JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri A. N. Bhargava and Sri DeoraJ, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. No one has appeared for the respondents.
2. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 24th April, 1985 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Bijnor by which Appeal Nos. 22 of 1983 and 152 of 1984 filed by Bharat Singh, respondent No. 1, have been allowed.
3- Brief facts giving rise to the writ petition are ; in pursuance of a money decree properties of Judgment- debtor were sold oil 20th August, 1982 in which the petitioner was the auction purchaser. An application was filed by respondent No. 1, Judgment debtor, against the action under Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure. In the application it was stated that auction proceedings are illegal and fabricated and the provisions of Order XXI Rule 68 of Code of Civil Procedure have not been followed. It was stated that auction purchaser is son-in-law of decree holder and no permission of the Court was taken for bid. It was further stated that value of the property is Rs. 2.5 lacs, which has been auctioned for less amount. The decree holder objected to the application and submitted that proclamation was issued for the auction fixed on 20th August, 1982 and provisions of Order XXI Rule 68 of Code of Civil Procedure were followed. The decree holder also raised objection that application is barred by time. The trial court after hearing the parties took the view that according to Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963 fhe application for setting aside the sale was to be made within 60 days whereas the application was filed on 1.12.1982. The trial court held that application is barred by time. The trial court further held that judgment-debtor was aware of the proceedings since he made applications on 21st August, 1982 and 25th September, 1982. The statement of Ainin and auction purchaser were also recorded by the Court. The auction was also approved on 1st December, 1982. The trial court held that auction was held according to procedure prescribed. The application was held to be barred by time and was consequently rejected. Two appeals were filed by the Judgment-debtor being Appeal No. 22 of 1983 against the order dated 1st December, 1982 and Appeal No. 152 of 1984 against the order dated 11th January, 1983 passed by trial court rejecting the application under Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure. The appellate court allowed the appeals and held that application was not barred by time. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 24th April, 1985 passed by the appellate court.
4. The counsel for the petitioner, challenging the order, contended that application filed by the judgment debtor under Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure was clearly barred by time and was rightly rejected by the trial court and the appellate court committed error in allowing the appeal. The counsel for the petitioner further contended that learned appellate court has wrongly observed that application under Older XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure was not barred by time since the sale was not conducted in which Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply. He further contended that application was not supported by deposit of 12.5% of purchase money as required by Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure as applicable in the present case.
5. I have considered the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
6. The first submission raised by counsel for the petitioner is that application filed by judgment-debtor under Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure was barred by time. There is no dispute that limitation for filing an application under Order XXI Rule 90 is 60 days. The trial court has recorded a finding that sale was conducted on 20th August, 1982 after following the procedure prescribed. The appellate court has observed that there was collusion between decree holder, his relation and Amin. The appellate could held that Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply, hence the application cannot be held to be barred by time,
7. In the present case the objection was filed by judgment- debtor purporting to be under Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure praying for setting aside the sale. The sale was also confirmed on 1st December, 1982. Before the trial court both, Amin and auction purchaser, appeared and were cross-examined. Finding was recorded by trial court that proclamation was duly Issued. The trial court further held that under Order XXI, Rule 66, the valuation of the property was kept as RB. 50,000 and no objection was filed by the judgment-debtor. The trial court noted that from papers of the auction it is clear that 7 persons have participated in the bid and last bid was of Chandra Pal. The trial court further held that there was no violation of Order XXI Rule 72 since prohibition was only against the decree holder. The sale having taken place and the objection having been filed by Judgment-debtor, the sale at best could have been said to be voidable capable of being set aside on grounds as mentioned under Order XXI Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure. The sale which requires to be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot be said to be void nor there are any facts in the present case on the basis of which it can be contended that sale was void. The sale being voidable Article 127 of Limitation Act, 1963 shall be fully applicable and application having not been filed within 60 days was rightly held to be barred by time. The Apex Court in Merla Ramanna v. Nallaparaju and Ors., AIR 1956 SC 87. observed that if the sale is one which has under the law to be set aside under Order XXI Rule 90 Article 166 (of old Limitation Act) shall apply. It was held that Article 166 (of old Limitation Act) shall be applicable only when the sale Is Inoperative and void. Apex Court observed in paragraph 10 :
"10. Coming next to Article 166, an application by a Judgment-debtor to set aside a sale in execution of a decree has, under that Article, to be filed within 30 days of the sale. If the present proceedings are governed by this Article, there can be no question that they are barred by limitation. But then there is abundant authority that Article 166 applies only when the sale is one which has under the law to be set aside as for example, under Order XXI Rules 89, 90 and 91, but that it has no application when the sale is inoperative and void."
8. The application of the judgment-debtor having been found barred by lime, It is not necessary to consider other submissions raised by counsel for the petitioner.
9. From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that application filed by judgment-debtor was clearly barred by time and trial court did not commit any error In rejecting the application as barred by time. The appellate court erroneously allowed the appeal holding that Article 136 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable in the present case. The order of appellate court cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.
10. The writ petition stands allowed.
11. Parties shall bear their own costs.