JUDGMENT Allah Raham, J.
1. This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.8.2006, passed by Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), Lucknow, in Criminal Case No. 14 of 2006, R.C.No. 2 (A)/2005, whereby the release of pass-ports of opposite parties was ordered.
2. Facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this revision are that a case under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (P.C. Act, in short) was registered against Sri Akhand Pratap Singh, IAS (Retd.) at C.B.I. Anti-Corruption Unit-V, New Delhi. Search warrants were obtained from the court of Special Judge, C.B.I, New Delhi. During the course of investigation, pass-ports of opposite parties, who are the married daughters of Sri Akhand Pratap Singh and their four Companies running in the names of M/s Angel Foods Pvt. Ltd., M/s Vinlab Exports Pvt. Ltd., M/s Terra Pharma Growers Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Trident Agri. Pvt. Ltd. were seized on the suspicion of laundering ill-gotten money of Sri Akhand Pratap Singh.
3. The opposite parties moved an application before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), Lucknow for release of their pass-ports, which were seized on 21.3.2005.
4. The revisionist opposed the application mainly on the ground that the court at Lucknow has no jurisdiction in the matter and the same is vested in the court of Special Judge, C.B.I., New Delhi.
5. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the record, the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), Lucknow held that the jurisdiction of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), Lucknow is not ousted in the matter; she, therefore, passed the impugned order releasing the pass-ports of opposite parties subject to an undertaking given by the opposite parties.
6. Aggrieved against the said judgment and order, the Central Bureau of Investigation, Anti-Corruption Unit-V, New Delhi has preferred this revision.
7. I have heard Sri Bireshwar Nath for the revisionist and Sri Anil Kumar Tiwari, Advocate assisted by Sri K.S. Pawar, Advocate for the opposite parties and have carefully perused the record.
8. Sri Bireshwar Nath, learned Counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the question of jurisdiction was also raised in Writ Petition No. 2067 (M/B) of 2005, Akhand Pratap Singh v. C.B.I. and Ors., before a Division Bench of this Court. It was pleaded by the petitioner that the C.B.I and the courts at Delhi will not have any jurisdiction to investigate or to try the offences, but this plea of the petitioner was not upheld by the Division Bench. Supplementing this argument, Sri Bireshwar Nath has submitted that M/s Angel Food Pvt. Ltd., through its Directors, who are opposite parties 1 and 2 in this revision, had challenged the order dated 21.3.2005 passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., New Delhi, by means of Writ Petition No. 4760 (M/B) of 2005. A Division Bench of this Court in the said petition had advised the petitioners to approach the appropriate court under the common law for redressal of their grievances i.e. either for quashing of the impugned order, or for release of the property. The submission of Sri Bireshwar Nath, learned Counsel for the revisionist is that this order of Hon'ble Division Bench is indicative of the fact that the court at Lucknow has no jurisdiction in the matter. This Division Bench's decision in Writ Petition No. 4760 (M/B) of 2005 was followed in judgment and order dated 7.7.2006 rendered in Writ Petition No. 3164 (M/S) of 2006, Angel Foods Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Special Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi and Ors. On the basis of aforesaid three judgments of this Court, Sri Bireshwar Nath has argued that the jurisdiction of the designated court at Lucknow is ousted and it was the Delhi court only, which has the jurisdiction in the matter.
9. This revision has been filed mainly on the ground that there is inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court, which has passed the impugned order. Ground III of the Grounds of Revision mentions that the revisionist prefers this revision "because the revisionist mainly challenged the jurisdiction of the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), Lucknow, to entertain the application for release of the Passport." Thus the limited question to be decided in the present revision is, whether the impugned order is bad in the eye of law because there was inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court below? Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. It may be quoted hereunder:
4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.-
(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the procedure hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.
10. In the case before us, the F.I.R was registered under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act; therefore, the jurisdiction of the court will be decided as per provisions of the P.C. Act. Section 4 of the P.C.Act relates to the jurisdiction of the court for trial of offences under that Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the P.C. Act may be quoted hereunder for convenience:
4. (2) Every offence specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be tried by the special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or, as the case may be, by the special Judge appointed for the case, or, where there are more special Judges than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government.
11. Thus, the only court, which has the jurisdiction to try the offences under the P.C. Act, is the court of Special Judge appointed for the area within which such offences were committed. Learned Counsel for parties have placed reliance upon the pronouncement of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, , CBI, AHD, Patna v. Braj Bhushan Prasad and Ors., wherein at page 442, the Apex Court has held, "So the pivot of the matter is to determine the area within which the offence was committed." Sri Bireshwar Nath, learned Counsel for the revisionist has informed the Court that Sri Akhand Pratap Singh was posted in Delhi from May, 1991 to May, 1994. Rest of his tenure was in Uttar Pradesh. The check period earlier was 1978 to 1991. But, now the check period stands revised from 1.4.1982 to 31.3.1998. In this check period, it is alleged, Sri Akhand Pratap Singh acquired two properties in Delhi, one in 1986 and the other in 1996-97. The rest of the properties were situated in undivided Uttar Pradesh. Now some of the properties are lying in Uttarakhand. Elaborating further on the point of jurisdiction, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held in para 39 of the judgment in Braj Bhushan Prasad's case (supra) as follows:
39. Now, observe the distinction between Section 181(4) of the Code and Section 4(2) of the PC Act. When the former provision envisaged at least four courts having jurisdiction to try a case involving misappropriation, the latter provision of the PC Act has restricted it to one court i.e. the Court of the Special Judge for the area "within which the offence was committed". No other court is envisaged for trial of that offence. We pointed out above that when the charge contains the offence or offences punishable under the PC Act as well as the offence of conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit or any abetment of any such offence, the court within whose local jurisdiction the main offence was committed alone has jurisdiction.
12. The same legal position has been emphasized in para 45 of the judgment, as under:
45. The said decision relied on by both sides would thus support the proposition that the place of jurisdiction would be determinative of reference to the place where the main offence was committed. The fact that other allied acts were committed at different places would be hardly sufficient to change the venue of the trial to such other places.
13. Now, the question will arise, where the main offence has been committed in this case. In Writ Petition No. 2067 (M/B) of 2005, Sri Akhand Pratap Singh has filed an affidavit commenting upon the properties, which are under the scanner of the investigator. The properties and their comments are spread over 15 pages of the affidavit. Needless to say that these properties are in dozens and they are the subject-matter of investigation by the revisionist. Out of these properties, only two are said to be situated at Delhi and the same were acquired when Sri Akhand Pratap Singh was not posted in Delhi. At best, it can be alleged that he earned the ill-gotten money in Uttar Pradesh and invested it in Delhi. The contention of learned Counsel for the opposite parties is that the ratio of Braj Bhushan Prasad's case (supra) clearly establishes that the main offence has been committed in Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh); therefore, the court at Lucknow has jurisdiction in the matter. I may hasten to add here that the matter is still under investigation and a charge-sheet is yet to be submitted in court. A final view of jurisdiction can only be taken after the entire evidence has been collected and the point of jurisdiction is argued at the time of framing of charge or before that. From the facts which have been supplied by the learned Counsel for the revisionist, it can only be inferred that the jurisdiction of the court at Lucknow is not ousted in the matter. Therefore, the submission of Sri Bireshwar Nath, learned revisionist's counsel that there is inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court at Lucknow, has no force.
14. Another aspect of the matter is that the opposite parties are Directors of the four Companies noted hereinabove. Their companies had moved applications before the designated court at Delhi and orders have been passed on the same. Sri Bireshwar Nath has submitted that since the opposite parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the designated court at Delhi, they are estopped from invoking the jurisdiction of the Lucknow court. It has been noted above that the jurisdiction is to be determined according to the provisions of law. Section 4(2) of the P.C. Act, as has been quoted above, clearly provides that the court of Special Judge appointed for the area within which the offence was committed, will have jurisdiction. Braj Bhushan Prasad's case (supra) further clarifies that the place of jurisdiction would be determinative by reference to the place where the main offence was committed. Prima facie the facts supplied to the Court clearly point out that the jurisdiction of the Lucknow court is not ousted in the matter.
15. This Court in three writ petitions, viz. Writ Petitions No. 4760 (M/B) of 2005, 2067 (M/B) of 2005 and 3164 (M/S) of 2006, reference of which has been given by Sri Bireshwar Nath, has not adjudicated upon the question of jurisdiction. In Writ Petition No. 2067 (M/B) of 2005, the following three points were adjudicated upon:
(i) The Central Bureau of Investigation cannot register and investigate a criminal case against the petitioner unless the State Government's prior sanction under Section 6 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is obtained.
(ii) The deletion of Section 438 Cr.P.C by virtue of U.P. Act 16 of 1976 is violative of the petitioner's fundamental rights envisaged under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The President's assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India being justiciable is a subject matter of judicial review.
(iii) The Central Bureau of Investigation cannot proceed to arrest the petitioner unless it is satisfied that the allegations mentioned in the First Information Report have some substance and there is material to proceed against him and such a stage can be arrived only when the petitioner even after an opportunity to explain, fails to account for the assets alleged to have been acquired by him.
16. None of the above petitions was in respect of jurisdiction of the court. In Writ Petition No. 4760 (M/B) of 2005, there has been no adjudication on the point of jurisdiction; the Court had simply advised the petitioner to approach the "appropriate court" under the common law for redressal of their grievances. It will, therefore, not be proper to say that the court at Lucknow was not the "appropriate court".
17. The submission of Sri Bireshwar Nath, learned Counsel for the revisionist is that if Delhi and Lucknow courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the court at Delhi will be preferred for the reason that the F.I.R has been lodged there and the opposite parties have also submitted to the jurisdiction of Delhi court. For this, he places reliance upon para 47 of Braj Bhushan Prasad's case (supra), which may be quoted as under:
47. Shri P.S. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel cited the decisions in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of W.B. and L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras . In the former, it was held that the court which has jurisdiction to try the offence of conspiracy could also deal with the overt acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. The latter decision is concerned with the converse position. In the light of the discussions made above, it is immaterial whether such other court would also have jurisdiction in the circumstances of those cases.
18. This para of the judgment may not have much bearing on the facts of the present case. Braj Bhushan Prasad's case (supra) was in respect of the offences punishable under the P.C.Act as well as the offence of conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or any abetment of any such offence. The facts supplied by Sri Bireshwar Nath do not constitute offences at least at this stage under the aforesaid heads. Here again para 39 of Braj Bhushan Prasad's case (supra) quoted hereinabove is relevant and clinches the issue that the jurisdiction of designated court at Lucknow is not ousted in the matter.
19. No other point has been pressed before me.
20. The revision is devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed.
21. The interim order dated 18.11.2006 stands vacated.