JUDGMENT G.P. Mathur, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed for quashing the judgment and order dated April 2, 1998 passed in O.A No. 1273 of 1973 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad.
2. Ajai Singh, respondent No. 1 to the writ petition, was appointed as a casual class IV employee in the office of the Commissioner, Income Tax, Allahabad, on September 7, 1994, and his services were terminated on November 4, 1997. He challenged termination of his service by filing an Original Application. The Tribunal held that as the services of respondent No. 1 has been terminated on account of non-satisfactory work, it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to hold a formal departmental enquiry and as the same was not done, the termination of his services was illegal.
3. We have heard Sri Amit Sthalekar for the petitioner, Sri O.P. Gupta for respondent No. 1, and have perused the record.
4. It may be stated at the very outset that before the Tribunal Ajai Singh neither filed copy of the appointment order nor the copy of the order by which his services were terminated. It was stated in paragraph 4 (i) of the Original Application that Annexure-1 thereof is the copy of the notice given to him on November 4, 1997. In the said notice he has been described as a daily wager and it was mentioned therein that his services would stand terminated w.e.f. November 4, 1997. The order nowhere mentions that his services were being terminated on account of unsatisfactory work. The whole basis of the order passed by the Tribunal is that the services of respondent No. 1 had been terminated on account of unsatisfactory work and, consequently, it was obligatory upon the writ petitioner to hold a formal enquiry. The view taken by the Tribunal is, therefore, not borne out from the material on record and, thus cannot be sustained.
5. In reply to the Original Application which was filed by Ajai Singh, before the Tribunal, the writ petitioner filed a counter affidavit and therein it was stated that his services had been terminated on account of his unsatisfactory work and not by way of punishment. The reference to unsatisfactory work of respondent No. 1 in the counter affidavit should not be read in isolation but should be read in the context in which it has been used and the pleas taken by the writ petitioner should be read as a whole. The Tribunal has erred in dissecting one word from the counter affidavit and, thereafter, proceeding to hold on its basis that the services of the respondent had been terminated on account of any specific charge. It was a simple order of termination which will be evident from the notice given to respondent No. 1. There was absolutely no material to show that the same had been done on account of any imputation or charge. The order did not visit him with any evil consequences.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent has, on the strength of the decision in Dr. Ms. Sumati P. Shere v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 1431 : 1989 (3) SCC 311 : 1989-II-LLJ-228, submitted that the termination of services of Ajai Singh without holding any enquiry was illegal. We are unable to accept the submission made. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. SGPGI of Medical Sciences, AIR 2002 SC 23 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 170 : 2002-I-LLJ-690 the services of the employee had been terminated and it was mentioned in the termination order that in the extended period of probation his work and conduct had not been found to be satisfactory. A similar contention was raised on behalf of the employee that the order was punitive and cast a stigma on him and consequently it could not be sustained without a full-scale departmental enquiry. The Court after considering a number of earlier decisions on the point held as follows, in para 21 of the report:
"One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was - (a) full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld."
7. In Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. LA. Balkrishna, 2001 (9) SCC 319 it has been held that the mere fact that in response to the challenge, the employer states that the services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment.
8. Applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the above mentioned case, we are clearly of the opinion that the order of termination was neither punitive nor cast any stigma upon the petitioner. There was absolutely no necessity to hold any departmental enquiry and the view to the contrary taken by (sic) the Tribunal is wholly erroneous in law.
9. The writ petition accordingly succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated April 2, 1998 of the Central Administrative Tribunal is quashed.