regard to the suspension of the Headmaster does not appear to be an order declaring his suspension illegal. In any event, the letter does not reinstate the Headmaster, and the petitioner was free to proceed with the enquiry. What has happened in the enquiry, has not been averred before the Court. The very nature of the impugned letter and the relief sought by this Court thereon, appears to be premature. The letter does not visit the petitioner with any civil consequences.
6. Sri Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the District Inspector of Schools has no jurisdiction to interfere in the functioning of the institution, in any manner, since the institution does not receive grant-in-aid. For the aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of the Lucknow Bench given in the case of City Montessory School v. State of U. P., 1983 UPLBEC 479. As I have already hereinabove held that the writ petition, at this stage appears to be premature, it is not necessary for me to deal with the aforesaid contention at this stage.
7. In view of the discussions noted above, the writ petition is dismissed as being premature, at this stage. It would be open for the petitioner to approach this Court when any action is taken or orders are passed which visit the petitioner with any penal or civil consequences. In my view, the writ petition being premature should be dismissed with the aforesaid liberty to the petitioner.
8. Writ petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observation.