IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL PETITION NO.5845/2015 BETWEEN:
CHANDRASHEKHAR S/O SANNA CHANNAYA AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS CIVIL JUDGE JUNIOR DIVISION AND JMFC AT HALIYALA R/AT ANNAPPA SMRUTHI BUILDING I FLOOR, OPP. GOVERNMENT BUS STAND, HALIYAL UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT-574294.
(BY SRI DILRAJ JUDE ROHIT SEQUEIRA, ADV.) AND:
1. THE STATE REPRESENTED THROUGH THE SARJAPURA POLICE REPRESENTED BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SMT. SHYLAJA S V W/O N A ANIL KUMAR AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS R/AT NO.1239/1 OPP: POLICE QUARTERS SARJAPURA TOWN ANEKAL TALUK BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT-562125 (BY SRI I S PRAMOD CHANDRA, SPP-II FOR R1 SRI B.S. SACHIN, ADV. FOR R2) ... PETITIONER ... RESPONDENTS THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR. NO.191/2015 PENDING ON THE FILE OF C.J. AND J.M.F.C., AT ANEKAL, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, FOR OFFENCES P/U/S 498A R/W 149 OF IPC AND SEC.3 AND 4 OF D.P.ACT.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
O R D E R Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and the learned counsel for respondent No.2.
2. The petitioner is a judicial officer presently working at Harapanahalli. The complainant is the sister-in-law of the petitioner. She lodged a complaint before Anekal Police against her husband accused No.1, her father-in-law and mother-in-law accused Nos.2 and 3 and her sister-in-law accused No.4 and the present petitioner as accused No.5.
3. According to the complainant her marriage was performed with accused No.1 on 18/19.10.2014. At the time of the marriage talks a demand of Rs.5,00,000/- was made and the said amount was received by the accused persons. On the date of the marriage after the rituals, in the evening, the petitioner herein along with accused Nos.1 and 2 questioned the complainant and her father as to why they did not bring ‘Honda City Car’ demanded by them to the marriage pendal ? The other allegations made against the petitioner herein are that when the complainant and her father approached the petitioner, the petitioner took the side of the other accused and instigated them to ill treat and harass her. It is alleged that on 11.01.2015 on a Sunday when the complainant and her father were in the house, number of people came in 3 to 4 vehicles and she could identify the voice of all the accused persons. Based on these allegations, FIR is registered against the petitioner as well as other accused persons under Section 498A r/w 149 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for brevity ‘the DP Act’).
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the allegations made against the petitioner, even if accepted on their face value do not constitute the offences alleged against him. The petitioner was not residing with the complainant at any point of time, hence there was no occasion for him to subject her to ill treatment or harassment as alleged in the complaint. The allegations of dowry demand are vague. The other allegations made against the petitioner are also equally vague and are general in nature. Therefore, the prosecution initiated against the petitioner is illegal and an abuse of process of law.
5. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 however, has opposed the submissions and would submit that serious allegations are made against the petitioner, which attract the offences alleged in the First Information Report (for short ‘the FIR’). These allegations are required to be investigated. Hence, the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked at this stage as the complainant has alleged serious acts of cruelty, ill-treatment and dowry demand, and thus seeks to dismiss the petition.
6. The learned State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 submits that, the police have already submitted ‘B’ report insofar as accused Nos.2 to 4 are concerned, but on account of the stay granted by this Court, the investigation could not be completed and if the stay is vacated, the investigating agency would file appropriate report before this Court.
7. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and on going through the material on record, it is not in dispute that the marriage between respondent No.2 and accused No.1 was performed on 18/19.10.2014. A reading of the complaint indicates that after the marriage, the complainant resided in the matrimonial house only for a brief period of 1 ½ months. The averments made in the complaint would disclose that during this period, she was not at all residing with the petitioner. Therefore, there was absolutely no occasion for the petitioner to subject the complainant to cruelty and harassment, so as to attract the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. The allegations in this regard are directed mainly against her husband and her-in-laws i.e., accused Nos.1, 2 and 3. It is fairly conceded by the learned State Public Prosecutor that after investigation even the jurisdictional police have submitted ‘B’ report against accused Nos.2 to 4 are concerned. The allegations made against the petitioner are at par with the accused Nos.2 to 4.
8. Therefore, it is evident that the complainant has failed to make out a prima facie case for prosecution of the petitioner for the offences punishable under Section 498A of IPC.
9. Coming to the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the D P Act, are concerned the only allegation made against the present petitioner in this regard is that on the date of marriage, in the evening, the petitioner and other accused persons questioned the complainant and her father as to why they did not bring ‘Honda City Car’ to the marriage pendal. This allegation, even assuming to be true, does not amount to dowry demand within the definition of the term “dowry” as defined under the Dowry Prohibition 1961. From the said allegation, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner herein made a dowry demand against the respondent No.2/complainant. There is nothing in the entire complaint to suggest that prior to the marriage, any demand for ‘Honda City Car’ was made either by the petitioner or by any other accused persons at the time of marriage or in consideration of the marriage. In the absence of any such averment, the allegation made in the complaint that after performance of the marriage, the accused persons questioned the complainant and her father as to why they did not bring ‘Honda City Car’, cannot be co-related to dowry demand so as to attract the offences under the DP Act.
10. In considering the above allegation, it is relevant to note that according to the complainant she used to approach the petitioner herein seeking his intervention when other accused persons were subjecting her to ill- treatment and harassment. This averment indicates that her relationship with the petitioner was quite cordial and he was her sympathizer and did not allow other accused persons to ill-treat her. But as already stated above, the Investigating Officer has submitted a ‘B’ report even against accused Nos. 2 to 4, which has not been objected to by the petitioner which indicates that there was no truth in the allegations made against the present petitioner in this regard. Therefore, there is no basis for the respondent No.2 to pursue her allegations against the petitioner. On overall consideration of the complaint, I find the allegations made therein are inconsistent apart from being vague and general in nature. Having regard to the omnibus nature of the allegations made against the accused persons, petitioner herein appears to have been implicated in the alleged offences only with a mala fide intention to settle score with her husband with whom she is ill-disposed. Nonetheless in the absence of necessary ingredients constituting the offences under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of D.P. Act, in my view, the registration of the FIR and the consequent investigation taken up against the petitioner is wholly illegal and amounts to abuse of the process of Court and therefore, cannot be allowed to be continued. As a result, in order to secure the ends of justice, it is just and necessary to quash the impugned FIR and all consequent proceedings arising therefrom.
11. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR in Crime No.191/2015 and consequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed only insofar as petitioner is concerned.
Sd/- JUDGE NG* CT:bms