Court No. - 45
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 42563 of 2018 Applicant :- Chandra Veer And 5 Others Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another Counsel for Applicant :- M J Akhtar,Sri V.M. Zaidi, Senior Advacate Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Siddharth,J.
Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned AGA for the State.
The applicants have approached this Court praying to consolidate the Criminal Case No. 7342/9/2017 (State Vs. Chandra Veer and others) pending in the court of A.C.J.M., Court No.3 Muzaffar Nagar and Criminal Case No. 4353/2018 (Ram Kumar Vs. Chandra Veer and others) pending in the court of A.C.J.M., VIIth, Meerut and direct the Magistrate, Meerut to disposed of both the cases according to the provisions contained under Section 210 Cr.P.C.
It has been submitted that the applicant moved an application before A.C.J.M., Court No.3, Muzaffar Nagar, for consolidating both the trials, which has been rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
As per Section 186 Cr.P.C., High Court can direct both trials to be conducted at one place. The cognizance has been taken by two courts in two districts. Therefore, it is only the High Court, which can direct that both the trials be decided by one court.
Learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgement of Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Bhagwan Das Agrawal and others, 2013 (16) SCC 574, wherein the Apex Court has held in paragraph Nos. 11 to 13 as follows:-
"11. Section 186, Cr.P.C., which deals with the power of the High Court to decide, in case of doubt, the district where inquiry or trial shall take place, is extracted hereinbelow:- "186. High Court to decide, in case of doubt, district where inquiry or trial shall take place.- Where two or more Courts have taken cognizance of the same offence and a question arises as to which of them ought to inquire into or try that offence, the question shall be decided -- (a) if the Courts are subordinate to the same High Court, by that High Court; (b) if the Courts are not subordinate to the same High Court, by the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the proceedings were first commenced, and thereupon all other proceedings in respect of that offence shall be discontinued."
12. From bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is manifest that the main object and intention of the Legislature in enacting the provision is to prevent the accused persons from being unnecessarily harassed for the same offences alleged to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of more than one courts. In order to avoid unnecessary harassment of the accused to appear and face trial in more than one courts, necessary direction is to be issued to discontinue the subsequent proceedings in other courts.
The provision is based on the principle of convenience and expediency. However, the sine qua non for the application of this provision is that the cases instituted in different courts are in respect of the same offence arising out of the same occurrence and that the same transaction and that the parties are the same. In other words, the persons implicated as an accused in different cases must be the same. If these conditions are satisfied then subsequent proceeding has to be discontinued.
13. Chapter XXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the provisions with regard to the enquiries and trials. Section 300 debars the Court from proceeding with the trial in respect of the same offence for which the accused has already been tried and convicted or acquitted. However, a person convicted for any offence may be afterwards tried if such act constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted. This Court elaborately dealt with the provisions contained in Section 300 Cr.P.C. in the case of State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC page 655. Some of the paragraphs are worth to be quoted hereinafter.
"26. Broadly speaking, a protection against a second or multiple punishment for the same offence, technical complexities aside, includes a protection against re-prosecution after acquittal, a protection against re-prosecution after conviction and a protection against double or multiple punishment for the same offence. These protections have since received constitutional guarantee under Article 20(2). But difficulties arise in the application of the principle in the context of what is meant by "same offence". The principle in American law is stated thus:
"The proliferation of technically different offences encompassed in a single instance of crime behaviour has increased the importance of defining the scope of the offence that controls for purposes of the double jeopardy guarantee. Distinct statutory provisions will be treated as involving separate offences for double jeopardy purposes only if 'each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not' (Blockburger v. United States). Where the same evidence suffices to prove both crimes, they are the same for double jeopardy purposes, and the clause forbids successive trials and cumulative punishments for the two crimes. The offences must be joined in one indictment and tried together unless the defendant requests that they be tried separately.
27. The expression "the same offence", "substantially the same offence" "in effect the same offence" or "practically the same", have not done much to lessen the difficulty in applying the tests to identify the legal common denominators of "same offence". Friedland in Double Jeopardy (Oxford 1969) says at p. 108: "The trouble with this approach is that it is vague and hazy and conceals the thought processes of the court. Such an inexact test must depend upon the individual impressions of the judges and can give little guidance for future decisions. A more serious consequence is the fact that a decision in one case that two offences are 'substantially the same' may compel the same result in another case involving the same two offences where the circumstances may be such that a second prosecution should be permissible....
" 28. In order that the prohibition is attracted the same act must constitute an offence under more than one Act. If there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients under two different enactments, a double punishment is not barred. In Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, the question arose whether a crime and the offence of conspiracy to commit it are different offences. This Court said: (SCR p. 827) "The offence of conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore, quite separate offences."
In view of the mandate of the Apex Court and also keeping in view the fact that both the trials pending at District Muzaffar Nagar and District Meerut relate to the same offence, Sessions Judge, Muzaffar Nagar is directed to send the record of Criminal Case No. 7342/9/2017 (State Vs. Chandra Veer and others) to Sessions Judge, Meerut where Criminal Case No. 4353/2018 (Ram Kumar Vs. Chandra Veer and others) is pending. Both the trials shall proceed at Meerut and be decided together by one court.
With the aforesaid observations, this application is allowed.
Order Date :- 29.11.2018 Ruchi Agrahari