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Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Harijan Evam Nirbal Varg Avas ...

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad|06 December, 1995

JUDGMENT / ORDER

JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J.
1. At the instance of the Revenue, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal drew up a statement of case and referred the two following questions to this court for its opinion :
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Tribunal was justified in law in holding that objects Nos. 2 to 5 as mentioned in the memorandum of association of the company were supplementary and were introduced with a view to achieve the object mentioned in Clause No. 1 of the said memorandum of association and without that the corporation cannot achieve its main objects ?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Tribunal was correct in law in holding that income attributable in executing the housing schemes and the other connected schemes therewith for the benefit of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are exempt under Section 10(26B) of the Income-tax Act, "1961, when the corporation was also formed for promoting the interests of backward classes and other weaker sections of the society ?"
The main objects of the assessee a Government (public) company, as defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, named as Harijan Evam Nirbal Varg Avas Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the assessee), are as follows :
(1) To frame and execute housing schemes and schemes connected therewith in the State of Uttar Pradesh for the benefit of Harijans, backward classes and other weaker sections.
(2) To undertake works as civil engineers, to carry out construction, maintenance and improvement of roads and buildings of all kinds and of barrages, dams, aqueducts, bridges, culverts, rope-ways electric and sanitary installations and town and village planning works.
(3) To manufacture, buy, sell, instal, work, alter, improve, manipulate or otherwise deal in all kinds of bricks, tiles, earthenware, cement, stone, sand, hardware and other building materials, equipment, tools and machinery connected with the construction of roads and buildings of all kinds.
(4) To purchase, take on lease or otherwise take over any roads, buildings, owned by the State Government for the purpose of construction, maintenance or management thereof.
(5) To establish, maintain and operate any transport service in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
The objects incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the main objects of the assessee, are as many as fifty, as enumerated in the memorandum of association which had been produced before us by the parties. We do not consider it necessary to reproduce them. It will suffice to state for the purpose of this reference that the ancillary objects are wholly different from the main objects. Besides the main and ancillary objects, the memorandum of association of the assessee sets out three other objects in Clause (C). The main objects and the ancillary objects are enumerated in Clause (A) and Clause (B) respectively in the memorandum of association.
2. The assessee claimed exemption under Section 10, Clause (26B), of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (briefly, the Act), which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1980, with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1972. Section 10, Clause (26B) is as under :
" 10. Incomes not included in total income. - In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included-- . .
(26B) any income of a corporation established by a Central, State or Provincial Act or of any other body, institution or association (being a body, institution or association wholly financed by Government) where such corporation or other body or institution or association has been established or formed for promoting the interests of the members of either the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this clause, 'Scheduled Castes' and 'Scheduled Tribes' shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in Clauses (24) and (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution."
Clause (26B) was amended by the Finance Act, 1994, with effect from 1st April, 1993, and the words occurring therein in the parenthetical clause were substituted for the words "members of either the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both". As the instant case related to the assessment year 1979-80, we are concerned with the unamended clause reproduced hereinbefore.
3. The Income-tax Officer rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under Clause (26B) of Section 10. On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (CIT (Appeals) for brevity's sake) accepted the contention of the assessee that it falls within the expression "any other body" occurring in Clause (26B) and is wholly financed by the Government. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), however, denied exemption on the ground that the assessee is free to pursue any of its main objects and that it is not formed only for promoting the interests of Scheduled Castes. He took the view that out of the five main objects, only one of the objects, i.e., object No. 1, relates to framing and executing housing schemes and schemes connected therewith in the State of Uttar Pradesh for the benefit of the Harijans. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was of the view that the existence of object No. 1 alone which comes within the ambit of Clause (26B), will not entitle the assessee to claim exemption under that clause, inasmuch as the assessee is free to pursue other main objects having nothing to do with object No. 1.
4. On further appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Tribunal held :
(a) that object No. 1 is the main and dominant object and objects Nos. 2 to 5 enumerated in Clause (A) of the memorandum of association, are "supplementary" ;
(b) that without objects Nos. 2 to 5, object No. 1 cannot be achieved ;
(c) that to make the housing schemes ideal, it is necessary to pursue the activities covered by the remaining objects Nos. 2 to 5 ;
(d) that without pursuing objects Nos. 2 to 5, the housing scheme as envisaged by object No. 1 cannot be executed ;
(e) that the assessee is not engaged in any profit earning activity; and
(f) that the letter addressed by the Special Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, to the Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, fully establishes that the housing schemes executed pursuant to object No. 1 by the assessee are for promoting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and also of the backward classes and other weaker sections.
The Tribunal, however, clarified that since the assessee pursued the activities also for the promotion of the interests of the backward classes and other weaker sections, its full income is not exempted and that the income attributable to the housing schemes and other connected schemes undertaken for the benefit of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only, is exempted.
5. Since the Tribunal partly accepted the case of the assessee, it did not go into the alternative plea of exemption under Section 10(20A) of the Act.
6. The first question for consideration is whether the Tribunal was right in holding that object No. 1 is the main and dominant object and objects Nos. 2 to 5 as enumerated in Clause (A) of the memorandum of association of the assessee are supplementary. Object No. 2 (reproduced hereinbefore) enables the assessee to undertake works as civil engineers, to carry out construction, maintenance, the improvement of roads and buildings of all kinds, of barrages, dams, aqueducts, bridges, culverts, ropeways, electric and sanitary installations and town and village planning works. The Tribunal, to elucidate its point of view, observed ;
"To elucidate further, it may be mentioned that while executing the housing schemes, the roads, dams, bridges, culverts, roadways, hospitals, etc., had to be constructed otherwise the housing scheme cannot be an ideal scheme. The Government wanted to construct the housing scheme and for achieving the object, the complete plan and objects were mentioned in the memorandum of association. Without objects Nos. 2 to 5 the scheme cannot be executed."
We do not agree with the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. In our opinion, construction of dams, bridges, barrages, aqueducts, ropeways, etc., are not necessary to complete a housing colony. Construction of a dam is a big and independent project in itself. May be that to complete that project, construction of temporary houses to accommodate the staff employed for construction, may be necessary but to complete a housing colony, construction of dams, barrages, aqueducts, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be ancillary or necessary. Similarly, the remaining main objects enumerated in Clause (A) of the memorandum of association, are not necessary to execute a housing scheme. A housing scheme taken up for the benefit of Harijans prima facie means to provide accommodation to the people of such a category. No doubt construction of a housing colony for the benefit of Harijans implies construction of approach roads, but in no case does it imply construction of barrages, dams, ropeways, bridges etc. The view of the Tribunal that construction of dams, bridges, roads, barrages, etc., is an integral part of the housing colony is patently erroneous. Each main object, in our opinion, is independent and the activities connected therewith may be pursued independently. Our view is also fortified by the memorandum of association, inasmuch as under Clause (B), the objects incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the main objects are separately provided and besides them under Clause (C) other objects are enumerated. If objects Nos. 2 to 5 falling under Clause (A) were supplementary to object No. 1, then they would have been enumerated in Clause (B) and not in Clause (A). No doubt, the objects enumerated in Clause (B) are ancillary or incidental to the main objects enumerated in Clause (A).
7. This being so, the income earned from all the main objects cannot be exempted under Clause (26B), because objects Nos. 2 to 5, in no way, promote the interests of Harijans.
8. Then, the question is whether income earned from the activities covered by main object No. 1 will qualify for exemption. The argument of learned standing counsel is that unless the assessee is formed solely for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both, no exemption can be claimed under Clause (26B) as it stood in the relevant assessment year. Though the assessee was formed for the benefit of Harijans, backward classes and other weaker sections as stated in the main object No. 1, the Tribunal rightly took the view that the income attributable to the housing schemes being executed within the meaning of main object No. 1 for the backward classes, will not be entitled to exemption, because the expression "backward classes" was inserted in Clause (26B) only by the Finance Act, 1994, with effect from April 1, 1993. Clause (26B) does not refer to the words "weaker sections" at all. To this extent, main object No. 1 is inconsistent with Clause (26B).
9. Before the Appellate Tribunal, the Revenue raised a preliminary objection that the assessee had not been formed for promoting the interest of the members of either the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, inasmuch as the main object No. 1 does not refer to those terms, but that simply refers to Harijans, backward classes and other weaker sections, which are not relevant for the purpose of this case. Reiterating the same argument, learned counsel for the Revenue submitted before us that the assessee being formed for the benefit of Harijans and other weaker sections which expression does not find place in Clause (26B), will not be entitled to exemption under that clause. The Appellate Tribunal, on the basis of the material on record, concluded that the assessee was formed "for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes besides the members of the backward classes and other weaker sections of the society". The terms "backward classes" and "other weaker sections" not being germane to this case, the question remains whether upon consideration of the term "Harijans", the conclusion reached by the Appellate Tribunal that the assessee was formed for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, can be upheld. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Father of the Nation--Mahatma Gandhi--coined the word "Harijan" for the people of Scheduled Castes and the word "Girijan" for the Scheduled Tribes. Commonly understood, the term "Harijan" refers to the members of the Scheduled Castes only. The term "Harijan" does not include "Girijan"--a word specifically coined by Gandhiji for the members of the Scheduled Tribes. We, therefore, fail to understand the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal that the term "Harijan" refers both to the members of the Scheduled Castes and the members of the Scheduled Tribes. In our opinion, this word is confined only to the members of the Scheduled Castes. Fiscal provisions require strict interpretation and if that principle is borne in mind, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the assessee was formed only for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and for the benefit of the people of backward classes and other weaker sections, which are not relevant for the purpose of Clause (26B). It appears that the Appellate Tribunal was influenced by a letter of the Special Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh dated January 9, 1981, addressed to the Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, which states that the assessee, inter alia, was formed for the development of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This letter is not relevant to unfold the meaning of the word "Harijan". This word should be interpreted from the point of view as to how it is understood by the people in common parlance and in which sense it was being officially used by the Government. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the word "Harijan" referred to both the members of the Scheduled Castes and the members of the Scheduled Tribes. The authorities are expected to be very clear about the meaning of the word "Harijan", used in object No. 1 of the memorandum of association. Since the word "Harijan" referred to the members of the Scheduled Castes, a body wholly financed by the Government--may be entitled to exemption under Clause (26B) as that clause does not use the term Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes conjunctively but alternatively. By virtue of the words "or of both", occurring in Clause (26B), even if a body is formed for both, i.e., the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, still it will be entitled to exemption. So, if a body is formed only for the benefit of the Scheduled Castes, it will be entitled to exemption.
10. The chief contention of the Revenue is that unless the activities of the assessee are limited to the main object No. 1 only, it will not be entitled to exemption under Clause (26B). The scope of Clause (26B) is not circumscribed by the words "only", "solely", "exclusively" or "wholly", but the expression used in that clause is "formed for promoting the interests of the members of either the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both". When the word "only", "exclusively" or "solely" is not used in Clause (26B) as a prefix or suffix to the past participle "formed" occurring in that clause, we are of the view that there is no reason to read Clause (26B) in a restricted manner. A corporation established by the Central or State Government or any other body, institution or association wholly financed by the Government may have several objects--some for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both and some not. The said corporation or the body, in our view, will be entitled to exemption in respect of the income, which is attributable to the execution of housing schemes for the promotion of the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both.
11. Parliament has used the word "exclusively" in Sub-clause (a) to the proviso to Clause (21), the word "solely" in Clause (22) and again the words "wholly and exclusively" in Sub-clause (a) to the third proviso to Clause (23) of Section 10. These clauses we have mentioned for sample sake and they clearly indicate that wherever Parliament considered it necessary, it used the words "solely", "wholly" or "exclusively" and omitted them from the other clauses wherever they were not required. Otherwise also, a statutory provision, and more so a provision of a fiscal statute, should be read without adding into it or subtracting any word therefrom. So long as Clause (26B) can be properly construed on the plain language of it, addition of a foreign word into it will be wholly unwarranted.
12. Clause (26B) like other clauses of Section 10 provides exemption in respect of any income of a corporation established by a Central or State Government. The assessee being a body within the meaning of Clause (26B) may qualify for exemption under that clause if it is established that it was formed for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both. Simply because the assessee has some other main objects besides one of the objects for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes, there seems to be no good reason to deny the exemption, envisaged by Clause (26B). The principle of severability of common law is well recognised in our country. In so far as the income of the assessee from the main object No. 1, is severable from the income accruing to it from other main objects, we see no legal infirmity in taking the view that the assessee's income attributable to the housing schemes undertaken for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes will be entitled to exemption under Clause (26B).
13. The matter may be looked at from the angle of constitutional law as well. Article 47 of the Constitution of India mandates, inter alia, that the State shall regard the raising of the standard of living of its people and improvement of public health as its primary duty. Article 46 of the Constitution enjoins upon the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in particular and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. These two articles put together, cast a duty on the State to protect the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and raise their standard of living. Exemption under Clause (26B) is in furtherance of these articles.
14. It need hardly be mentioned that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. All other laws, including the Income-tax Act, are subordinate to the Constitution and must be read and interpreted in the light of the constitutional provisions. We, therefore, must take into account articles 46 and 47 while interpreting Section 10(26B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and give the latter provision a meaning which will further the object of the former articles.
15. Clause (26B), therefore, deserves to be interpreted in such a way as to promote the schemes undertaken for ameliorating the lot of the members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both. A corporation or other bodies may be formed having one of -the objects for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or of both and if strict interpretation is put on Clause (26B), then they will be precluded from taking the benefit of exemption. Clause (26B) is, therefore, to be interpreted in such manner as to encourage the corporations or other bodies to undertake the activities to promote the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes more and more, rather than to defeat the purpose of Clause (26B). Viewed from this angle, there is no justification to put a restricted interpretation on Clause (26B). The plurality of objects of the assessee will, therefore, not disentitle it from claiming exemption under Clause (26B), but benefit of the exemption will be confined only to the main object No. 1, which alone refers to the promotion of interests of the Scheduled Castes.
16. Then, learned counsel for the assessee argued before us that the activities under main objects Nos. 2 to 5 in the memorandum of association are undertaken to generate resources for being ultimately utilised for executing housing schemes for the benefit of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes under the main object No. 1, and, therefore, the whole income of the assessee is liable to be exempted under Clause (26B). To buttress his argument, he relied on a letter of January 9, 1981, addressed by the Special Secretary to the Government of U. P. to the Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, stating that the Government of Uttar Pradesh for executing various Government schemes for the development of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes established several bodies, including the assessee. His submission is that the assessee being formed only for promoting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as certified by the Government of Uttar Pradesh also under that letter, the whole income of the assessee will be entitled to exemption under Clause (26B). This contention of the assessee deserves to be rejected straightaway. For what purpose a corporation or a body is established, that has to be considered in the light of the memorandum of association and not on the basis of a communication sent by the Secretary to the Government of U. P. to the Secretary of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi. From the memorandum of association, it is patent that the assessee may earn income from several objects. But it will be entitled to exemption only in respect of the income earned from the activity which is consistent with Clause (26B).
17. Counsel for the assessee further argued that, in fact, the assessee earned income only from the execution of the housing schemes under the main object No. 1 and not from the activities covered by any other object. This is not very relevant for the purpose of this case. When the assessee has several main objects, then it is capable of earning income from all those objects and it is wholly irrelevant to see whether in a given year, the assessee earned income only from one of the objects or all.
18. Whereas the Tribunal was right to exclude the income earned from the execution of housing schemes undertaken for the promotion of backward classes, the Tribunal was wrong in allowing blanket exemption for all the activities, covered by all the main objects. If the income earned from object No. 1 is not severable from the income of other main objects and if income from all the main objects is inextricably mixed up, then the assessee will not be entitled to exemption even in respect of the income earned from the housing schemes, executed for the benefit of the members of the Scheduled Castes.
19. The assessee will do better if it gets the main object No. 1 suitably amended to make it consistent with the provisions of Section 10, Clause (26B), of the Income-tax Act.
20. Question No. 1 is, therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and question No. 2 is partly answered in favour of the assessee to the effect that the income attributable to the housing schemes executed under the main object No. 1, for promoting the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes only will be entitled to exemption, provided that is severable from the income accruing to the assessee from other main objects.
21. Let the record of the case be sent down to the Appellate Tribunal to pass an order conformably to our judgment.
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Title

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Harijan Evam Nirbal Varg Avas ...

Court

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad

JudgmentDate
06 December, 1995
Judges
  • O Prakash
  • M Katju