JUDGMENT Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. This batch of writ petitions under Section 226 of the Constitution of India involves a similar controversy based upon identical facts and as such are being taken up together with the consent of the respective counsel appearing for the contesting parties.
2. The brief background leading to the filing of these petitions is that the Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short LIC) for promotion of its business interest launched a "salary saving scheme," particularly, for the salaried class of people viz., government and semi government employees and the employees of the various corporations etc. The scheme provides for the payment of monthly premium by the assured employees. The scheme is optional and under it the employees subscribing to the scheme have an option to pay the LIC premium either directly or through their respective employers to the LIC on monthly basis. The employees in making such a payment through the employer have a definite advantage of rebate of 5% on payment of such premium. Apparently, there is no advantage to the employers in taking the responsibility of deducting the LIC premium from the monthly salary of its employees and to make the lump sum payment to the LIC. It appears that as deduction of LIC premium on authorization of the employees is legally permissible from the wages of the employees in view of Section 7(d) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (in short Wages Act), most of the employers initially agreed for making such deduction and in making payment of lump sum premium to the LIC on behalf of the employees, but later, on account of the amount of extra work and accounting involved in it, they realised the mistake and evolved methods to withdraw from the responsibility.
3. The petitioners in this batch of writ petitions are all employees of Railways. All of them have individually taken the above policy from the LIC and has authorized the Railways to make deduction of the LIC premium from their monthly salary for payment to the LIC. The Railways till now had been making the deduction and paying the premium to the LIC collectively on behalf of its employees. However, by the impugned order dated 30th April 2007 followed by the consequential order dated 2/3.7.2007 the Railways have decided not to make such a deduction in future from the monthly salary of its employees including the petitioners for payment to the LIC. It is against this action of the Railways that the petitioners have individually come up before this Court in writ jurisdiction.
4. I have heard Sri Siddhartha Srivastava, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri Govind Saran and Sri Vivek Singh for the Railways and Sri Prakash Padia, Sri R.C. Shukla , Sri V.K. Chandel and Sri Sanjeev Singh for the LIC.
5. A preliminary objection has been raised jointly on behalf of the Railways and the LIC that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions directly without first relegating the petitioners to the Central Administrative Tribunal, in as much as, the matter relates to the service of the employees of the Indian Railways. In support reliance has been placed upon L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. . To meet the above preliminary objection, Sri Siddhartha Srivastava Learned Counsel appearing for petitioners has argued that first of all it is not a service matter as defined under Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985 (herein after referred to as Tribunals Act). Secondly, even if it happens to be a service matter, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not completely ousted and the High Court is within its jurisdiction to entertain such petitions, if they fall within the 3 exceptional categories, particularly when no factual dispute is involved, namely;
(i) where the order is completely without jurisdiction;
(ii) it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice; and
(iii) where it is apparently on order passed contrary to any provision of a statute.
6. In the light of the submissions made on the preliminary objection two points as under arises for determination:
1. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to directly entertain writ petitions, concerning the 'service matter' of the Railway employees; and
2. Whether the action of the Railways in refusing to make deduction of LIC premium from the monthly salary of its employees would fall within the ambit of the 'service matter' as defined under Section 3(q) of the Tribunals Act.
7. Administrative Tribunals Act, (Act No. 13 of 1985) was enacted in exercise of powers under Article 323A and 323B of the Constitution of India which were introduced by way of 42nd amendment of 1976 with effect from 3rd January 1977. The object for enacting the said act was to constitute tribunals as alternative forum for the purpose of due consideration of the matters relating to the service of persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union of India or any State or any local or other authority within the territory of India or under control of Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government of India. The object was to minimise the work load of the High Courts in deciding matters concerning the above area of law under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Article 323A of the Constitution specifically provides that the parliament may while enacting such law make provision for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all Courts with respect to the matters concerning the above area of law except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, Section 28 of the Tribunals Act also provide that on and from the date the jurisdiction and the powers under the said Act are exercisable by tribunals matters concerning the above area of law shall exclusively be dealt with by the tribunals and not by any other Court except the Supreme Court. The validity of the above enactment was upheld by the 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 386. The Apex Court held that parliament is competent to provide and make effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangements for judicial review. Therefore, the enactment providing for such an alternative institutions or tribunals as additional forums barring the jurisdiction of the High Court can not be faulted with. In L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra), the 7 Judges bench of the Supreme Court concluded that the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not stand completely ousted with the enforcement of the Tribunals Act or with the establishment of Central Administrative Tribunals in as much as all decisions of the tribunals shall be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court. The tribunals shall act as Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and it will not be open for the litigants to directly approach the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution without first going to the Court of first instance i.e., the tribunals, even in cases involving the vires of statutory legislation (except where legislation which creates the tribunal itself is under challenge) by over looking the jurisdiction of the concerned tribunal. The conclusions of the aforesaid verdict of the Supreme Court has been summarised in paragraphs 93 and 99 of the judgment which are being reproduced herein below:
93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions of the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear the matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional setup, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these tribunals rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division bench of their respective High Court. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for the litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.
99. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the cornered Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.
8. In Samrendra Das v. State of West Bengal and Ors. a dispute arose before the Apex Court as to whether the posts of Assistant Public Prosecutor appointed in a Magistrate Court by the Governor of the State was a civil post and the matter falls within the purview of Section 15, 4(2) and 2(c) of the Tribunals Act. The Court held that the employment was under the State Government of West Bengal, therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India.
9. In another case relating to the service matter concerning the employees of Kendriya Vidyalaya reported in Kendriya Vidyalaya and Anr. v. Subhash Sharma the Supreme Court in paragraphs 12 and 13 laid down as under:
12. The Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that tribunals set up under the Act shall continue to act as the only Courts of first instance "in respect of areas of law for which they have been constituted."It was further held that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Court even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.
13. In view of the clear pronouncement of this Court the High Court erred in law in directly entertaining the writ petitions concerning service matters of the employees of Kendriya Vidyalaya as these matters come under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. We, therefore, hold that the High Court committed an error by declining to transfer the writ petition tot he Central Administrative Tribunal. Consequently, we set aside the impugned orders and direct the High Court to transfer both the writ petitions to the Central Administrative Tribunal. Chandigarh Bench which may, in its turn, make over the case to the Circuit Bench in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for disposal in accordance with law.
10. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court makes it clear in no ambiguous terms that in respect of service matters in relation to the services contemplated by Article 323A of the constitution and the Tribunals Act no litigant is authorised to approach the High Court directly invoking the writ jurisdiction and the tribunal shall act as the Court of first instance. It is only after a decision has been rendered by the tribunal that the matter can be taken to the High Court for judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
11. In view of the above legal position the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions directly in service matters of the employees in respect to whom tribunals have been constituted and the tribunals so constituted alone shall have the jurisdiction in the matters as the Courts of first instance.
12. Sri Siddhartha Srivastava on behalf of the petitioners placed reliance upon T.K. Rangrajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , Suraj Deo Rai v. Ram Chadnra Rai and Ors. , L.K. Verma v. HMT Limited and Anr. and U.P. State Spinning Company Limited v. R.S. Pandey and Ors. .
13. The rulings cited on behalf of the petitioners referred to above are practically decisions which lays down that under certain given circumstances even where statutory alternative remedy is provided, a litigant may approach the High Court in writ jurisdiction without exhausting the alternate remedy. Meaning thereby, that alternate remedy is not an absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition in a given set of circumstances. However, we must not over look that the question of alternate remedy and the question of jurisdiction of the Court are two different aspects altogether. It may be in the discretion of the High Court to entertain a writ petition instead of dismissing it on the ground of availability of alternate remedy but this discretion would not at all be available where the High Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain the writ petition directly. In such cases where the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petition directly is excluded, the order if any passed would be a nullity being without jurisdiction.
14. Out of the aforesaid rulings cited, much emphasis has been placed upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court reported in T.K. Rangrajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. to canvass that High Court can proceed to hear a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even though the petitioners have not approached the tribunal which is a Court of first instance and an alternative forum provided under the Tribunals Act. In this regard paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 of the aforesaid judgment are relevant which lay down that the High Court is empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet an unprecedented situation having no parallel. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a part of inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and it can not be said that such tribunals are effective substitute of the High Courts in discharging powers of judicial review. In paragraph 10 of the same judgment it has been said that there can not be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of the larger Bench (L. Chandra Kumar's case) is binding upon this Court and we respectfully agree with the same. Thereafter, it proceeds to record that because of very very exceptional circumstances as the Court was of the opinion that the Administrative Tribunal would not be in a position to render justice to the case, it was held that the High Court was not justified in not entertaining the petitions on the ground of alternative remedy. This was so as the tribunal was non functional.
15. The aforesaid judgment arose out of an unprecedented situation which was caused due to en mass termination by the Tamil Nadu Government of service of the employees who had resorted to strike. The Supreme Court held that the employees had no fundamental right, not even a legal or a statutory right or any moral or equitable justification for going on strike but as most of the employees had been reinstated the Supreme Court directed for the reinstatement of service of the remaining employees on their giving unconditional apology and an undertaking that in future they would maintain the discipline and abide by the rules. Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment clearly shows that it was passed in the peculiar facts and the exceptional circumstances of that case on equitable principles and when the tribunal was not functioning. In short, the Supreme Court held when tribunal is not functioning the employee can not be denied right to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court otherwise they will be rendered remedy less. However, even the aforesaid judgment no where states that the ratio of L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) was not binding and that the litigant can approach the High Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India bypassing the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. Thus in the circumstances petitioners derive no benefit even out of the aforesaid judgment. The aforesaid judgment appears to be a judgment in persona only which is confined to the peculiar facts of case whereas the judgment in L.Chandra Kumar's case (Supra) is of universal application ie., a judgment in rem. The true import of L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) is to the effect that though tribunals do not substitute the High Court but they act as additional forums of redressal of dispute in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. The litigant can not approach the High Court in respect of such matters directly and the tribunals would supplement the High Court and act as the Courts of first instance and it is only thereafter that the decision of the tribunal would stand scrutiny by the division bench of the High Court. In this way, the jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise the writ jurisdiction in mattes relating to areas of law for which tribunals have been created has completely been excluded. Therefore, once it has been laid down that the High Court has no jurisdiction to even entertain a writ petition in relation to subject matters covered by the tribunals, the High Court is not competent to exercise the said jurisdiction even though alternate remedy may not have been set up as a defence or a ground to refuse the writ.
16. It is a question of jurisdiction and not the availability of alternate remedy which is crucial in the present case. Since in view of L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) this Court has no jurisdiction to exercise writ jurisdiction directly, the present writ petitions are not entertainable even though availability of alternate remedy may not be an absolute bar in as much as exercise of discretion in this regard pails into insignificance when the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction. This view of mine also finds support from an unreported judgment of the single judge of this Court dated 14.7.1998 passed in writ petition No. 26743 of 1995 B.S. Bhaskar v. General Manager, Northern Railways and Ors. This takes me to the second point.
17. According to the Learned Counsel for the petitioner the matter with regard to deduction or non deduction of the LIC premium from the monthly salary of the petitioners is not a 'service matter' and as such the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this regard.
18. The answer to the above question though appears to be simple is not that simple. Petitioners are all employees of the Railways. They are asking for a relief against the Railways independently and not against the LIC or any agent of LIC. In a way, they want to compel the Railways to make deduction of LIC premium from their monthly salary and to pay the same in lump sum to LIC as authorized by them. This burden is being thrust upon the Railways by the petitioners only on account of their employer and employees relationship otherwise they have no authority of law to insist upon the same. Therefore, the dispute has naturally arisen in context with the employer and employees relationship between the Railways and the petitioners and as such is a service matter.
19. It is also acknowledged legal position that no employer can make any deduction from the salary/wages of its employees which do not have the sanction of the law. The deductions which may be made from the salary/wages have been enumerated in Section 7 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Section 7(d) of the Wages Act permits the employers to make deduction of the LIC premium from the salary/ wages of its employees on the authorization of the employees and not otherwise. Therefore, such a deduction by the Railways from the salary of its employees may nor may not be unlawful nevertheless it is a matter concerning salary of the employees. In the normal understanding of a common man therefore such a matter falls basically within the ambit of 'service matter'. Therefore, legal technicalities apart, it would be a matter concerning service in the eyes a prudent man.
20. In Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi and Anr. the Supreme Court while dealing with this very scheme of the LIC held that the employer while making such deduction from the salary of its employees for payment of LIC premium may not be acting in a strict sense as a licensed agent of the LIC under Section 42 of Insurance Act, 1938 and the provisions of the LIC of India Agents Regulations, 1972 but nonetheless it renders the services of an agent to the LIC as contemplated by Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Now whether in this case the Railways is acting as an agent of the LIC or not is not material. What is material is whether the action of the Railways falls within the scope of ' Service matter' as per Section 3(q) of the Tribunals Act.
21. Section 14 of the Tribunals Act provides that Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise all jurisdiction powers and authority exercisable by all Courts except the Supreme Court in relation to;
A) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment to any all India Service....;
B) all service matters concerning;
a)
b)
c)
22. Thus from the above, the tribunal has jurisdiction and power in respect of all service matters. Service matters have been defined in Section 3(q) of the Act as under:
"Service matters", in relation to a person, means all matters relating, to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government, as respects-
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever;
23. It is couched in the widest possible language. The term "any other matter whatsoever" is wide enough to include within its ambit any matter which arises out of the relation-ship of employer and employee.
24. In a judgment of 3 Judges of the Supreme Court reported in Union of India v. D.C. Pandey 1992 AWC 1795 it has been observed that the scope of Article 323A is very wide and the Administrative Tribunals Act covers a very wide field and there is nothing to suggest that the provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the tribunal should receive a narrow interpretation. It was accordingly held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the employees.
25. Reliance has been placed from the side of petitioners upon the rule of "ejusdem generis" and a decision of the Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Limited v. Collector of Custom, Bombay . According to the aforesaid rule when general words follow the words of particular and specific meaning in that case general words are not to be construed in their widest extent and are to be applied only in respect of kind or class of things mentioned. The rule however, does not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to identical things specifically mentioned. Nor does it apply when the context manifests a contrary intention. This is what has been explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of the above judgment with a word of caution. It says that the above rule is to be applied with great care and caution. It is not an inviolable rule of law but it is only a permissible inference. There is no room for application of this rule of "ejusdem generis" where the words are clearly wide in their meaning and aught not to be qualified on the ground of their association with other words.
26. A conjoint reading of Section 14 and 3(q) of the Tribunals Act reveals that the words used are "all service matters" and "any other matter whatsoever" both these terms are of widest amplitude used independently and does not qualify the terms used earlier in the provision. "Any other matter whatsoever" used in the 3(q)(v) refers to all "service matters" used in Section 14 of the act and not only in connection with the conditions of service, remuneration, pension, retirement benefits, tenure, confirmation, seniority, promotion,reversion, pre-mature retirement, superannuation, leave are disciplinary matters. The word "whatsoever", also has its own significance and has not been used superfluously. Therefore, Rule 3 (q) (v) of the Tribunals Act can not be said to be of a general nature qualifying the service conditions of service enumerated earlier in the provision. It is in itself an independent rule and is not dependant on the first four rules enumerated in Section 3(q) of the Tribunals Act and is wide enough to cover every aspect of the service. Therefore, the phrase "any other matter whatsoever" though of general nature but has been used independent of the terms used in Section 3(q) (i) to (iv) of the Act.
27. Besides, the rule of "ejusdem generis" is merely a rule of construction and not a substantive law and is hardly applicable where general words such as "any other matter whatsoever" does not intend to take colour from the specific words used earlier. The intention of establishing Central Administrative Tribunal is also to cover all service matters arising from the employer and employees relationship and therefore it would not be apt to give any restricted meaning to the phrase "any other matter whatsoever" and to confine the application of the Act only to recruitment and conditions of service.
28. Therefore, it would not be proper to apply the rule of "ejusdem generis" in the interpretation of the 'service matter' in context with the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunals.
29. In view of the above, it is difficult to comprehend how the present matter can be excluded from the ambit of the service matter.
30. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. v. B. Shaym Sundar 2001 (9) SC 87 for the purpose establishing that the matter in dispute is not a 'Service matter'. I have carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment. The said decision relates to the employee of the revenue department under the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. The Central Board of Direct Taxes by a scheme decided to reward the officers and the staff of the Income Tax Department by placing them into various categories. One of the employee was not given the award. Therefore, the matter was taken to the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the claim and directed the department to grant award as prayed by the respondent employee. The Supreme Court in such a situation without any discussion observed that the matter was outside the purview of the tribunal as under Section 14 the tribunal only had jurisdiction in respect of service matter. The facts of the above case are totally different and are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. There the matter was with regard to grant of reward which was purely ex gratia payment. Accordingly, the aforesaid judgment is of no help to the petitioners. On the other hand Sri Padia placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court 1995 Labour and Industrial Cases 767 B. Narsimha and Ors. v. Commanding Officer and Ors. In this case the dispute was with regard to deduction of loan amount from the salary of the employees. The Court held it to be a service matter outside the purview of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court & the petition was held to be not maintainable. It supports my view to a great extent.
31. There is another angle of examining the above aspect of the matter. The petitioners have themselves chosen to file these writ petitions under the category "service matter" before the High Court and the office also reported these petitions to be service matters as such. Undoubtedly, therefore the petitioners also impliedly accepted in one way or the other that the matter relates to the service matter. If that be the position, the petitioner can not say that the cause is partly concerning a service matter in some respects and not a service matter in so far as the jurisdiction of the tribunal is concerned.
32. In view of the above position, the dispute involved in the writ petition is nothing but a dispute regarding the 'service matter' of the employees of the Railways.
33. Lastly, Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon certain interim orders passed by this Court in similar and identical writ petitions.
34. I have gone through the said orders. In none of them the basic controversy about the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the writ petition was raised or was considered. The said interim orders though time bound appears to have been passed in ignorance of the question of jurisdiction of the Court. It is well settled that an interim order is not a precedent. A reference may be had to a Full Bench of this Court in the case of S.C. Shukla v. G.B. Singh 1999 AWC 958. Therefore, where the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition merely because few petitions have been entertained and an interim order has been passed therein would not compel me to follow the suit and pass a similar interim order. It is also settled position that where a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the proceedings/ writ petition or of the jurisdiction of the Court has been raised it is incumbent upon the Court to first decide the same before proceeding on the merit of the case. This is the view expressed in T.K. Lathika v. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas and Manubhai ji Patel and Anr. v. Bank of Baroda and Ors. .
35. Thus, in the totality of circumstances the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Railways and the LIC is sustained and it is held that such dispute is in respect of a service matter and the same is not entertainable by the High Court directly in exercise of writ jurisdiction and in view of the ratio of L. Chandra Kumar's case.
36. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable with liberty to the petitioners to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, if so advised. No order as to costs.