IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2017 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN WRIT PETITION NO. 37911 OF 2015 (S-RES) BETWEEN:
CHIKKANNA S/O LATE RAMAIAHA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS WORKING AS BILL COLLECTOR (NOW ILLEGALLY KEPT UNDER SUSPENSION), DHANAGERE VILLAGE PANCHAYATH, KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT AND RESIDING AT SARAGURU POST DHANAGERE VILLAGE KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJNAGARA DISTRICT.
(BY SRI M. SUBRAMANYA BHAT, ADV.) AND:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER JILLA PANCHAYATH CHAMRAJANAGARA CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT.
2. PANCHAYATH DEVELOPMENT OFFICER DHANAGERE VILLAGE PANCHAYATH KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT.
... PETITIONER 3. DHANAGERE VILLAGE PANCHAYATH KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT.
... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI ASHOK N. NAYAK, ADV. FOR R1-R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 17.7.2015 [ANNEX-D] ISSUED BY THE R-3 AND THE ORDER DATED 6.8.2015 [ANNEX-F] ISSUED BY THE R-1 AS THE SAME ARE ARBITRARY, IRRATIONAL, UNREASONABLE AND VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14, 16, 19 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
O R D E R Aggrieved by the order dated 17-07-2015, passed by the Dhanagere Village Panchayat, Kollegala Taluk, whereby the petitioner has been suspended from his service, aggrieved by the order dated 06-08-2015, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the Chief Executive Officer, the petitioner has approached this Court.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that on 13-08-1996, the petitioner was appointed as a Bill Collector with the Dhanagere Village Panchayat, the respondent No.3. Initially he was appointed temporarily, subsequently by order dated 31-10-2014, the petitioner was regularly appointed as Bill Collector for a probationary period of one year. During the course of his service, on 17-03-2007, some villagers and members of certain Women Associations lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Hon’ble Lokayuktha. After a lapse of eight years, the Hon’ble Lokayuktha addressed a letter on 24-02-2015, to the Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayath Raj Department, enclosing a copy of the report of the Upa Lokayuktha dated 20-02-2015. The Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayath Raj Department, was asked to conduct an investigation and submit a report on the basis of the report submitted by the Hon’ble Upa Lokayuktha. According to the report, certain allegations had been made against the elected members of the Dhanagere Village Panchayat and the petitioner. The allegations leveled were that they had misappropriated some monies, and committed certain illegality with regard to the developmental works undertaken by the Gram Panchayat. Considering the report dated 17-07-2015, the Gram Panchayat decided to suspend the petitioner. Consequently, on 17-07-2015, the suspension order was passed by the Panchayath Development Officer. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the suspension order, he filed an appeal under Section 113(3) of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (‘the Act’ for short), before the Chief Executive Officer. However, by order dated 06-08-2015, the said appeal has been dismissed by the Chief Executive Officer. Hence this petition before this Court.
3. Mr. M. Subramanya Bhat, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has pleaded that despite the fact that the complaint was made in the year 2007, despite the fact that the petitioner was suspended on 17-07-2015, inspite of the lapse of two years, not a single charge has been framed against the petitioner. Thus the petitioner is being kept in animated suspension. Relying on the case of AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY VS. UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY & ANR. [(2015) 7 SCC 291], the learned counsel has pleaded that in case a charge-sheet is not furnished to the delinquent officer within three months from the date of the suspension, the suspension order deserves to be quashed by this Court. Moreover, as an under-trial has a right of speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, similarly a delinquent officer has a right of a speedy departmental enquiry. But, despite the lapse of two years, the respondents have not even initiated the departmental enquiry. Therefore, the suspension order dated 17-07-2015, and the order dated 06-08-2015, deserve to be set aside by this Court.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Ashok N. Nayak, the learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (‘CCA Rules’ for short), are inapplicable to the Panchayatraj Department. Therefore, the case of AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY (supra), is not relevant and is inapplicable to the present case. Secondly, the petitioner has been suspended due to the orders of the Upa Lokayuktha. Since there are grave allegations against him, the suspension order is a legal one. Therefore, the respondent No.1 was equally justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner. Hence the learned counsel has supported both the impugned orders.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the impugned orders.
6. Even if the CCA Rules are inapplicable to the Panchayatraj, even then, the requirement of law is that any action that needs to be taken by the competent authority, must be taken within a reasonable time. The competent authority cannot be permitted to sit quietly over an issue, and to keep a delinquent officer in animated suspension. Although suspension may not be a punishment, but it has certain professional and social ramifications for the delinquent officer. After all, the delinquent officer is neither given the full salary, nor is he permitted to enjoy certain reputation in the society. Therefore, the suspension order adversely affects the professional and personal interest of a person. Undoubtedly, as an under-trial has a right to speedy trial, a delinquent officer also has a fundamental right of a speedy departmental enquiry. Therefore, to keep the petitioner in a limbo for a period of two years, that, too, with regard to an allegation that was leveled in the year 2007, is clearly in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, neither the impugned order dated 17-07-2015, nor the impugned order dated 06-08-2015, are legally sustainable.
For the reasons stated above, this petition is hereby allowed. The impugned orders dated 17-07-2015 and 06-08-2015, are set aside.
However, merely because the suspension order has been set aside by this Court, it would not preclude the respondent from initiating a departmental enquiry, if necessary, against the petitioner.
Sd/- JUDGE RD