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Commissioner Of Central Excise Surat Ii vs Gujarat Borosil Ltd Opponents

High Court Of Gujarat|05 July, 2012
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JUDGMENT / ORDER

(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI) 1. Looking to the controversy involved instead of admitting the appeals, we have heard learned counsel for the parties for final disposal of the appeals at the admission stage.
2. Draft amendment is allowed and may be carried out forthwith. These appeals involve common questions of law and of facts. For the purpose of this order, we may record facts as emerging in Tax Appeal No.160/2009.
3. Said appeal has been filed by the Revenue calling in question the legality and validity of decision of the Customs Excise and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (“the Tribunal” for short) dated 12.9.2008.
4. Following question of law has been presented for our consideration :
“Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal has committed substantial error of law in rejecting application for condonation of delay and consequently dismissing appeal of the appellant?”
5. Respondent assessee is engaged in manufacturing safety glasses. It is exigible to excise duty and also pays such duty regularly. There have been long standing disputes between the assessee and the department with respect to inclusion of secondary packing charges in the assessable value of such product. Previously, when the Adjudicating Authority raised such demands and framed the assessment, the respondent approached the Appellate Commissioner. The Appellate Commissioner by his order dated 28.5.1997 ruled in favour of the respondents. Such decision was carried in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 4.10.2002 confirmed the order of the CIT(Appeals). These decisions gave rise to refund claims. Such claims were allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals) by order dated 30.3.2007. Against such order department preferred appeal before the Tribunal which came to be dismissed. Against which we are informed this Court also dismissed Tax Appeal No.1569/2010 on 7.4.2011.
6. For different periods therefore, demands were raised by the Assessing Officer which gave rise to further appeal proceedings. The Commissioner(Appeals) passed two separate orders both on 8.3.2006 and allowed the appeal of the respondents deleting the duty demands. These orders were placed before the Committee of the Commissioners ('Committee' for short) to take a decision whether appeal should be filed against such order or not. The Committee had at one stage on 8.6.2006 taken a decision not to file appeal. However, subsequently the same Committee on 20.8.2008 decided to file appeal and authorised an officer in this behalf to present such appeal before the Tribunal. Obviously, since such appeal was belated, the department also filed delay condonation application explaining such delay. Such delay condonation application however, came to be dismissed by the Tribunal by an order dated 12.9.2008 which is challenged in Tax Appeal No.160/2009. Similar but a separate order rejecting delay application in another proceeding came to be passed by the Tribunal which has given rise to Tax Appeal No.318/2009.
7. The Tribunal was of the opinion that it was only when the Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the refund in favour of the assessee that the appeals came to be filed. According to the Tribunal, this reflected upon the intention of the Revenue to deny the assessee consequent relief of refund and the present proceedings were carried only with an intention to undo the effect of the earlier order. The Tribunal was of the opinion that delay was not properly explained. The Tribunal also opined that the Committee could not review its own decision once having decided not to challenge the order of the Commissioner(Appeals).
8. Learned Senior Counsel Shri R.J. Oza for the appellant submitted that when the Committee previously took a decision not to appeal, decision of the Apex Court in case of Commr. Of C. Ex., Allahabad v. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd. reported in 2005(181) ELT 178 (SC), was not noticed. Such decision according to the counsel had direct bearing on the issues involved. Subsequently, when such decision was brought to the notice of the Committee, a fresh decision was taken. Appeal was filed with condonation application. Such appeal should have been heard on merits after condoning the delay. Taking us through the file notings which we had permitted the counsel to place on record before us, he submitted that there was sufficient justification for the Committee to change its previous decision. The delay was caused on this count which stood properly explained. The Tribunal therefore, erred in rejecting such delay condonation application.
Counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and another v. MST. Katji and others reported in 1987(28) E.L.T. 185(SC), to contend that delay should normally be liberally condoned particularly when the cause of substantial justice is pitted against technicalities. Counsel also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Bhag Singh and others v. Major Daljit Singh and others reported in 1987(32) E.L.T. 258(SC), for the same purpose.
9. On the other hand learned counsel Shri Anand Nainawati for the respondent opposed the appeals. He submitted that the Committee previously had taken a conscious decision not to challenge the decision of the Appellate Commissioner. Having once taken such a decision, it was not open for the Committee to revive or review its own decision. In this respect, counsel relied on decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Commissioner of C. Ex. & Cus. v. Gujarat Alkalies & Chemicals Ltd. reported in 2009(235) E.L.T. 19 (Guj.). For the same purpose, he also relied on decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Commissioner of C. Ex., Chandigarh v. Apsco Prefabs Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2008(226) E.L.T. 508(P&H).
9.1) Counsel submitted that there was gross delay in filing the appeal. Such delay was not explained. There was no cause much­ less sufficient cause for filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation. He pointed out that section 35­B of the Central Excise Act (“the Act” for short)provides for a limitation of 90 days for filing the appeal from the date of receipt of copy of the impugned order. He submitted that though the Tribunal referred to delay of 440 days, in the present case, apparently the delay was of over two years.
9.2) From the documents presented before the Tribunal in the form of paper book by the respondent, counsel pointed out that while challenging the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 30.3.2007, the department had taken note of and relied heavily on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd(supra). Thus at any rate the Committee was aware about such a decision in March 2007, despite which the present appeal came to be filed only in August 2008. Such further delay at any rate, cannot be accepted.
10. Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties, we may peruse the facts on record more closely. Since it was pointed out to us that the duty involved is substantial, we had by our order dated 10.3.2011 permitted the counsel for the department to produce additional documents along with draft amendment. Such documents by allowing the amendment have been taken on record.
11. Before proceeding further, we may take note of the statutory provisions governing the departmental appeals.
● Section 35­B of the Act pertains to appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. Sub­section(1) of section 35­B permits any person aggrieved by the orders mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of the said sub­section to prefer an appeal before the Tribunal. Sub­section(2) of section 35­B which is of considerable importance for us pertains to the Committee of Commissioners of Central Excise for the purpose of deciding whether appeal by the department is to be presented before the Tribunal and reads as under :
“(2) The Committee of Commissioners of Central Excise may, if it is of opinion that an order passed by the Appellate Commissioner of Central Excise tinder section 35, as it stood immediately before the appointed day, or the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 35­A, is not legal or proper, direct any Central Excise Officer authorised by him in this behalf (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the authorised officer) to appeal on his behalf to the Appellate Tribunal against such order.
Provided that where the Committee of Commissioners of Central Excise differs in its opinion regarding the appeal against the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), it shall state the point or points on which it differs and make a reference to the jurisdictional Chief Commissioner of Central Excise who shall, after considering the facts of the order,if is of the opinion that the order passed by the Commissioner(Appeals0 is not legal or proper, direct any Central Excise Officer to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order.”
● Sub­section(3) of Section 35­B provides for period of limitation of three months for such appeals starting from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party preferring such appeal as the case may be.
● Sub­section(5) of section 35­B however, permits the Appellate Tribunal to admit an appeal which is filed after after expiry of period of limitation and reads as under :
“5. The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross­objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub­section(3) or sub­section(4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.”
● Sub­section (2) of Section 35­B envisages a Committee of Commissioners of Central Excise who if it is of the opinion that an order passed by the Appellate Commissioner or Commissioner(Appeals) as the case may be is not legal or proper, may direct the Central Excise Officer authorised by the Committee to file appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. In case, the Committee of Commissioners differs in its opinion, it has to state point or points on which it differs and make a reference to the jurisdictional Chief Commissioner of Central Excise who shall after considering the facts of the order, shall take a decision in this regard.
12. It can thus be seen that the decision that the department may take to appeal or not to appeal against the order of the Appellate Authority, is statutorily governed by sub­section(2) of section 35­B of the Act. In order to bring uniformity and consistency to protect the interest of the Revenue on one hand and at the same time to safeguard against any arbitrariness in subjecting the assesses to further litigation, the Committee of Commissioners is envisaged who would on individual case basis take a decision and form an opinion whether the order of the Appellate Authority is required to be further challenged or not. Such a Committee would also ensure reduction of of unnecessary litigation and filtration of frivolous appeals.
13. Bearing in mind such statutory provisions, for the purpose of these appeals, we are prepared to proceed on the basis that the Committee performed administrative functions and not quasi­ judicial and that therefore was not strictly bound by the principles of res­judicata. If we revert back to the facts on record, the department in order to explain delay in the application that it filed before the Tribunal primarily, stated that the office received the impugned order in appeal on 10.3.2006. At the material time the Committee of Commissioners had decided that such order is acceptable. Such decision was taken on 8.6.2006. This was on the basis that the Mumbai Tribunal had decided a similar issue in favour of the assessee relying on two decisions of the Supreme Court. Later on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd(supra) was rendered which the Committee had failed to notice. Such decision was brought to the notice of the Committee later. On these grounds, delay condonation was sought.
14. As already noted, the Tribunal was not impressed by such explanation and rejected the application inter­alia on the ground that the intention of the department was not bona fide, in any case, the Committee could not have reviewed its own previous decision.
15. If we peruse the file notings leading to two decisions of the Committee, it emerges that the order of the Appellate Commissioner dated 10.3.2006 was placed before the Committee along with detailed file notings which suggested that order of the Commissioner seems to be proper and acceptable. On such office notings dated 2.6.2006, it appears that there was some deliberation on whether the decision in case of M/s. Gujarat Borosil Ltd. (in which similar issue was decided by the Commissioner(Appeals) ) was further carried in appeal or not. The Committee desired to know the details upon which on 6th June. The Committee was informed that the Surat Commissionerate had accepted the CESTAT's order; the Commissioner (Appeals) order is correct and acceptable on which the Committee put following endorsement “We may accept the OIA” on 8.6.2006
● The matter rested there and according to the opinion of the Committee no appeal was filed before the Tribunal. For over two years thereafter, the department took no further steps.
● On 1.8.2008, senior departmental representative one Dr. Manojkumar Rajak wrote a letter to the Commissioner, Central Excise, Surat requesting that the matter be reexamined regarding filing of appeal against the order of Commissioner(Appeals) dated 8.3.2006 in light of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd(supra). He was also of the opinion that merely because in earlier case, the department had not filed appeal, would not preclude the department from filing appeal in the present case.
● Upon receipt of such a letter, office submissions were placed before the Committee on 8.8.2008 in which it was stated as under :
“Received letter F. No.E/794/2007 dtd. 01/08/08 from SDR, CESTAT, Ahmedabad regarding appeal filed in this case before CESTAT. The SDR has sought for some clarifications and also asked to provide copies of some documents. We may ask the JAc to give comments of SDR's letter and also to provide copies of required documents.
Accordingly, letter to JAc is prepared and put up for kind approval pl & Sign pl.”
● On such office submissions, Joint Commissioner made his noting on the same day as under :
“Meanwhile take copy of documents required to examine which are available in files and prepare a reply immediately so that it can be brought to the notice of senior officers”
● On 14.8.2008, the Joint Commissioner wrote as under :
“As ordered (above) Draft appeals to CESTAT A,bad alongwith application for delay condonation is preferred and pas as opp. For perusal and kind approval please.”
● On 20.8.2008 the Superintendent put following noting which Joint Commissioner approved.
“As approved, authorisation letter is placed for signature by Committee.
Also letter to SDR is put up for sign.”
● At the bottom of such approval, we find signatures of two Commissioners who formed the Committee at the relevant time. They signed the document on 20.8.2008 itself, upon which authorisation letter was issued on the same date duly signed by both the Commissioners.
16. To our mind, there is no explanation for long delay of over two years in filing the appeals before the Tribunal. Though the department has computed the delay of nearly more than 440 days, it is apparent that actual delay exceeds over two years. We may recall that the Appellate Commissioner passed his order on 8.3.2006. Same was received by the department shortly thereafter, and also placed before the Committee for its decision whether to accept such an order or to file further appeal. The Committee had at one stage in June 2006 decided that this is not a fit case for appeal. For two years thereafter, there was no further development. Decision of the Committee rested at that stage. Only on 1.8.2008, the senior departmental representative wrote a letter to the Commissioner, Surat and urged him to have the decision of the Committee reviewed in light of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd(supra). When such letter was presented before the Committee with recommendation to file appeal and the drafts of appeals and delay condonation application were presented, the members of the Committee simply signed the notings.
17. Firstly, there was no opinion expressed by the Committee on the files. No reasons are stated why the Committee decided to review its previous decision. In fact, the file notings also do not suggest that the earlier decision be reviewed and appeals now be presented. The members of the Committee therefore, at­least from the file notings do not appear to have taken any formal decision that the Committee is of the opinion that the decision of the Commissioner(Appeals) is required to be challenged.
18. Secondly, even otherwise in the facts of the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that it was not open for the Committee to review its decision which was taken long back. In June 2006, the Committee took a conscious decision not to appeal. For the purpose of these appeals, we are prepared to accept the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the Committee while doing so did not perform any judicial function and therefore, being merely an administrative action, was open to review without any limitation of res judicata. Even then the question arises whether, such a decision can be reviewed at any time without any reference to the period. The answer has to be clearly in the negative. The Committee which took the decision after due deliberation and examination of facts that in its opinion the decision of the Appellate Commissioner was not required to be challenged, could have on better facts or correct law being brought to its notice, within reasonable time thereafter, recalled its decision and instead directed the authorised officer to file appeal before the Tribunal. However, such liberty cannot be had at any point of time after inordinate delay.
19. For over two years as we have already noted, the Committee 's decision prevailed. In the meantime, the order of the Commissioner(Appeals) in refund case came to be challenged before the Tribunal under the authorisation granted by the same Committee sometime in March 2007 precisely on the ground that the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd(supra) would have bearing on the issues involved. If that be so, we fail to understand how for over one year, the Committee thereafter, took no further steps to revisit its previous decision to accept the order of the Commissioner(Appeals) on merits of the duty demand.
20. In the result, we do not find that the Tribunal committed any error in dismissing the Revenue's appeals. These appeals are therefore, dismissed.
(Akil Kureshi,J.) (Harsha Devani,J.) (raghu)
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Title

Commissioner Of Central Excise Surat Ii vs Gujarat Borosil Ltd Opponents

Court

High Court Of Gujarat

JudgmentDate
05 July, 2012
Judges
  • Akil Kureshi
  • Harsha Devani
Advocates
  • Mr Rj Oza