JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. Heard Counsel for the petitioner and Standing Counsel for respondent-State Government.
2. Junior High School Ropan Chapra, district Deoria (here-in-after referred to as the petitioner institution) is a recognized junior high school. It was granted temporary recognition by order dated 12.8.1978 and permanent recognition with effect from 1.7.1984. The petitioner has come up in this petition for a direction to the respondent authorities to bring the aforesaid institution on the grant in aid list.
3. Contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the State Government has treated the petitioner-institution with discrimination and has acted arbitrarily in not taking it on the grant in aid list. According to the petitioner's Counsel, the petitioner-institution has not been brought on the grant in aid list only on the ground that three teachers appeared to have been appointed against non sanctioned posts in the institution which is in fact incorrect as all the teachers had been appointed after approval was granted by the appropriate authority. He submits that other institutions namely Shri Ram Bhagwati Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Shiv Nagar Kishanpur Gavdi Thakur Dwara, Moradabad and Kodra Chintamni Samta Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya Cadhpurva, Deoria, which are similarly situated where some of the teachers were working on non sanctioned posts, have been brought on the grant in aid list by the State Govt., as such action of the State Govt. is directly hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and is arbitrary.
4. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon paragraph 17 of the judgment in Harpal Singh Chauhan and Ors. v. State of U.P. , which reads as under:
It is true that none of the appellants can claim as a matter of right, that their terms should have been extended or that they should be appointed against the existing vacancies, but certainly they can make a grievance that either they have not received the fair treatment by the appointing authority or that the procedure prescribed in the Code and in the Manual aforesaid, has not been followed. While exercising the power of judicial review even in respect of appointment of members of the legal profession as District Government Counsel, the Court can examine whether there was any infirmity in the "decision making process". Of Course, while doing so, the Court cannot substitute its own judgment over the final decision taken in respect of selection of persons for those posts.
5. The Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon paragraph 11 of the judgment in Nitasha Paul v. Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak and Ors. wherein the Apex Court held that it is true that migration cannot be claimed as a matter of right from one University to another but the University cannot decide questions of migration arbitrarily and according to the whims of the Vice Chancellor or the Principal of the Dental College.
No other point has been argued by the Counsel for petitioner.
6. In Harpal Singh Chauhan's case (supra), the Apex Court under its power of judicial review was considering the question of extension of term of District Government Counsel and the procedure followed by the State. In that case, neither any panel of names for extension of term was prepared nor any effective and real consultation between the Sessions Judge and District Magistrate had taken place. But term of the District Government Counsel was not extended because of some vague and general comments by the District Magistrate against some candidates, hence the Court was of the view that requirement of Section 24(4) of Criminal Procedure Code and Para 7.06 of U.P. Legal Remembrancer Manual, was not followed.
7. A close reading of paragraph 17 of Harpat Singh Chauhan's case (supra) would show that the Court was of the view that while exercising the power of judicial review even in respect of appointment of members of the legal profession as District Government Counsel, the Court can examine whether there was any infirmity in the "decision making process" but while doing so, the Court cannot substitute its own judgment over the final decision taken in respect of those posts.
8. In Nitasha Paul's case (supra), students were claiming migration from one university to another and the University decided the question of migration which according to the petitioner was an arbitrary decision. The Apex Court in that context held that migration from one university to another cannot be claimed as a matter of right but the University cannot decide questions of migration arbitrarily and according to the whims of the Vice Chancellor or the Principal of the College.
9. In the instant case, the petitioner has not come out with the case that there is any illegality in the decision making process. His case is simply that he has been discriminated as in respect of some other institutions which have been brought on the grant in aid list where some teachers were also working against non sanctioned posts. According to the petitioner, he has a better case as all appointments made in the institution had been made after taking prior approval from Basic Shiksha Adhikari.
10. Thus, the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases had found an element of arbitrariness and it is in that context, the Court had passed the judgment with approval of the decision in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All E.R.-141, wherein it was held that" The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court."
11. In the present case, the State Government has the authority to look into individual applications of the petitioner pursuant to the advertisement made and it is for the State Government to come to a conclusion after fair treatment. It has not been brought on record by the petitioner what kind of unfair treatment has been given or what illegality is there in the decision making process of the State Government. What is said in the petition is that similarly situated institutions where teachers have been appointed against non sanctioned posts, which institutions have been brought on the grant in aid list but the petitioner institution has not been taken on the said list.
12. In my opinion, the the petitioner has got no legal right to request the Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the State Govt. to give aid to any institution subject to its financial strains and other factors. It is not that all institutions can be brought on the grant in aid list merely because they are eligible in conformity with the guidelines issued by the State Government. The application of the petitioner institution was also considered by the State Government and it is thereafter that it has not been taken on the grant in aid list. It is discretion of the State government to grant aid or not to grant. Where discretion is to be exercised by the authority, it cannot be challenged on the ground of illegality or arbitrariness. In Harpal Singh Chauhan and Nitasha Paul's cases (supra), there was no discretion vested in the authorities rather they were required to act in accordance with provisions and Rules laid down in Cr.P.C., U.P. Legal Remembrancer and the State University Act. The petitioner here received a fair treatment, his application has been considered and the State Govt. has thereafter reached to a conclusion that petitioner institution is not to be taken on grant in aid list. No illegality or defect has been shown in the decision making process. The Court is not inclined to interfere in the conclusion reached by the State which may be based on any number of reasons in favour of other similarly situated institutions. Since in the present case there is discretion of the State Government for taking institutions on the grant in aid list, its action cannot be challenged on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution unless shown to be unfair and arbitrary. Neither it is mandatory for the State Govt. to provide grant in aid to all institutions established in the State nor the State government is obliged to give grant in aid to all institutions which are so established.
13. If the petitioner has chosen to establish and run an institution at its own, he cannot expect the State Government to pay salary to the teachers and employees of the institution. It is the management which has established the institution to arrange and make provision for payment of salary to the teachers and employees.
14. It is the judicious discretion of the State Government to choose some of the institutions which comply with conditions for grant-in-aid and in its opinion advance the cause of education in a particular geographical area of the State to cater needs of children in the State and provide grant to those institutions for their further development. Of course, the discretion has to be judicious and not to mean that all institutions who conform with the policy of the State Government, are to be given grant-in-aid in area of education only at the cost of development of other areas requiring development.
15. The State government has limited resources from revenue. It cannot overlook its duties in other sectors like power, infrastructure, roads and industry etc. Since all its revenue cannot be poured by it only in the education sector and a balance has to be struck between development in other sectors also, therefore, no institution can claim as of legal right grant-in-aid to its school.
16. As the petitioner has no legal right to demand grant in aid merely because it has established an institution at his own or falls within the eligibility criteria laid down in various Govt. orders or of policy framed by the State Government for the purpose, this Court is not inclined to interfere in such matters while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.