AFR
Court No. - 59
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 205 of 2018 Appellant :- The Central Railway Thru Its Chairman Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Appellant :- Sanjay Kumar Tiwari,Anil Kishore Sharma Counsel for Respondent :- Ashok Kumar Tripathi (Now Ashok Tripathi),Ramendra Asthana AND Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 206 of 2018 Appellant :- The Central Railway Thru Its Chairman Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Appellant :- Sanjay Kumar Tiwari Counsel for Respondent :- Ashok Kumar Tripathi (Now Ashok Tripathi),Ramendra Asthana
Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J.
1. Heard Sri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Anil Sharma along with Sri Ashok Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents.
2. The First Appeal No.205 of 2018 has been filed by the Central Railway challenging the judgment and order dated 16.03.2017 in L.A. Case No.578 of 2004 (Sri Dharmesh Kumar Shivhare vs. State of U.P. and others) passed by the Presiding Officer, U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Viksas Parishad Tribunal, Civil Court, Agra.
3. The First Appeal No.206 of 2018 has also been filed by the Central Railway challenging the judgment and order dated 08.02.2017 in L.A. Case No.580 of 2004 (Sri Dharmesh Kumar Shivhare vs. State of U.P. and others) passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge/ Presiding Officer, U.P.A.E.V.P. Tribunal, Agra.
4. The controversy involved in both the afore-noted appeals are similar and, therefore, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, both the appeals are being finally heard together.
FACTS OF FIRST APPEAL NO.205 OF 2018
5. Briefly stated facts of this appeal are that by notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Land Acquisition Act published on 31.08.2001 and lastly published on 22.09.2001, 5.3589 hectares land of village “Bad”, Tehsil Sadar, District Agra was acquired for construction of a railway line. Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 04.01.2002 and lastly on 19.01.2002. Possession over the acquired land was taken on 05.07.2002. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 25.08.2003 determining the market value at Rs.217.39 per square meter and after deduction of 50%, awarded compensation @ Rs.108.69 per square meter. The compensation of the claimant was determined at Rs.1,38,447/-. About a month before the award, claimant respondent No.4 purchased the rights by a deed dated 29.07.2003 (Paper No.32C) for a total sum of Rs.25,000/- from the original owner namely Sri Ghanshyam. Thereafter, claimant- respondent No.4 received under protest the aforesaid compensation of Rs.1,38,447/- on 03.09.2003 and filed a reference application before the competent authority on 03.10.2003 under Section 18 of the Act. The matter was referred and the reference was registered as L.A. Case No.578 of 2004, which has been decided by the impugned judgment dated 16.03.2017. The reference court determined the market value of the land at Rs.325.27 per square meters and after deduction of 10%, the value of the acquired land was determined @ Rs.293/- per square meter. To determine the market value as aforesaid, the reference court relied upon sale deed exemplars being Paper No.29C and 30C. One of it was a sale deed dated 27.03.2000 executed by one Dilip Kumar in favour of Indian Oil Corporation whereby khasra plot No.65 measuring 390 square meters was sold for a sum of Rs.1,26,859/-, i.e. Rs.325.27 per square meter. The other sale deed was with respect to khasra plot Nos.377 and 378 measuring 57.69 square meters of village “Bad” executed by one Smt. Ram Beti for Rs.16,000/- on 15.07.2000. As per this sale deed, the value comes to Rs.276/- per square meters. The reference Court relied upon the sale deed dated 27.03.2000 executed by Dilip Kumar in favour of Indian Oil Corporation to determine the market value of the acquired land.
FACTS OF FIRST APPEAL NO.206 OF 2018
6. Briefly stated facts are that acquisition giving rise to the present appeal is the same as is involved in afore-noted First Appeal No.205 of 2018. Khasra plot No.359 measuring 760 square meters of the aforesaid village “Bad” were owned by Sri Banwari Lal, Mangi Lal and Ramakant sons of Vishambhar Singh and Smt. Ka nth Devi, the wife of Vishambhar Singh, which were acquired in the aforesaid acquisition for construction of railway line. After four days of the award dated 22.08.2003, a deed transferring rights dated 26.08.2003 was executed by the aforesaid person in favour of the claimant-respondent No.4, Sri Dharmesh Kumar Shivhare for a sum of Rs.40,000/- as against the award of the acquired land for Rs.1,15,121/- made by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Agra on 22.08.2003 @ Rs.108.69 per square meter (after deduction of 50%). The claimant-respondent No.4 received the compensation of Rs.1,15,121/- as aforesaid, on 03.09.2003. Thereafter, the claimant-respondent No.4 (purchaser of rights) filed an application under Section 18 of the Act before the competent authority for reference, which was registered as L.A. Case No.580 of 2004 (Sri Dharmesh Kumar Shivhare vs. State of U.P. and others), which has been allowed by the impugned judgment dated 08.02.2017 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge/ Presiding Officer, U.P.A.E.V.P, Civil Court, Agra, who determined the market value of the acquired land at Rs.293.07 per square meters after deduction of 10% and also allowed other statutory benefits under the Act.
7. The grounds and evidences considered by the court below to determine the compensation in both the L.A. Cases are the same, which gave rise to the present two First Appeals. SUBMISSIONS:-
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits as under:
(i) The respondent No.4 was having no right to file a reference application under Section 18 of the Act since he has got transfer of right to sue under the deed executed by the original owners and such the transaction is hit by the provisions of Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
(ii) The compensation determined by the court below is wholly arbitrary and illegal inasmuch as the court below has neither considered the relevant exemplars on record nor gave any justifiable reason for restricting the deduction to 10% as against the deduction of 50%.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 submits as under:-
(i) By the deed executed by original owners, the entire rights were transferred to the claimant-respondent No.4 and, therefore, the claimant-respondent No.4 was not only having right to receive the compensation but also to apply for enhancement of compensation and to file a reference application under Section 18 of the Act.
(ii) The reference court has lawfully determined the compensation which does not require any interference by this court.
DISCUSSION AND FINDING:-
10. So far as the first question is concerned, it is concluded by a Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 19.03.2018 in First Appeal No.152 of 2014 (Soran Singh vs. Collector Agra & Others) in which the Division Bench held that for acquisition of land the right to receive compensation from the State is a right related to property and not an assignment, and not merely right to sue as provided under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It concluded in para-36 of the judgment as under:
“36. In view of above exposition of law, the view taken by Court below that right to claim compensation could not have been transferred by erstwhile owner to appellant as it amounts to mere right to sue, cannot be sustained. The question formulated above, is answered in favour of appellant. We hold that Court below in taking otherwise view has erred in law.”
11. In First Appeal No.62 of 1999 (The Distt. Manager, Food Corporation Of India & Another vs. Shri Kailash Chand & Others), and other connected first appeals decided on 12.12.2013, another Division Bench of this court framed following three issues for determination:
“1.Whether transfer of right to receive compensation in pending Land Acquisition References is impermissible by virtue of Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
2. Whether the right to receive enhanced compensation, if any is a transfer of right to property or is transfer of "mere right to sue"?
3. Whether a transferees who obtained transfer during the pendency of Land Acquisition References could have prosecuted the Land Acquisition References and are entitled to receive enhanced compensation as per the orders passed by Additional District Judge? ”
12. After referring various judgments including the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Vs. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 775, the Division Bench in the aforesaid case of Kailash Chandra and others (supra) held, as under:
“In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that transfers made in favour of the respondents during the pendency of the land acquisition reference before the Additional District Judge/District Judge was not hit by section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. Transfer of right to receive compensation consequent to reference proceedings was a right in a property i.e. compensation on true market value of the property at the time of notification under section 4 and cannot be held to be "mere right to sue" The transferees thus after transfer of the right to receive compensation and other sums consequent to the reference proceedings, stepped into the shoes of the original owners and were rightly substituted under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. by the reference Court. The respondents thus, were clearly entitled for the benefits of the order passed by the reference Court. The submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the transferees cannot be awarded or given any compensation, cannot be accepted.”
13. Another Division Bench in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Kanak & Ors. decided on 26.5.2010 reported in 2012 (6)ADJ 444 (Paras 51 to 63), considered a similar controversy with reference to the provisions of Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and held, as under:
"51. In the second category of first appeals (i.e. FA Nos. 273/94, 274/94, 368/97, 370/97, 263/98 & 555/99), the landowners themselves received the compensation amount as was determined by the Spl. LAO, who did not accept the award and sought for the reference by moving their written applications. During the pendency of the reference proceedings before the Tribunal, they assigned their rights en mass including their right to receive compensation and to prosecute their reference proceedings. Pursuant thereto, these post-award assignees got their names added /substituted by the Tribunal's orders on the basis of the consent given by the assignors and continued the reference proceedings. The Tribunal ultimately awarded a higher amount of compensation to these 'post-award assignees'.
52. Against the above factual backdrop, the true nature of the rights acquired by the assignees (the claimants in these 14 appeals) for both the stages i.e. 'pre-award' and 'post-award' needs examination.
53. For this purpose, if we examine the scheme of the LA Act, it reveals that a land "vests" in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances when its possession is taken either under S. 16 (post- award) or 17(1) (pre- award) of the LA Act. Immediately with the taking of the possession, the rights of a landowner extinguishes who acquires a vested, irrevocable and indefeasible 'right to receive compensation' as per the LA Act, though it may be actually quantified later on and at different stages. In Joginder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 231, it was succinctly held that "the right to compensation and the quantification thereof are two distinct concepts. The right to compensation arises when the land vests in the State while its quantification may be concluded much later. Although the process of quantification may pass through several stages, from the Land Acquisition Officer to the District Judge and thereafter to the High Court, the process of quantification is merely one of computing the value of the land, on the principles enacted in the Land Acquisition Act. All along, however, the right to the compensation so quantified refers back to the date of acquisition."
54. Therefore, it is crystal clear that at the pre-award stage, an ex-owner is entitled to receive compensation per the Collector's award with his valuable right to seek a reference u/s 18 of the LA Act against such award. However, when an award is already made by the Collector which is not accepted by the person interested, he can, at that post-award stage, seek a reference u/s 18 of the LA Act to get his compensation judicially determined by the Reference Court subject to further appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court. In both these 'pre-award' and 'post-award' stages, the rights possessed by an ex-owner constitute "property" in view of the binding dictum of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai (supra), wherein the contrary contention raised before the Supreme Court was as below (vide para 8): " ....... the compensation as determined under the awards made by the Special Deputy Collector was paid to and received by the deceased and, hence, at the time of the death the initial right to receive compensation had already merged in those awards and the only right which the deceased had was the right to agitate against the correctness of the award and nothing more and this right to claim further compensation was a precarious rights, being merely a right to litigate - a chancy and dicey right, which could not be elevated to the status of any asset or property and as such, there was no question of any property having escaped the assessment to duty. It was urged there that such a right to further compensation would become property only when the claim would be accepted finally by the Court and till the enhanced compensation became payable by reason of final adjudication of the Court, no property could be said to have come into existence "
55. The above quoted contention was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and clearly settled that the rights of an ex-owner at both the 'pre-award stage' and the 'post-award stage' constituted a property. While dealing with the 'pre-award stage rights' (i.e. where land has already vested in the Government but the compensation was not received), it was observed as under (vide para 10):
" the right to receive compensation at market value on the dates of the relevant notifications unquestionably accrued to the deceased which was property and it would be such property that would pass on the death of the deceased. That such right is property is well settled and if necessary reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha v. CWT, (1974) 3 SCC 126, a case under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 where it has been clearly held that the right to receive compensation in respect of the Zamindari Estate which was acquired by the Government under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, even though the date of payment was deferred, was property and constituted an asset for the purpose of that taxing statute." (Emphasis added)
56. In Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha (supra), the contention was that since the amount of compensation payable under the Bihar Land Reforms Act was not determined, therefore, it be excluded from the assets of the assessee for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. While rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Assuming for the sake of argument that the amount of compensation payable to the assessee had not been determined by the Compensation Officer by the valuation date, that fact would not justify the exclusion of the compensation payable from the assets of the assessee. The right to receive compensation became vested in the assessee the moment he was divested of his estate and the same got vested in the State in pursuance of the provision of Bihar Land Reforms Act. As the estate of the assessee which vested in the State was known and as the formula fixing the amount of compensation was prescribed by the statute, the amount of compensation was to all intents and purposes a matter of calculation. The fact that the necessary calculation had not been made and the amount of compensation payable to the assessee out of the definition of assets or make it cease to be property." (para 19)
57. Pandit Laxmikant Jha (supra) was, later, followed by the Supreme Court in CWT v. Smt. Anjamli Khan, 1991 Sup. (2) SCC 681 and CWT v. U.C. Mehtab, (1997) 10 SCC 252. In UP Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd, (1996) 3 SCC 124 also, the view taken by the Supreme Court was that the purchaser would be entitled to step into the shoes of the owner and to claim payment of the compensation according to the provisions of the LA Act.
58. It may also be mentioned that the Court of Appeal in England, more than a century back, in its judgment of Mrs. Dawson (supra) also held that "his right to be paid compensation under the notice to treat, which is not simply a right to claim damages for a wrongful act, but is a right to a payment under the terms of a statute and to be ascertained in the way prescribed by the legislature, which is to be regarded as the price payable for the exercise by the undertakes of their statutory powers, and as such is property." This opinion is also clearly in line with the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
59. Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai (supra) also clearly lays down that even at the 'post-award stage', the rights of an ex-owner constitute a property, if a reference against the award is sought under S. 18 of the LA Act. It was held as below (vide para 11):
"In our opinion the High Court was right in holding that there are no two separate rights -one a right to receive compensation and other a right to receive extra or further compensation. Upon acquisition of his lands under the LA Act, the claimant has only one right which is to receive compensation for the lands at their market value on the date of the relevant notification and it is this right which is quantified by the Collector under S. 11 and by the Civil Court under S. 26 of the LA Act. It is true that under S. 11, the Collector after holding the necessary inquiry determines the quantum of compensation by fixing the market value of the land and in doing so is guided by the provisions contained in S. 23 and 24 of the Act - the very provisions by reference to which the Civil Court fixes the valuation. It is also true that the Collector's award is, under S. 12, declared to be, except as otherwise provided, final and conclusive evidence as between him and the persons interested. Even so, it is well settled that in law the Collector's award under S. 11 is nothing more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimants whose property is acquired. [Vide Privy Council decision in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India, 32 IA 93 (PC) and this Court's decisions in Raja Harish Chandra v. Deputy. LAO, AIR 1961 SC 1500 and Mr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237. If that be the true nature of the award made by the Collector then the question whether the right to receive compensation survives the award must depend upon whether the claimant acquiesces therein fully or not. If the offer is acquiesced in by total acceptance the right to compensation will not survive but if the offer is not accepted or is accepted under protest and a land reference is sought by the claimant under S. 18, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in civil court. It is impossible to accept the contention that no sooner the Collector has made his award under S. 11, the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merged in the award, or what is left with the claimant is a mere right to litigate the correctness of the award."
60. As to the right of an owner in a reference proceedings, it was also observed by the Supreme Court that "the claimant can litigate the correctness of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which he prosecutes in civil court. That is why when a claimant dies in a pending reference his heirs are brought on record and are permitted to prosecute the reference."
61. In view of the above binding decisions of the Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that the "right to receive compensation" in respect of an acquired land both at 'pre-award' and 'post-award' stages is a "property" and the contrary contention of the Parishad is totally devoid of any substance and is, accordingly, rejected.
62. The contention raised on behalf of the Parishad that the rights assigned by the ex-landowners both at 'pre-award' and 'post-award' stages were "mere right to sue" and their assignments were hit by S. 6(e) of the TP Act, has also no force. As held above, the rights assigned by the ex-tenure holders constituted a "property" which could not be termed as a "mere right to sue". It may be recalled that S. 6 of the TP Act provides for that the "property of any kind may be transferred except as otherwise provided by this Act or any other law for the time being in force." The exceptions to this general rule of transferability of a property, as stipulated in S. 6, are enumerated from clauses (a) to (i) but none of these clauses forbids the transfer of the "compensation rights". No other provision of the TP Act or any other law also prohibits its transfer. Rather, S. 8 of the TP Act further envisages the incidences of a transfer by postulating that "unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof." As such, a transfer of a property "vests" in the transferee the entire interest of the transferor with all legal incidents thereof, unless the parties intend differently. In view of S. 8 of the TP Act, it would be evident that the transfer of the property (namely, the right to receive compensation) vested in the assignees all the rights of the assignor and the assignees, thereby, entered into their shoes with the right to recover the compensation.
63. Further, the word 'mere' as employed in S. 6(e) of the TP Act is significant, which depicts the distinction between a 'mere right to sue' and a 'right to sue'. It needs mention that it is now settled law that no legal bar exists to transfer a "right to sue" as one of the incidents attached to a "property" vide Union of India v. Shri Sharada Mills, (1972) 2 SCC 877 and Mrs. Dawson v. Great Northern & City Rail Co. (supra). Thus, the law is that the "right to sue" can be assigned as an incidental, ancillary and subsidiary right in favour of an assignee alongwith the right to recover the assigned property. The assignment of the "right to sue" should necessarily be along with the property and not de hors the property."
14. The aforementioned Division Bench judgments are binding on this Bench. Therefore, the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is rejected and it is held that the claimant-respondent No.4 was having right to receive compensation and to file reference under Section 18 of the Act.
15. Section 6(e) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not deny the right to receive compensation in pending land acquisition references. Transfer of right to receive compensation consequent to reference proceedings is a right in a property i.e. compensation on true market value of the property at the time of notification under section 4 and cannot be held to be "mere right to sue" The transferees, after transfer of the right to receive compensation and other sums consequent to the reference proceedings, steps into the shoes of the original owners.
16. The right to compensation and the quantification thereof are two distinct concepts. The right to compensation arises when the land vests in the State while its quantification may be concluded much later. Although the process of quantification may pass through several stages, from the Land Acquisition Officer to the District Judge and thereafter to the High Court, the process of quantification is merely one of computing the value of the land, on the principles enacted in the Land Acquisition Act. All along, however, the right to the compensation so quantified refers back to the date of acquisition. Therefore, at the pre-award stage, an ex- owner is entitled to receive compensation per the Collector's award with his valuable right to seek a reference u/s 18 of the LA Act against such award. However, when an award is already made by the Collector which is not accepted by the person interested, he can, at that post-award stage, seek a reference u/s 18 of the LA Act to get his compensation judicially determined by the Reference Court subject to further appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court. In both these 'pre-award' and 'post-award' stages, the rights possessed by an ex-owner constitute "property". Upon acquisition of his lands under the LA Act, the claimant has only one right which is to receive compensation for the lands at their market value on the date of the relevant notification and it is this right which is quantified by the Collector under S. 11 and by the Civil Court under S. 26 of the LA Act.
17. It is true that under S. 11, the Collector after holding the necessary inquiry determines the quantum of compensation by fixing the market value of the land and in doing so is guided by the provisions contained in S. 23 and 24 of the Act - the very provisions by reference to which the Civil Court fixes the valuation.
18. It is also true that the Collector's award is, under Section 12, except as otherwise provided, final and conclusive evidence as between him and the persons interested. Even so, it is well settled that in law the Collector's award under S. 11 is nothing more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimants whose property is acquired. If that be the true nature of the award made by the Collector then the question whether the right to receive compensation survives the award must depend upon whether the claimant acquiesces therein fully or not. If the offer is acquiesced in by total acceptance the right to compensation will not survive but if the offer is not accepted or is accepted under protest and a land reference is sought by the claimant under Setion 18, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in civil court. As to the right of an owner in a reference proceedings, the claimant can litigate the correctness of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which he prosecutes in civil court. That is why when a claimant dies in a pending reference his heirs are brought on record and are permitted to prosecute the reference. Thus, "right to receive compensation" in respect of an acquired land both at 'pre-award' and 'post-award' stages is a "property".
19. S. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for that the "property of any kind may be transferred except as otherwise provided by this Act or any other law for the time being in force." The exceptions to this general rule of transferability of a property, as stipulated in Section 6, are enumerated from clauses (a) to (i) but none of these clauses forbids the transfer of the "compensation rights". No other provision of the TP Act or any other law also prohibits its transfer. The word 'mere' as employed in Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act is significant, which depicts the distinction between a 'mere right to sue' and a 'right to sue'. Thus, the law is that the "right to sue" can be assigned as an incidental, ancillary and subsidiary right in favour of an assignee alongwith the right to recover the assigned property. The assignment of the "right to sue" should necessarily be along with the property and not de hors the property.
20. So far as the determination of market value of the acquired land is concerned, I find that the acquired land is near to Agra city. The town “Bad” is situate on Agra-Gwalior National Highway. DW-3 Rajendra Prasad Pippal (Revenue Inspector) has stated in his cross-examination that in Tehsil and Village “Bad”, there exists schools, shops, electricity, telephone-facility and amenities and on both side of the National Highway, there is residential houses. On the basis of the sale deed dated 27.03.2000 executed by Dilip Kumar in favour of Indian Oil Corporation, the court below determined the compensation @ Rs.325.27 square meters. However, it allowed the deduction of merely 10%.
21. In Nelson Fernandes and others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and others, decided on 02.03.2007 Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of deduction in case of acquisition made for construction New BG line for the Konkan Railways and held as under:
“However, the purpose for which the land acquired must also be taken into consideration. In the instant case, the land was acquired for the construction of new BG line for the Konkan Railways. This Court in Hasanali Khanbhai & Sons & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat, 1995 2 SCC 422 and L.A.O. vs. Nookala Rajamallu, 2003 (10) Scale 307 had noticed that where lands are acquired for specific purposes deduction by way of development charges is permissible. In the instant case, acquisition is for laying a railway line. Therefore, the question of development thereof would not arise. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside and in view of the availability of basic civic amenities such as school, bank, police station, water supply, electricity, high way, transport, post, petrol pump, industry, telecommunication and other businesses, the claim of compensation should reasonably be fixed @ Rs. 250/- per sq. mtr. with the deduction of 20%. The appellant shall be entitled to all other statutory benefits such as solatium, interest etc. etc. The appellants also will be entitled to compensation for the trees standing on the said land in a sum of Rs. 59,192 as fixed. I.A. No. 1 of 2006 for substitution is ordered as prayed for.”
22. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nelson Fernandes and others (supra), I find that the reference court should have made deduction at least 20% instead of 10%. On such deduction, the value of acquired land would come to Rs.260.72 per square meter. Thus value of the acquired land is determined at Rs.260.72 per square meter.
23. In view of the above discussion, both the appeals are partly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the reference court in L.A. Case No.578 of 2004 and 580 of 2004, are modified to the extent indicated above. Other consequential and statutory benefits shall also be determined accordingly.
Order Date :- 29.11.2018 NLY
Recall Application
Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J.
Heard Sri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Anil Sharma along with Sri Ashok Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents on Civil Misc. Recall Application No.6 of 2018.
Learned counsel for the appellant states that he does not want to press the recall application. Therefore, the recall application is rejected as not pressed.
Order Date :- 29.11.2018 NLY