JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J.
1. Petitioner has entered the portals of this Court challenging the impugned order (Annexure 30) passed by the Vice-Chancellor, Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut, whereby the Vice-Chancellor has revoked the suspension order dated 9.3.97, passed by the Management Committee, D.N. (PG) College, Meerut, of course, qualifying it with a proviso that the on-going disciplinary enquiry against the 3rd respondent-Dr. P.C. Pachuari, suspended Principal of the College, may go on.
2. The Petition was presented in the Registry on 4th June, 1997 with a concommitant application for interim relief in addition to a separate application attended with an affidavit, unfolding therein the urgency for the matter to heard in the course of vacation. On the urgency application, the learned Senior Vacation Judge seripted the following order :
"5.6.97 Registry does not find the case to be urgent. Report of the Registry is upheld. Petition may come up after vacation.
Sd-DS Sinha Sr. Vacation Judge."
3. On 5.6.97 itself, the petitioner moved another application which came to be registered as Civil Misc. Application No. 39367 of 1997 praying therein that the Court may call for the record of the writ petition consistent with its urgency and pass such other and further order as the Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances. Viewing the urgency in its pros and cons, the said application was directed by this Court to be put up with the record the following day and that is how, the matter has found its access to this Court on 6.6.1997.
4. Heard Sri Shailendra for the petitioner, Sri S.N. Upadhaya for the Vice-Chancellor and Sri Ramesh Upadhayaya holding brief of Sri V.K. Shukla, appearing for the 3rd respondent. The learned Counsel appearing for the Vice-Chancellor raised a preliminary objection that in the teeth of the order passed by the learned Sr. Vacation Judge, relegating the petition to come up after vacation, this Court is left with no jurisdiction to hear the matter. The Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent put weight to the said argument of Sri S.N. Upadhayaya on the question of jurisdiction and on merits, he urged that no case was made out obstenibly for interference by this Court. The first question, therefore, that is to be decided is whether the Court is seized of the jurisdiction to hear the matter during vacations. It is beyond the pale of controversy that "fresh in service writs" was apportioned by the Hon. C.J. to this Court for the first week commencing from June 2 to June 6 of the summed vacation, 1997 and besides nominating vacation Judges in different jurisdictions, the Hon. C.J. nominated Hon. D.S. Sinha, J to act as of Senior Vacation Judge during summer vacation, 1997 with the following rider :
"During the vacation, only urgent matters which cannot wait till the opening of the Court, can be entertained. Civil cases and writ petitions filed during the vacation should be accompanied by a separate application supported by an affidavit specifically stating the urgency in the matter. Such application will be examined by the Addl. Registrar (Listing) or any Officer Incharge of his office during the vacation and in case, it is felt that the case is not urgent, and it can wait till the reopening of the Court the record will be placed before the Hon. Senior Vacation Judge for his consideration."
5. Requirement of civil cases and writ petitions being accompanied by a separate application supported by an affidavit stating the urgency in the matter is not a requirement of the Rules of the Court, 1952. It is under the order aforestated that a separate urgency application is required to be filed in civil cases and writ-petitions. However, it brooks no dispute that the constitution of Benches and allocation of work to each Bench is prerogative of the Chief Justice and the same finds its echo in Chapter V, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, 1952. Rule 10 of Chapter V which is the relevant mariner's compass for the controversy on hand is excerpted below :-
"10. Judge on duty during vacation- (1) Criminal work shall continue to be dealt with during the vacation by such Judges as may be appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice.
(They may also exercise original, appellate, revisional, civil or writ jurisdiction vested in the Court in fresh matters which in their opinion require immediate attention.) Such jurisdiction may be exercised even in cases which are under the Rules cognizable by two or more Judges, unless the case is required by any other law to be heard by more than one Judge.
(2) Subject to any general or special order of the Chief Justice, the senior-most vacation Judge at Allahabad or Lucknow, as the case may be, shall in the absence of the Chief Justice exercise jurisdiction at Allahabad or Lucknow as the case may be, in connection with the arrangement of Benches, listing of cases and other like matters."
6. It is mentioned from Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 abstracted above, that Senior-most Vacation Judge has to exercise jurisdiction, in the absence of the Chief Justice, in connection with the arrangement of Benches, listing of cases, and other like matters "subject to any general or special order of the Chief Justice". The order extracted above, is referable for its source of power, to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the Rules aforestated. It cannot be repudiated that the aforestated order passed by the Chief Justice directing that the urgency application "will be examined by the Addl. Registrar (Listing) or any officer Incharge of his office during vacation and in case, it is felt that the case is not urgent and it can wait till the opening of the Court, the record will be placed before Hon. Senior Vacation Judge for his consideration" has the complexion of 'administrative' order as distinguished from 'judicial' or 'legislative' hues. The crux of the question which craves for determination is that what is the nature of function of the Senior Vacation Judge in relation to the classification of urgent and non-urgent civil cases and writ petitions which he performs in exercise of the power vested in him by virtue of the order" of the Chief Justice quoted above. In my opinion, consideration of urgency in respect of civil cases and writ petitions by the Senior Vacation Judge under the aforesaid order of the Chief Justice is an administrative function and any order by the Senior Vacation Judge singling out civil cases and writ petitions as non-urgent cannot fetter and stymie the exercise of discretion vested in the Court under Rule 10 (1) of the Rules in relation to fresh matters allocated to it by the order of the Chief Justice. What is subject to such order of the Chief Justice. Apply, it may be observed that exercise of the discretion and power by the Court under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 is not subject to any general or specific order of the Chief Justice. What is subject to such order of the Chief Justice is the exercise of the administrative powers by the Senior Vacation Judge. The Court concerned may entertain any fresh matter appertaining to jurisdiction allocated to it, which in its opinion, requires immediate attention and the discretion of the Court in this respect cannot be shackled by an administrative order. The Senior Vacation Judge may lend approval to the exercise of classification of urgent and non-urgent civil cases and writ petitions undertaken by the Registry and albeit the approval so given, deserves respect but it being an administrative order would not operate as an obstacle in to exercise of discretion by the concerned Court to entertain a fresh matter which in its opinion, needs immediate tearing attention, as postulated in second part of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Rules.
7. A perusal of the programme of sitting during summer vacation 1997 at Allahbad publicised in the cause-list on 29.5.1997, would be eloquent of the fact that the Senior Vacation Judge has not been clothed with any judicial function in any jurisdiction and the order by the Chief Justice authorising the Senior Vacation Judge to consider the matter churned out by Addl. Registrar (Listing) or any officer Incharge of his office during vacation as non-urgent, to my mind, has the trapping of an administrative order incapable of fettering the jurisdiction of the concerned Court vested in it under the second part of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 which authorises the Vacation Judge to entertain such fresh matters appertaining to his jurisdiction, which, in his opinion. "require immediate attention." The power vested in a Bench in relation to the business allocated to it by the Chief Justice under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of Chapter V of the Rules, read with Articles 226/227 of the Constitution or under Section 151, C.P.C. depending on whether the matter on hand is writ petition or civil case, is not in any manner fettered or over-reached by any order passed by the Senior Vacation Judge.
8. Mere fact that the classification of urgent and non-urgent, civil and writ matters is done under the order of the Chief Justice by the Senior Vacation Judge, is not sufficient to make the classification so done as a judicial function for it is settled that even a Judge may have an administrative function. In Shanker Lal v. Shanker Lal, AIR 1965 SC 506, the Apex Court was pleased to observe as under :
"That the power is entrusted to or wielded by a person who functions as a Court is not decisive of a question whether the act or decision is administrative or judicial. But we conceive that an administrative order would be one which is directed to the regulation or supervision of matters as distinguished from an order which decides the rights of parties or confers or refuses to confer rights to property which are subject of adjudication before the Court."
9. In the process of considering urgency, neither the Registry nor the Senior Vacation Judge is required to adopt the judicial approach and comply with the basic requirements of justice. In this view of the matter, I am pursuaded to the view that the order passed by the Senior Vacation Judge, lending approbation to the oral finding to the Registrary that the matter is not urgent, constituted nothing but an administrative exercise as contrasted with a judicial function. I have searched the entire record in vain to find out the reason which pursued the learned Senior Vacation Judge to view that the matter was not urgent. If one delves in to the record of the case on hand, one would find that it does not contain any report or any finding by the Addl. Registrar (Listing) or any Officer Incharge of his office to give prop to the basis that the matter is not urgent. Approval by the Senior Vacation Judge of the oral finding/report given by the Registry that the matter was not urgent cannot, in my opinion, operate as an impediment in the way of the Court to take a decision and pass appropriate orders in the matter, if approached by means of an application. The Court was confronted with altogether different situations in State v. Debi Dayal, AIR 1959 Alld. 421, Ramveer v. Superintendent, Distt., Jail and Ors., 1995 (3) AWC 1539; S.K. Srivastava v. Acting Chief Justice and Ors., 1996 (2) AWC 644; and Inder Mani v. Matheswari Prasad, (1996) 6 SCC 587, reliance on which was placed by Counsel appearing for respondent in support of their preliminary objection. The decisions cited above are of peripheral relevance and the point raised herein was not up for consideration in any of the cases aforestated. Similarly, Rule 13, Chapter V and Rule 16, Chapter VI came in to play in respect of orders on judicial side. Preliminary objection is therefore liable to be over-ruled.
10. In any case the Rules, it may be observed, are intended to serve as vehicle of justice. They are 'means' and not 'ends' themselves. The Rules of the Court as also Executive orders issued by Hon. C.J. relating to urgency have to be construed liberally as to advance the cause of justice and not so as to block its course and litigants from having access to the Temple of Justice. Executive orders stand on a much lower pedestal than Rules. They can, under no circumstances, fetter or over-ride the statutory and constitutional exercise of discretion by the Court under Rule 10 (1) of the Rules read with Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and Section 151, C.P.C. in respect of writ petitions and civil cases including application therein. Optimum utilisation of time and energy of vacation Courts would be salubrious and would subserve the larger public interest to avoid accumulation and deluge of work in the post vacation period. In S. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, JT 1993 (5) SC, 27, it has been aptly observed by his Lordship, R.M. Sahai, J. as under :
"Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.....Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher Courts is funded on enquiry and fairness."
11. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent, who happens to be the Principal of the College, was suspended from service by the Committee of Management pursuant to the resolution dated 9.3.1997 on grave charges of financial irregularities and administrative lapses. The petitioner apprehends that revocation of suspension and re-instatement of the 3rd respondent pending enquiry could risk the consequence of blunting the free and fair enquiry into serious allegations of defalcation of public funds and could afford on a platter an opportunity to the 3rd respondent to spirit away the material evidence which the may take possession of after being reopened to the office of Principal. I find the submissions made by the Counsel cogent and plausible and loaded with substance and I am further of the view that delayed intervention by the Court may defeat the ends of justice and therefore, having regard to the element of public interest providing the matter involved in the case, I find this matter to be pre-eminently urgent one so as to be taken up during vacation for the petitioner cannot wait till the opening of the Court except at the expense of public interest being jeopardised.
12. In the conspectus of the facts and circumstances discussed above, it is hereby provided that until further orders by the Court, the operation of the impugned order shall remain stayed and the parties shall maintain status quo as on date immediately preceding the date of impugned order.