ORDER Bennet, J.
1. This is a civil revision by the plaintiffs against an order of a Small Cause Court directing the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper Court on the ground that the suit was cognizable only by a revenue Court. The Court held that the suit lay under Section 48, Agra Tenancy Act of 1926. That section deals with a suit by a tenant from whom any sum of produce is exacted by his landholder in excess of the amount recoverable from him as an arrear of rent. The present plaint sets out that the defendant is a zamindar of one quarter share in the land of which the plaintiffs are tenants and that the yearly rent is Rs. 120 per annum and that Phundan Lal is the owner of the other three quarter zamindari share. Para. 2 sets out that the defendant collected for the years 1337 and 1338 Fasli arrears of rent of her own share and of Phundan Lal's share amounting to Rupees 254-9-0 and did not allow Rs. 30 remaining for Rabi. Prara. 3 sets out that later Phundan Lal got a decree for arrears of rent for this period of Rs. 242 against the plaintiffs. Para. 5 alleged that the plaintiffs had demanded from defendant the excess she had collected but she had refused to give it. This appears to me to be a very clear case under Section 48, Tenancy Act. and under Section 230 the jurisdiction lies only in the Revenue Court. Learned Counsel referred to a ruling, Ravi Pratap Narain Singh v. Ram Prasad Bharti 1924 All. 125, corresponding to Section 36 of Act 2 of 1901. That ruling laid down that the section would not apply to the case of a zamindar gathering produce of a grove for himself when the produce was not handed over to him by tenants.
2. The ruling has therefore no application to the present case as the plaint clearly sets out that the rent in question was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant. Some argument was made on the meaning of the word "to exact" Oxford Dictionary as stating its mean in Section 48. The ruling quoted Murray's ing "to demand and enforce payment of" The ruling does not quote Murray fully as Murray states that the literal sense is to derive or force out and the various derivative senses are to demand, require etc. The first meaning no doubt is to demand and enforce the payment of or to extort. The second meaning includes the meaning "to insist upon," the third meaning to call for demand, require. It is clear that the word may or may not indicate force and may indicate mere insistence. It is clear to me that it is not intended that a suit of this nature should lie in the Civil Court if the demand is made with insistence or if it is enforced and that the suit should lie in, the Revenue Court if the demand is made without insistence or without force. Such a position of affairs would be quite absurd. I consider that a case like the present where the plaintiffs, say that the defendant collected from them more rent than they should have paid is a case which comes under Section 48. Tenancy Act, and that that suit is triable only by the Revenue Court.
3. For these reasons I dismiss this application in revision with costs.