JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
2. This second appeal has been filed by Chandra Shekhar Singh. plaintiff-appellant against the judgment and decree dated 19th September, 1987 passed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Ghazipur in Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1983. The appellant filed Suit No. 15 of 1975 challenging his termination order dated 15th December, 1974.
3. The appellant was employed as a clerk in Basic Junior High School and his services were terminated by the management of defendant school, hence he filed suit praying that the order of termination was illegal and void and that he continues to be in service. The trial court decreed the suit by Judgment and decree dated 15.3.1983. On appeal being filed by defendant, the trial court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit, hence this second appeal.
4. During the pendency of the appeal, in this Court a compromise was filed on 30.3.1998 by the parties, which was sent for verification to the District Judge, Ghazipur, where it was duly verified. On the basis of the said compromise, this Court disposed of the second appeal by an order dated 10.3.1999 and compromise was made part of the decree. Later on, said order was recalled by this Court by order dated 10.5.2002. When the appeal was taken up, the learned counsel for the respondent raised objection to the maintainability of such compromise stating that in view of the fact that suit was itself not maintainable in civil court, compromise can also not be made part of the decree of this Court.
5. The suits of all civil nature are cognizable by civil court unless they are barred expressly or impliedly. The suit is barred when any enactment so provid'es and suit is said to be impliedly barred when jurisdiction itself is barred on general principles of law, i,e., when a statute confers a right and also provides remedy for its enforcement, such a right cannot be agitated in any other forum and jurisdiction and suit is said to be impliedly barred. Such cause would be exclusively cognizable in that forum according to the procedure provided in that statute. The contract for personal- service cannot be enforced by a civil court. There are three well known exceptions to this principle i.e. (i) when public servant is sought to be removed (ii) when a statutory body acts in breach or violation of mandatory provisions of a statute and (iii) when a workman seeks reinstatement under industrial law.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 888, has held that contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be enforced and a civil court cannot normally give a declaration that a contract of personal service subsists even after service of an employee having been terminated and employee be deemed to be in service. The Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, AIR 1995 SC 1715, Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2043 and Premier Automobile Ltd. v. Kamlekar, AIR 1995 SC 2238, has considered this aspect in detail. The last case in the series is Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corporation , Ahmedabad, 2O02 Lab IC 794, the Apex Court has held :
"The Industrial Disputes Act is enacted by the Parliament to provide speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of dispute arising between workmen and employers, the underlying idea being to ensure that the workmen, does not get caught in the labyrinth of civil court, which the workmen can ill afford. The procedures followed by civil courts are too lengthy and consequently is not an efficacious forum for resolving industrial disputes speedily. The power of Industrial courts also is wide and such forums are empowered to grant adequate relief as they think just and appropriate. It is in the interest of the workmen that their disputes, including the dispute of illegal termination are adjudicated upon by an industrial forum. The legality of the order of the termination passed by the employer will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2K and under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act."
7. It is now well-settled that "education" is an industry though the teachers working in the educational institutions are not 'workmen'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Miss A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, 1989 (1) ALJ 61. has held that education is an industry but teachers employed in it are not workmen. The appellant was employed as clerk and not as a teacher, hence he was workman employed in an industry. He should have raised an industrial dispute regarding his termination. The latest decision in Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam (supra) declares that jurisdiction of the civil court is impliedly barred and civil court has no jurisdiction to grant decree of personal service. The civil court in the instant case has no jurisdiction to grant reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff-appellant. The suit was, therefore, not maintainable in civil court.
8. It has been argued that the parties to a suit can compromise a suit before the civil court. The question is when civil court has no jurisdiction, which is barred, expressly or impliedly, can it entertain compromise and pass decree, on the basis of such compromise?
9. It is well-settled that compromise decree is a contract between the parties and it only receives seal of the Court. It is not a decision of the Court to which Court applies mind. It does not decide controversy between the parties. In Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannatha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, the Apex Court held :
"A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the Court can be a decree. It will not be even res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter. It might creates estoppel by conduct between the parties."
10. It is also well-settled that the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on Court by an agreement, if a Court has no jurisdiction over a matter. Once it is held that civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit, it cannot pass any other order except returning the plaint or dismiss the suit as it cannot decide the matter. Hence, in my opinion, compromise, which was filed before this Court, cannot be accepted and no decree can be passed on the basis of compromise by this Court.
11. For the reasons stated above, the second appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.