JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The landlord filed a suit before the Judge Small Cause Court for ejectment of the petitioner along with the recovery of arrears of rent and for damages for use and occupation of the premises in question from the date of the filing of the suit till the actual delivery of possession. The landlord also prayed that a decree of possession be also granted. The petitioner, who is the tenant is the premises in question, contested the suit and contended that he was not a defaulter and that he was not in arrears of rent. The petitioner also claimed the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, alleging that he had deposited the entire arrears of rent, etc., unconditionally.
2. The trial court after determining the points in question decreed the suit of the landlord holing that the petitioner was in arrears of rent and that he had failed to pay the same within one month from the date of service of the notice of demand and determining the tenancy. The Judge Small Cause Court further found that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act as he had not deposited the entire amount.
3. Aggrieved by the order of the Judge Small Cause Court the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Before the revisional court, the petitioner moved an amendment application, which was allowed. On the basis of the amendment, the petitioner contended that the suit filed by the landlord was for recovery of possession of the immovable property and therefore, the suit was not cognizable under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The petitioner further contended that the notice determining the tenancy was invalid and was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The revisional court dismissed the revision and held that the notice, determining the tenancy, was a valid notice and was in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The revisional court further found that the suit filed by the landlord was maintainable and the relief of possession could also be granted by the Judge Small Cause Court.
4. Heard Sri G. R. Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner. No one appears on behalf of respondents.
5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit filed by the landlord was for the possession of the immovable property, which was not cognizable by the Judge Small Cause Court and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable, is devoid of any merit. The suit that was filed by the landlord was for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the petitioner was in arrears of rent and inspite of notice of demand being served upon the petitioner, the rent was not paid and therefore, the notice of tenancy was determined. The relief of possession of the property in question was made as a necessary corollary after the ejectment of the tenant inasmuch as the landlord was entitled to take possession from the tenant after its ejectment.
6. In view of the provisions of U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, all suit for ejectment of a tenant and for arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and for possession of it became cognizable by the Court of Small Cause. Thus, a suit for possession could be tried by the Court of Judge Small Cause when it was brought by the landlord against the tenant for its ejectment.
7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice determining the tenancy was invalid and was not issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is wholly erroneous. It was contended that the tenancy of the petitioner was terminated forthwith by the said notice and was not determined after the expiry of the stipulated period of 30 days. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit. The words used in the notice are : "your tenancy is terminated". The use of the words "your tenancy is terminated" does not mean that the landlord intended to terminate the tenancy forthwith, i.e., on the date when he gave the notice. From a reading of the notice, it is clear that the landlord did not intend to terminate the tenancy forthwith. The notice clearly expressed an intention that the landlord did not want the petitioner to continue in possession of the premises after the expiry of the period of one month. Thus, in my view, the notice issued by the landlord was sufficient and valid.
8. In Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin. AIR 1963 All 581, this Court held that a notice determining the tenancy may include a demand for possession, but a notice only demanding possession cannot be interpreted as a notice determining the tenancy. The Division Bench further held :
"The appellant did not say in the notice that the respondent's tenancy was terminated on the date on which the notice was given ; he wrote "your tenancy is terminated" and not "your tenancy is terminated today". He used the present tense but it does not mean that he was terminating the tenancy in praesenti ; the present tense is quit consistent with the termination of the tenancy in future when the act by which the tenancy is to terminate in futuro is done in praesenti. Since it was by the act of giving the notice that the tenancy was to be terminated he could say "year tenancy is terminated". The tenancy of the respondent was terminated by the notice given by him and therefore, on the date on which he gave the notice he could say "your tenancy is terminated". What he meant was "your tenancy is terminated after the expiry of thirty days from the receipt of the notice" ; this was made clear by the addition that he should vacate the accommodation on the 30th day after the receipt of the notice."
9. The aforesaid ruling of this Court is fully applicable to the present facts of the case. In the present case, the intention in the notice was very clear, namely the tenancy was being terminated after the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of the notice and which was made clear that the petitioner should vacate the accommodation after 30 days from the receipt of the notice.
10. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in the writ petition and is dismissed with costs.