JUDGMENT BY THE COURT :
For the opinion of this Court, the Tribunal referred the following question under s. 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961 :
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there should have been two separate assessments for the two periods as claimed by the assessee or one assessment for the entire previous year as framed by the ITO ?"
2. The facts are that upto 8th May, 1973, the assessee-firm comprised two major partners, namely, Smt. Munni Devi and Shri Ram Nath Gupta and two minors, who were admitted to the benefits of partnership. On 9th May, 1973, two more major partners were admitted and seven minor partners were admitted to the benefits of partnership in place of Km. Asha Devi Gupta and Km. Madhu Gupta. The assessee filed two returns for two periods viz. from 5th November, 1972 to 8th May, 1973 and from 9th May, 1973 to 25th October, 1973 and prayed before the assessing authority that two assessments for two broken periods be made.
The assessing authority rejected the contention of the assessee and made one assessment for the entire period from 5th November, 1972 to 25th October, 1973, when the asst. yr. 1974-75 ended.
On appeal, the CIT(A) reversed the order of the assessing authority and held that two separate assessments for two broken periods should have been made by the assessing authority, as claimed by the assessee.
On further appeal, the Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A).
3. The question referred to this Court is no more res integra, inasmuch as a Full Bench of this Court in Vishwanath Seth vs. CIT (1984) 146 ITR 249 (All) (FB) held that in the case of reconstitution, a firm which retains its identity, is assessable in respect of the income for the entire accounting year. From the facts, as stated above, it is clear that the firm was merely reconstituted and that there was no dissolution of the firm.
In view of Vishwanath Seth (supra), we hold that one assessment for the entire previous year relevant to the asst. yr. 1974-75 was rightly made by the assessing authority.
4. The question referred to this Court is answered accordingly.