Chauhan Govindbhai Gordhanbhai & 463S vs India Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd Now Known As Reliance

Common questions on law and facts are involved in this group of petitions and hence, they are decided by this common judgment. RULE. Learned counsel for the respondent waives service of rule. With the consent of both the sides, the matters were taken up for final hearing today. 1. Can the Labour Court impose a precondition on the workmen to deposit the entire amount received under the voluntary retirement scheme, excluding the amount towards Provident Fund Contribution, for referring the dispute u/s.10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication, is the moot question that has come up for consideration of this Court in this group of petitions.

2. The facts in a nutshell are that the petitioners herein were the employees of respondent, Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited, Vadodara (Now known as Reliance Industries Limited). All the petitioners were working on different permanent posts in the respondent­Company. On 06th March 2007 the respondent­Company issued a Circular titled “Voluntary Separation Scheme for Baroda Complex” for the regular non­supervisory employees of Baroda Complex (including offices located in the Regions). Under the said Scheme, the eligible employees were to be given a lump­sum amount calculated as per the method prescribed therein. The interested employees were asked to submit Applications in the prescribed form and the last date for submission of such Applications was 20th March 2007. In pursuance of the aforesaid Circular, several employees submitted their Applications, including the petitioners herein. However, many employees withdrew their Applications before the closing date, which was duly granted.

3. It is the case of the petitioners that the Management of the respondent­Company had maliciously instructed all its key officers and departmental heads to compel the employees, including the petitioners, to accept the Voluntary Separation Scheme. The petitioners and other employees fell prey to the tactics of the Management and submitted their Applications disclosing their willingness to accept the said Scheme. However, subsequently, the petitioners submitted applications in writing seeking withdrawal of their Applications submitted under the said Scheme.

4. In the month of April 2007, the respondent­Company relieved all those employees who had opted for the said Scheme, including the petitioners and also made payment of the monetary benefits under the said Scheme to such employees.

5. When the respondent­Company did not allegedly decide the applications preferred by the petitioners seeking withdrawal of their Applications filed under the aforesaid Scheme, the petitioners preferred Special Civil Application No.20727/2007 & allied matters before this Court seeking prayer to issue appropriate directions to the respondent­ Company. After bi­parte hearing on 22.08.2007, this Court came to the conclusion that the petitions involved several disputed questions and therefore, liberty was granted to the petitioners to raise appropriate dispute under the relevant Act.

6. Pursuant to the above order dated 22.08.2007, the petitioners raised industrial dispute under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the ID Act”). However, the competent authority under the ID Act refused to refer the dispute raised by the petitioners to the Labour Court concerned u/s.10(1) of the ID Act on 11.04.2008.

7. Being aggrieved by the order dated 11.04.2008, the petitioners preferred Special Civil Application No.7102/2008 & allied matters before this Court. However, the said group of petitions were dismissed vide judgment and order dated 13.03.2009.

8. Against the above order, the petitioners preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.418/2009 & allied matters before the Division Bench. The Division Bench disposed of the said group of Letters Patent Appeals, vide judgment and order dated 23.08.2010 whereby, direction was issued to the State Government to refer the dispute u/s.10(1) of the ID Act to the competent Labour Court or Tribunal.

9. Being dissatisfied with the above order passed in Letters Patent Appeals, the respondent­Company preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos.28714/2010 to 29172/2010 before the Apex Court. However, the said group of Appeals were dismissed on 24.01.2011, as having been withdrawn, with a liberty to seek remedy before the Labour Court where the reference might be made.

10. Pursuant to the above order of the Apex Court, the appropriate authority referred the dispute u/s.10(1) of the ID Act to the Labour Court for adjudication and it was numbered as Reference (LCV) No.688/2010 and Reference (LCV) No.677/2010 to 1151/2010. In the said proceedings, the respondent­Company filed Application (Exhibit­8) with the prayer that the petitioners be directed to refund the entire amount received by them under the said Scheme as a precondition to proceed further with the reference cases. The petitioners filed their reply to the said application vide Exhibit­12.

11. After hearing both the sides, the Labour Court, Vadodara allowed the Application (Exhibit­8) filed by the respondent­Company, vide impugned order dated 20.08.2012 and thereby, directed the petitioners to deposit the entire amount received by them under the said Scheme, excluding the amount towards Provident Fund, with the respondent­Company, within a period of three months failing which the references shall automatically stand dismissed. The respondent­Company was also directed to file an Undertaking to the effect that if, ultimately, the workmen succeed in the reference proceedings, the respondent­Company shall refund the entire amount deposited with it along with interest at the rate of 06% per annum.

12. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Labour Court, Vadodara, the petitioners have preferred the present group of petitions.

13.0 Mr. P.R. Thakkar learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that this matter involves several disputed questions of facts. He submitted that the real issue could be ascertained only after a full­fledged trial. The petitioners seriously disputed the issuance of Circular dated 21.03.2007 (Exhibit­18/1) by the respondent­Company regarding acceptance of the Applications of VSS submitted by the petitioners.

13.1 Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar submitted that the petitioners had filed the applications for withdrawal much before the closing date and therefore, the findings recorded by the Court below on the said issue are premature and do not go into the root of the matter. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed below application Exhibit­8 deserves to be quashed and set aside.

13.2 Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar for the petitioners submitted that the Management of the respondent­ Company had threatened and coerced the petitioners and other employees to accept the Voluntary Separation Scheme of the respondent­Company.

13.3 Learned counsel submitted that on account of the atmosphere of tension created by the Management, the petitioners and other employees opted for the said Scheme but, when they realized the conspiracy of adopting unfair labour practice by the respondent­Company, the petitioners and other employees submitted applications for withdrawal of their names from the Voluntary Separation Scheme. However, the Court below ignored the aforesaid real issue and passed the impugned order.

13.4 Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court had directed the State Government to refer the dispute for adjudication u/s.10(1) of the ID Act. While issuing such direction, the Division Bench had not imposed any precondition to refund the retiral benefits to the respondent­Company for referring the dispute. Therefore, the Court below had no jurisdiction to travel beyond the scope of such reference and it ought to have decided the dispute on merits, without entertaining the application Exhibit­8.

13.5 Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar had drawn my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Man Singh v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., JT 2011 (9) SC 558. In that case, the Apex Court had imposed the condition to deposit the amount at the stage of deciding the issue as to whether the reference u/s.10(1) of the ID Act is required to be made or not ? However, in the present case, the Division Bench has issued direction to the State Government to refer the dispute u/s.10(1) of the ID Act to the Labour Court concerned without imposing any such condition. Thus, by entertaining the application Exhibit­8, the Court below has imposed a condition, which did not form a part of the order passed by the Division Bench and it has proceeded to decide the matter on merits, which is not permissible.

13.6 Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in interpreting Section 10(4) of the ID Act by holding that it has jurisdiction to decide an issue, which is incidental to the reference. He submitted that the unconditional reference made by the Division Bench of this Court for adjudication of the dispute could not have been refused to have been decided on merits under the guise of exercising power u/s.10(4) of the ID Act. On this ground also, the impugned order passed by the Court below is bad in law and without jurisdiction.

13.7 Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar submitted that the petitioners had received the monetary benefits flowing from the Voluntary Separation Scheme somewhere during March – April 2007. At this time, the petitioners would not be having the funds with them and therefore, if the impugned order is sustained, then it would amount to rejecting the reference at the threshold without any adjudication since many of the petitioners would not be in a position to refund the amount.

14. Over and above the decision rendered in Man Singh’s case (supra), learned counsel Mr. Thakkar has placed reliance upon another decision of the Apex Court in the case of The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., v. The Workmen and others, AIR 1967 SC 469 and more particularly, on the following observations made in Paras – 8 & 9;

“8. Proceeding in the order in which the arguments were addressed, we propose to deal with issues 3 and 4 first. Under S.10(1)(d) of the Act, it is open to the appropriate Government when it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists to make an order in writing referring “the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute, ...... to a Tribunal for adjudication. Under S. 10(4) “where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this Section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto.”

9. From the above it therefore appears that while it is open to the appropriate Government to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected therewith for adjudication, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication to the points of dispute referred and matters incidental thereto. In other words, the Tribunal is not free to enlarge the scope of the dispute referred to it but must confine its attention to the points specifically mentioned and anything which is incidental thereto ”

14.1 Mr. Thakkar has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation Ltd. v. Gujarat Jal Samiti Vikas Nigam Kamdar Maha Sangh & Ors., 2005 (3) GLR 2515 wherein, it has been held that the award of the Tribunal granting reliefs, which did not fall within the terms of reference, amounted to making out an entirely new case and therefore, the High Court could interfere with an award of such nature.

14.2 Mr. Thakkar has also placed reliance upon another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendra L. Jain and others v. Indore Development Authority and others, AIR 2005 SC 1252 and more particularly, on the following observations made in Para­34 of the said decision;

“34. ....Furthermore the Labour Court having derived its jurisdiction from the reference made by the State Government, it was bound to act within the four corners thereof. It could not enlarge the scope of the reference nor could deviate therefrom. A demand which was not raised at the time of raising the dispute could not have been gone into by the Labour Court being not the subject­matter thereof.”

15.0 Mr. K.S. Nanavati learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Nandish Chudgar for respondent­Corporation submitted that in the application filed by the petitioners before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Annexure­F to the petition), the petitioners disclosed their willingness to refund the entire amount received by them under the said Scheme. Therefore, the petitioners cannot say that they are not in a position to refund the amount.

15.1 Learned senior advocate Mr. Nanavati submitted that the petitioners have pocketed large amounts pursuant to the Voluntary Separation Scheme floated by the respondent­ Company. He submitted that after having accepted the amounts, the petitioners are estopped from agitating that they are wrongly considered as having retired by the respondent­Company and raising an industrial dispute for the same while retaining all the monetary benefits collected by them under the said Scheme.

15.2 Learned senior advocate Mr. Nanavati submitted that u/s.10(4) of the ID Act, it is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide all incidental and ancillary issues while deciding the question referred to it by the State Government u/s.10(1) of the ID Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while passing the impugned order.

16.0 In support of his submissions, Mr. Nanavati has placed reliance upon a decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Orissa Forest Development Corporation Limited v. State of Orissa & others, 1997 (III) LLJ 102 and more particularly, on the following observations made in Para­6 therein;

“6. ....The Tribunal / Labour Court, as the case may be, is required to confine its adjudication to the matter referred to it. It has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental to them. It cannot travel beyond the terms of references. From the provisions of Sections 10(1)(a) and 10(4) of the Act it appears that while it is open to the appropriate Government to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected therewith for adjudication, the Tribunal / Labour Court must confine its adjudication to the points of dispute referred and matters incidental thereto. In other words, the Tribunal / Labour Court is not free to enlarge the scope of the dispute referred to it but must confine its attention to the points specifically mentioned and anything which is incidental thereto. ‘Something incidental to a dispute’ must therefore mean something happening as a result of or in connection with the dispute or associated with the dispute. The dispute is the fundamental thing while something incidental thereto is an adjunct to it. Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut at the root of the main thing to which it is an adjunct ”

16.1 Learned senior advocate Mr. Nanavati has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Milind Pandharinath Behere v. Union Bank of India, Mumbai and others, 2010 (II) LLJ 542 (Bom) wherein, it has been held that the employee, having received benefits under Voluntary Retirement Scheme but, unable to redeposit them in entirety, cannot obtain order for quashing refusal of his application for withdrawal of the one for voluntary retirement.

16.2 Learned senior advocate Mr. Nanavati has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others v. Vikram Cement and Others, (2008) 14 SCC 58 wherein, it has been held that the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court directing refund of the amount received under the voluntary retirement scheme was in furtherance of justice and that not only has it not resulted in miscarriage of justice, in fact, it has attempted to restore the status quo ante by balancing interests and leaving the matter to be decided by a competent authority in accordance with law. It was further held that even otherwise, according to the workmen, they were compelled to accept the amount and they received such amount under coercion and duress and therefore, they cannot retain the benefit if they want to prosecute claim petitions instituted by them with the Labour Court challenging the voluntary retirement scheme in question.

16.3 Learned senior advocate has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Man Singh v. Maruti Suzuki India and Another, 2011 (IV) LLJ 295 (SC), which was also relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners. He has relied upon the observations made in Paras – 8 & 9, which read as under;

“8. The workmen challenged the order of the Division Bench before this Court inter alia on the ground that having held that the management’s appeals were not maintainable, the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to make the impugned direction. This Court repelled the workmen’s contention and in paragraphs 100 and 101 of the decision held and observed as follows;

“100. Even otherwise, according to the workmen, they were compelled to accept the amount and they received such amount under coercion and duress. In our considered opinion, they cannot retain the benefit if they want to prosecute claim petitions instituted by them with the Labour Court. Hence, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court as to refund of amount cannot be termed unjust, inequitable or improper. Hence, even if it is held that a “technical” contention raised by the workmen has some force, this Court which again exercises discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, will not interfere with a direction which is in consonance with the doctrine of equity. It has been rightly said that a period “who seeks equity must do equity”. Here the workmen claim benefits as workmen of the Company but, they do not want to part with the benefit they have received towards retirement and severance of relationship of master and servant. It simply cannot be permitted. In our judgment, therefore, the final direction issued by the Division Bench needs no interference, particularly when the Company has also approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

101. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court deserves to be confirmed and is hereby confirmed. The payment which is required to be made as per the said order should be made by the applicants intending to prosecute their claims before the Labour Court, Mandsour. In view of the fact, however, that the said period is by now over, ends of justice would be served if we extend the time so as to enable the applicants to refund the amount. We, therefore, extend the time up to December 31, 2008 to make such payment. We may, however, clarify that the claim petitions will not be proceeded with till such payment is made. If the payment is not made within the period stipulated above, the claim petitions of those applicants will automatically stand dismissed. The Labour Court will take up the claim petitions after December 31, 2008.”

The present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others v. Vikram Cement and others (supra). We, thus, find no merit in the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had no jurisdiction to make a direction for refund of the entire amount received by the appellant as a condition precedent for the reference to proceed.

9. We, however, feel that the imposition of interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum was a little harsh and unwarranted. Having regard to the fact that the appellant is no longer in service, we feel that the ends of justice would meet if the direction for refund is confined only to the principal amount received by the appellant under VRS. We, accordingly, modify the order of the High Court to this limited extent and direct the appellant to refund the amount received by him under VRS, without any interest. In case the amount, as directed, is deposited by the appellant by November 30, 2011, the reference shall proceed in accordance with law, otherwise it would stand quashed.”

16.4 Learned senior advocate Mr. Nanavati has also placed reliance upon an unreported decision of this Court passed in S.C.A. No.5809/2010 dated 06.10.2010. Mr. Nanavati does not press the decision mentioned at Sr. No.6 in the list of judgments supplied by him and therefore, it is not considered in this judgment. He lastly submitted that the impugned order passed by the Court below is in consonance with the prevailing law on the subject and therefore, this group of petitions deserve to be dismissed.

17. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears that the factum of submission of Application Form by the petitioners opting for the Voluntary Separation Scheme of the respondent­Company is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the inaction on the part of the respondent­Company in deciding the withdrawal applications submitted by the petitioners for opting out of the said Scheme. The respondent­Company issued the Circular regarding Voluntary Separation Scheme on 06th March, 2007. The last date for submission of Applications under the said Scheme was 20th March, 2007.

18. It is the case of the petitioners that the Management of the respondent­Company coerced them to opt for the said Scheme. However, subsequently, they submitted applications seeking withdrawal of their names from the said Scheme, before the closing date, when they realized that the action of the Management was against their interests. The aforesaid fact has been seriously disputed by the respondent­Company.

19. In fact, the stand of the respondent­Company is that no such applications seeking withdrawal from the Scheme was ever submitted by the petitioners. In the impugned order also, the Court below has observed that the petitioners had not produced any evidence on record to prove that they had submitted such applications before the respondent­Company. If that be so, then the say of the petitioners that the respondent­Company had proceeded without deciding the applications of the petitioners seeking withdrawal of their names from the said Scheme assumes less significance. However, the non­existence or otherwise of such applications is a matter of fact, which could be adjudicated at the stage of trial, which has also been observed by this Court in the earlier proceedings of Special Civil Applications No. 20727/2007 & allied matters.

20. Pursuant to the order passed in Special Civil Applications No. 20727/2007 & allied matters dated 22.08.2007, the petitioners raised an industrial dispute under the provisions of the ID Act. However, the competent authority refused to refer the dispute raised by the petitioners to the Labour Court concerned u/s.10(1) of the ID Act. Against the said order, the petitioners had preferred Special Civil Application No.7102/2008 & allied matters, which were rejected, vide judgment and order dated 13.03.2009. Against the order dated 13.03.2009, the petitioners had preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.418/2009 & allied matters before the Division Bench. The Division Bench disposed of the said group of Appeals vide judgment and order dated 23.08.2010. In Paras – 10, 17, 18, 34 & 36, it has been observed as under;

“10. A specific plea was taken by the management that after voluntary separation, all the applicants have withdrawn the amount and they have accepted the compensation/monetary benefits flowing out of the Scheme and, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief.

17. It will be evident that the Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) and the Special Separation Scheme (SSS) were floated on 6.3.2007 by the management inviting offers from the concerned employees. On 15.3.2007, a circular was displayed by the whole time Director that in case there is any pressure on employees for opting voluntary separation, then it may be brought to his notice so that steps can be taken. The 20.3.2007 was the last date to submit application for voluntary retirement.

18. The case of the management is that on the late evening/night of 20.3.2007, a decision was taken by the competent authority i.e. Mr SK Anand, the whole time Director, to accept all the applications, 2266 in total, made for VSS for non­supervisory employees and 125 applications for SSS for non­supervisory employees excepting those who have withdrawn their applications on or before 20.3.2007. Further case of the management is, as it appears, that a circular was pasted on the notice board on 21.3.2007, communicating all the optees that the applications for VSS and SSS have been accepted by the competent authority. However, such evidence is not on record.

34. From the aforesaid decisions, it will be evident that relevant dates are required to be noticed by leading evidence, the date when such offer for voluntary retirement was made by the workmen, the actual date on which it was accepted and communicated to the workmen and the date of voluntary retirement when it was actually given effect.

36. In the present case, it will be evident that the workmen also moved before this Court in Special Civil Application No. 20727 of 2007 and in analogous cases. therein, this Court by order dated 22.8.2007 after considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, having noticed that a number of disputed questions are raised in the aforesaid group of petitions, which require some evidence to be taken before the appropriate authority, allowed the parties to move before the State. Thereafter, the workmen moved before the respondent – State for reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act. Such observations having already made, the matter having remitted at the instance of the parties including the management, when the question of deciding the disputed fact was required to be determined on the basis of the evidence, we are of the view that the respondent – State or its authority could not have arrogated on itself the power to adjudicate on the question whether the relationship between the management and the workmen ceased because of voluntary retirement or they were retrenched. In view of the Supreme Court decisions as referred to above, we also hold that the respondent – State and the Assistant Labour Commissioner, in particular, had no jurisdiction to look into the evidence to adjudicate on the question which was required to be determined by the Tribunal in a reference, if it would have been made under Section 10(1) of the ID Act.

21. The petitioners have raised a specific contention that the conditional order passed by the Court below is contrary to the observations made by the Division Bench as it travels beyond the scope of reference. It is true that the Division Bench had not issued any direction to pass a conditional order. In fact, it has simply directed the State Government to refer the dispute u/s.10(1) of the ID Act to the competent Court or Tribunal.

22. Pursuant to the above direction issued by the Division Bench, the dispute was referred to the Court below for adjudicating the issue whether the petitioners are entitled for being reinstated in service on their original post with continuity of service and all consequential benefits and full back wages. The petitioners have vehemently argued that the term of reference never prescribed for the imposition of any precondition for deciding the reference and therefore, the Court below was not justified in passing the impugned order. The position is fairly well settled and in fact accepted by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that the Tribunal / Labour Court in exercise of its jurisdiction is only bound by the terms of the reference. The jurisdiction is confined to the points of dispute referred to and incidental questions can be taken note of while answering the reference. A thing is said to be incidental to another when it appertains to the principal thing. Thus, the Tribunal / Labour Court has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental to them and it cannot travel beyond the terms of reference.

23. In my opinion, the issue regarding refund of monetary benefits received by the petitioners is incidental to the terms of reference. The petitioners accepted the monetary benefits under the Voluntary Separation Scheme floated by the respondent­Company. Now, when the terms of reference pertain to reinstatement with continuity of service and all consequential benefits with full back wages, the issue regarding monetary benefits received by the petitioners would definitely fall under the criteria of ‘something incidental thereto’, as provided in Section 10(4) of the ID Act. ‘Something incidental thereto’ must, therefore, mean something happening as a result of or in connection with the dispute or associated with the dispute.

24. The conditional order of deposit is associated with the main dispute since the petitioners had received payment under the voluntary retirement scheme of the respondent­ Company and the main dispute pertains to reinstatement. Thus, if, ultimately, the petitioners succeed in the reference proceedings and are ordered to be reinstated, then a question would arise as to how the payment made to the petitioners under the voluntary retirement scheme could be recovered. Thus, the issue regarding monetary benefits received by the petitioners is closely associated with the main dispute on hand and the Court below has rightly passed a conditional order against the petitioners.

25. It is a matter of fact that the petitioners herein had raised the industrial dispute after accepting the monetary benefits derived under the voluntary retirement scheme of the respondent­Company. In the complaint filed before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the petitioners had disclosed their willingness to deposit the entire amount received by them under the said scheme. In Ramesh Chandra Sankla (supra), a number of workmen of Vikram Cement Company, who had ceased to be the employees of Company after accepting full benefits under the scheme of voluntary retirement, moved the Labour Court under Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 making the same allegations against the Company, as the petitioners in this case. In that case, the Labour Court declined to decide certain issues framed at the instance of the Management as preliminary issues. The Management’s appeal against the decision of the Labour Court not to decide those issues as preliminary issues, was rejected by the Industrial Court. The writ petition filed by the Management was dismissed by a learned single Judge on the ground that the orders passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by the Industrial Court were interlocutory in nature. The Management took the matter before the Division Bench, which held that the writ petitions filed by the Company were under Article 227 of the Constitution and the single Judge was exercising supervisory jurisdiction, hence, intra­court appeals were not maintainable and the appeals filed by the Company were liable to be dismissed on that score alone. Even while holding that the Management’s appeals were liable to be dismissed, as not maintainable, the Division Bench went on to hold that since the workmen had approached the Labour Court after having received the benefits under the scheme, it would be equitable to direct the concerned employees to return the benefits so received to the employer, subject to the undertaking by the Company that in the event the Labour Court allowed the claim and granted benefits to the workmen, the same would be restored to them by the Company with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in Man Singh’s case (supra).

26. The present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Vikram Cement (supra), which is also followed in Man Singh (supra). I, therefore, find no merit in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the Court below had no jurisdiction to issue a direction for refund of the entire amount received by the petitioners as a condition precedent for the reference to proceed. Hence, I find no reasons to entertain these petitions.

27. For the foregoing reasons, all the petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged. Time to deposit the amount, as directed by the Court below, is extended by a further period of three months from today.

(K.S.JHAVERI, J.) PRAVIN