IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF APRIL 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR REGULAR FIRST APPEAL No.973 OF 2016 BETWEEN C.Ramesh, S/o. Chikkanna Gowda, Aged about 50 years, R/o. No.826, 17/F, 1st Main Road, VI Block, Koramangala, Bengaluru-560095.
(By Sri. S.N.Aswathanarayan, Advocate) AND 1. Smt. R.Chanchal, W/o. Rikhab Chand Jain, Aged about 68 years, R/o. No.401, Panchasheel Apartments, III Floor, III Cross, Gandhinagar, Bengaluru-560009.
2. N.Devaraju, S/o. N.Narasaraju, Aged about 42 years, R/o. No.421, I Cross, New Thippasandra, HAL III Stage, Bengaluru-560075.
…Appellant 3. The Inspector General of Registration & Commissioner, VII Floor, BWSSB Building, Cauvery Bhavan, Bengaluru-560009.
4. The District Registrar, NO.2722, XII Cross, Jayanagar IV Book, Bengaluru-560004.
5. The Sub-Registrar, Office of the Sub-Registrar, Bommanahalli, Koramangala, BDA Complex, Bengaluru 6. Smt. Vijayalakshmi, D/o. B.Krishna Urs, Aged about 59 years, R/o. Lakshmi Nilaya, Chandra Layout, Laljinagar, Bengaluru-560030.
7. Gibu Abrahaman Mathew, S/o. P.Mathew, Aged about 38 years, Rep. by his General Power of Attorney Holder Marium Mathew R/o. No.928, III Cross, ITI Layout, Nagarabhavi II Stage, Bengaluru-560072.
8. Srivatsan Rangachari, S/o. S.R.Chari, Aged about 48 years, No.0-21, Diamond District, Airport Road, Bengaluru-560008.
…Respondents (By Sri. Padmanabha V. Mahale, Senior Advocate for Sri. D.N.Manjunath, Advocate, for C/R1 and R2; Smt. M.Geetha, HCGP, for R3 to R5;
R6 & R7 deleted as per court order dt. 26.10.2016; M/s Green Life India Law Associates, Advs., for R8) This RFA is filed under Section 96 of CPC against the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2016 passed in O.S.No.2990/2010 on the file of the XL Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, decreeing the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction.
This RFA coming on for final hearing this day, the court delivered the following:
JUDGMENT The validity of a sale deed not cancelled by a Civil Court according to Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is the core issue involved in this appeal.
2. 7th defendant is the appellant. O.S.No.2990/2010 was brought by respondents no. 1 & 2 in the court of XL Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, claiming the following reliefs:
”a. For a judgment and decree to declare that the entries as found in the encumbrance certificate and so also the records pertaining to a registering authority relating to the suit property as found in items one to seven and so also the entry as found in the encumbrance certificate for the period 01.04.2004 to 26.11.2008 as per entry number one reflecting the same transaction between Sri. Srivatsan Rangachari and C.Ramesh who are the defendants six and seven are fraudulent entries and hence not binding on the plaintiffs.
b. For a judgment and decree for mandatory injunction by way of a direction to the defendants one to three to delete/revoke the entries as found in the encumbrance certificate and all the records pertaining to the registering authority as relating to the transaction reflected in items one to seven for the period 01.04.1987 to 18.12.2007 and the entry as found for the period 01.04.2004 to 26.11.2008 as per the encumbrance certificate issued by the defendant number three as relating to the suit property.
c. For cost of the suit.
d. For such other relief or relief’s as this Hon’ble court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstance of the case”.
3. For the sake of convenience, for brief narration of pleadings and discussion, the parties are referred to with respect to their position in the suit. Subject matter of the litigation is a vacant site no 818, IV Block, Koramangala, Bengaluru, measuring east to west 12.20 mtrs and north to south 18.30 mtrs (referred to as ‘schedule property’ hereafter). The Bangalore Development Authority (‘BDA’ for short) allotted the schedule property to plaintiffs’ vendor, K.N.Krishna Murthy on 30.01.1988 and issued possession certificate also. The BDA executed a lease-cum-sale deed in favour of Krishna Murthy and then an absolute sale deed in his favour an 20.08.2007. The plaintiffs being convinced about title of their vendor with regard to schedule property purchased it under registered sale deed dated 18.02.2010.
4. Before purchasing the schedule property, the plaintiffs also learnt that the 7th defendant, a purchaser of schedule property from 6th defendant had filed a writ petition, (WP 14037/2008) in this court questioning the cancellation of allotment and sale of schedule property in favour of 6th defendant by executing a deed of cancellation dated 10.07.2007. In the said writ petition, an enquiry was ordered with regard to cancellation of sale deed by affording opportunity to all the parties to substantiate their stand, and accordingly, the BDA held an enquiry again and passed an order on 27.08.2009 confirming the order of revocation or cancellation of allotment to 6th defendant. Being aware of all these proceedings, the plaintiffs, in order to ensure that there are no illegal and fraudulent entries in the encumbrance register in respect of schedule property, applied for issuance of encumbrance certificate. To their shock, they found certain entries being made in the name of 4th and 5th defendants; the 4th defendant claiming to be an allottee of schedule property from the BDA had conveyed the said property to the 5th defendant under a document dated 19.10.2005. Thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to defendants No.1 to 3 for deletion of the names of defendants 4 to 7. Since no action was taken pursuant to their notice, they brought the suit for aforesaid reliefs.
5. Defendants 1 to 3 being the authorities and officer of the Department of Registration, Government of Karnataka, in their statement denied their authority to cancel the entries in the encumbrance register. They also stated that they did not have jurisdiction to cancel the entries made in the registers of their office. They contended that if according to the plaintiffs, the transaction giving rise to the entries in the concerned registers were illegal and outcome of fraud, they should question the same in a court of law and that they would obey the order of the court.
6. The 6th and 7th defendants filed their separate written statements taking up common specific pleas apart from denying the plaintiffs right, title and interest in respect of schedule property. They admitted that the BDA had originally allotted the schedule property to K.N.Krishna Murthy and executed a lease cum sale agreement in his favour on 30.01.1988. But he did not want that site and therefore requested the BDA to allot him an alternative site. The BDA, therefore cancelled the allotment to him by executing a cancellation deed on 07.05.1990 and then allotted the schedule property to the 6th defendant considering his seniority in the list of applicants. Allotment letter was issued to 6th defendant on 05.05.1990 and a lease cum sale agreement on 07.05.1990.
6.1. It is stated that the BDA issued possession certificate to him on 15.05.1990 and executed conditional sale deed on 16.05.1990. The 6th defendant sold the schedule property to the 7th defendant thereafter on 06.04.2005. Thus the 7th defendant became the absolute owner of schedule property. They have pleaded that the unilateral action taken by the BDA on 17.07.2007 cancelling the sale deed dated 16.05.1990 in favour of 6th defendant was bad and illegal; the enquiry said to have been conducted by the BDA was illegal and not transparent, and there was collusion between Krishna Murthy and the BDA. He did not derive any right again to convey the schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs. The suit is misconceived.
7. Raising twenty issues, the trial court received both oral and documentary evidence and ultimately came to conclusion that the suit deserved to be decreed in terms of relief claimed by the plaintiffs.
8. Questioning the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial court, the learned counsel for the appellants argued as follows:
8.1. The trial court has failed to notice that once the BDA executed a registered sale deed in favour of 6th defendant, it did not have power to cancel it unilaterally. A registered instrument of sale cannot be cancelled at all, there can only be reconveyance from the purchaser to the vendor. In case the sale deed has to be cancelled, it can be done only by a civil court under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, the deed of cancellation, Ex.P.17 unilaterally executed by the BDA is bad in law and by virtue of this deed, the title over schedule property did dot revert to K.N.Krishna Murthy. On this point, he has placed reliance on a few decided cases, namely (1) Binny Mill Labour Welfare House Building Co-operative Society Limited vs D.R.Mruthyunjaya Aradhya [ILR 2008 KAR 2245]; (2) M/s Latif Estate Line India Limited vs Mrs. Hadjeeja Ammal and Others [AIR 2011 Madras 66]; (3) G.D.Subramaniam vs The Sub-Registrar and Another [2009 (1) CTC 709].
8.2. Secondly he argued that the BDA was a necessary party to the suit. It held an enquiry to come to conclusion that there was fraud played by some of its officials in connivance with defendant No.6. This enquiry was the basis for cancellation of sale deed that was executed in favour of 6th defendant. In the backdrop of the pleas taken up by the plaintiffs, they should have made BDA a party to suit for effective adjudication. If BDA had been arraigned as a party, the 6th defendant would have had an opportunity of cross-examining the officials of BDA for placing the truth before the court. The expression ‘Necessary Party’ cannot be always understood as the one against whom a relief is claimed, but whose presence helps the court arrive at a proper conclusion. In this regard, the learned counsel has referred to number of authorities, some of which will be referred to in the paras to come.
8.3. Thirdly the validity of sale deed cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Whether an instrument can be cancelled or not, is a question to be tried and answered by civil court only. Therefore any opinion that this court expressed while disposing of writ petition is not binding. 6th defendant became the owner as the BDA executed a sale deed in his favour, and the sale made by him in favour of 7th defendant is legal.
8.4. Lastly, the reliefs that the plaintiffs have claimed are very peculiar, they cannot seek a direction to the defendants 1 to 3 to cancel or remove the entries made in the registers of their office. The plaintiffs should have sought for declaration of their title. Suit should have been dismissed.
9. Meeting the arguments of Sri S.N.Aswathanarayan, the learned senior counsel Sri Padmanabha Mahale for respondent/plaintiff argued that BDA was not a necessary party to suit as no relief is claimed against it. There was no need to make BDA a party to the suit as the plaintiffs have sought a direction for deletion of certain transactions from the encumbrance register. The BDA, even if impleaded, would have been a proper party to explain the actual transaction that took after initial allotment of schedule property to Krishna Murthy, but not a necessary party. Absence of proper party is not fatal to suit. Actually the defendants 6 and 7 should have filed a suit against BDA questioning cancellation of sale deed; they did not do so. The seventh defendant filed writ petition questioning the action taken by BDA and since the writ petition was dismissed and that the said order was confirmed in the writ appeal, the appellants cannot question the cancellation of sale deed. Once the order in writ petition attained finality, the course open to the plaintiffs for removal of entries in the names of defendants 3 to 5 was to file a suit of the present nature for, the revenue authorities do not delete the entries unless there is a decree from civil court. The suit is properly framed. The trial court has come to right conclusion to decree the suit. The appeal is devoid of merits. In support of his argument that the BDA was not a necessary or proper party, he relied upon three judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Others [AIR 2010 SC 3109]; Sumtibai and Others vs Paras Finance Company [AIR 2007 SC 3166].
10. In the light of points urged by learned counsel during their arguments, the following points are formulated for discussion : -
(i) Whether the deed of cancellation Ex.P17, unilaterally executed by the BDA is bad in law?
(ii) Did the 6th defendant Srivatsan Rangachari acquire title over schedule property by virtue of conditional sale deed dated 16.5.1990 as per Ex.D6?
(iii) Is the BDA a necessary party to the suit?
(iv) Are there grounds to interfere with the judgment of the trial court?
Points No. (i) & (ii) :-
11. These two points can be discussed together. The oral evidence may not be of that importance because entire case rests on validity and legality of documents. What is found from the documentary evidence is that the BDA initially allotted the schedule property to K.N.Krishna Murthy and also executed a Lease-cum-Sale deed in his favour on 30.1.1988. There is no dispute about it. The plaintiffs claim to be purchasers from K.N.Krishna Murthy through a sale deed dated 18.2.2010 as per Ex.P7. But the defendants 6 and 7 contend that allotment of schedule property in favour of K.N.Krishna Murthy was cancelled as per Ex.D7 and thereafter the BDA executed a conditional sale deed in favour of 6th defendant on 16.5.1990 as per Ex.D6 which had been preceded by allotment of that site to him and issuance of possession certificate. The BDA having noticed that the allotment of schedule property to 6th defendant and execution of sale deed in his favour being a fraudulent transaction due to mischief and malpractice by one official in its office, cancelled the sale deed by executing a Deed of Cancellation on 10.7.2007 as per Ex.P17. It is in respect of this deed that the learned counsel for appellant/defendant No.7 argued emphatically that such a cancellation was not permitted in law; the only recourse available to BDA was to file a suit for cancellation of sale deed according to section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Since he has placed reliance on many rulings, it is necessary to refer to them. In the case of Binny Mill Labour Welfare House Building Cooperative Society Limited (supra), this court has held that a sale deed duly executed and registered cannot be cancelled unilaterally. It is held as below : -
“36…….. Unilaterally he cannot execute what is styled as a deed of cancellation, because on the date of execution and registration of the deed of cancellation, the said person has no right or interest in that property. Normally what can be done by a Court can be done by the parties to an instrument by mutual consent. Even otherwise if the parties to a document agree to cancel it by mutual consent for some reason and restore status quo ante, it is possible to execute such a deed. An agreement of sale, lease or mortgage or partition may be cancelled with the consent of the parties thereto. Because in the case of agreement of sale, lease, mortgage or partition, each of the parties to the said document even after the execution and registration of the said deed retains interest in the property and, therefore, it is permissible for them to execute one more document to annul or cancel the earlier deed. However, it would not apply to a case of deed of sale executed and registered. In the case of a sale deed executed and registered the owner completely loses his right over the property and the purchaser becomes the absolute owner. It cannot be nullified by executing a deed of cancellation because by execution and registration of a sale deed, the properties are being vested in the purchaser and the title cannot be divested by mere execution of a deed of cancellation. Therefore, even by consent or agreement between the purchaser and the vendor, the said sale deed cannot be annulled. If the purchaser wants to give back the property, it has to be by another deed of conveyance. If the deed is vitiated by fraud or other grounds mentioned in the Contract Act, there is no possibility of parties agreeing by mutual consent to cancel the deed. It is only the Court which can cancel the deed duly executed, under the circumstances mentioned in Section 31 and other provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Therefore, the power to cancel a deed vests with a Court and it cannot be exercised by the vendor of a property”……..
12. The Full Bench of the High Court of Madras in the case of M/s Latif Estate Line (supra) has held as below : -
“There is no provision in the Transfer of Property Act or in the Registration Act, which deals with the cancellation of deed of sale. The reason is that the execution of a deed of cancellation by the vendor does not create, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in the immovable property and the same has no effect in the eye of law. A provision relating to the cancellation of a document is provided in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963”.
13. In another decision of High Court of Madras in G.D.Subramaniam (supra) it is held that if unilaterally executed cancellation deed is allowed to be registered without the knowledge and consent of the other party to the earlier contract, such registration would cause violence to the principles of natural justice and lead to unnecessary litigations emanating there from.
14. There cannot be a second word with regard to proportions laid down in the above rulings. A sale deed, in particular, validly executed and registered cannot be cancelled unilaterally. Because by the act of execution of sale deed, the vendor conveys his absolute title to the purchaser, and in case such a transaction is required to be annulled, it can only be through another instrument of sale or re-conveyance or if the vendor alleges fraud or misrepresentation in coming into being of the sale deed, he can sue in a civil court under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act for cancellation of the sale deed. But the question here is whether recourse to suit by the BDA was necessary?
15. The answer to this question requires reference to some other events. The BDA initiated proceedings in respect of the schedule property when it was brought to its notice that one of its officials namely Muniraju had illegally created documents to show that allotment was made in favour of Srivatsan Rangachari by rounding off the name of Sri K.N.Krishna Murthy, the first allottee from BDA. The BDA also initiated criminal proceedings against Muniraju. In the proceedings by the BDA, it appears that notice was issued to Srivatsan Rangachari, but he did not appear for enquiry. Therefore the BDA recorded a finding that there was fraud and illegality in cancellation of allotment of schedule property in favour of K.N.Krishna Murthy and re-allotment of the same in favour of Srivatsan Rangachari and consequently the sale deed made in favour of Srivatsan Rangachari was cancelled. The purchaser from Srivatsan Rangachari i.e., the seventh defendant preferred a writ petition (W.P.No.14037/2008) in this Court questioning the propriety of cancelling the sale deed without giving him an opportunity. Therefore this court disposed of the writ petition setting aside the cancellation of the sale deed with a direction to the BDA to conduct enquiry once again by affording opportunity to the concerned. Accordingly enquiry was held once again and the BDA stuck to its stand of cancellation of sale deed in favour of Srivatsan Rangachari and this was again questioned by seventh defendant by preferring a writ petition (WP No.5918/2010). In this writ petition, this Court dealt with the matter in depth and came to conclusion that there was no illegality in cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the sixth defendant Srivatsan Rangachari. The seventh defendant challenged the order in the writ petition by filing writ appeal (WA No.2759/2011) and it was also dismissed. It appears that the matter was taken to Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition which was also dismissed. Therefore the order passed by this Court in WP No.5918/2018 attained finality. Now if the findings given by this Court in said writ petition are perused, what becomes clear is that the cancellation deed dated 07.05.1990 in regard to allotment made in favour of Krishna Murthy and subsequent transactions in favour of the sixth defendant are held illegal. The cancellation deed dated 07.05.1990 does not show allotment of alternative site to Krishna Murthy and what the said document actually indicates is that by allotting a site bearing No.818, 4th Block, Koramangala, Bengaluru, the allotment dated 29.01.1988 in favor of Krishna Murthy was cancelled. This Court has clearly observed in writ petition that there was no allotment of alternative site to Krishna Murthy and instead what is forthcoming from the said document is allotment of very same site. There was no cancellation. There is also observation that cancellation of allotment of site made to Krishna Murthy was against the BDA Rules pertaining to allotment of sites. In this context any allotment made subsequently in favour of the sixth defendant was not in accordance with rules and moreover the said allotment in favour of sixth defendant was not made by BDA at all, rather the documents such as allotment letter, possession certificate and conditional sale deed were all outcome of fraud and mischief by one of the officials of BDA. Need to cancel the said allotment in favour of Srivatsan Rangachari arose since the documents stood in the name of BDA. This Court has clearly held that the BDA had not allotted the schedule property to the sixth defendant and therefore all those documents standing in the name of sixth defendant are void and non est in the eye of law. In a circumstance like this, the action taken by the BDA cancelling the allotment in favour of Srivatsan Rangachari was not illegal. These findings, though given in writ petition, bind both the sixth defendant and the seventh defendant as they have all the semblance of the principles of resjudicata enunciated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This being the position, there is no justification in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that unilateral cancellation of a sale deed is not permitted under law. At this stage I find it appropriate to place reliance on a ruling cited by the respondents counsel in the case of M.Ramakrishna Reddy vs. Sub Registrar Bengaluru and Another (AIR 2000 KAR 46. ) It is held as below:-
“10. In view of the above, when a person who claims to be the owner or a person interested in an immovable property, finds that someone else has executed and registered a sale deed or other deed in regard to his property, claiming to be the owner or a person interested in the property, the appropriate course for him is to file a suit for declaration and consequential reliefs. If he is satisfied such sale deed is executed by a person without any title and that the deed is void ab initio, he may even choose to ignore the same and leave it to the person claiming title under such deed to establish his title in appropriate proceedings. A Court of Law has the jurisdiction to declare a document to be void or even cancel a document. But under no circumstances, a person claiming to be the owner of a property or a holder of a property, can require the Registering Authority to cancel the registration of a document or to cancel the entry made in Book No. 1 in regard to a registered document or to delete or remove the entry made in the indexes relating to Book No. 1. The Registering Officer has no such power. Consequently, the question of the Registering Officer deleting any entry either from the Indexes of Book No. 1 or the extracts there from contained in the Encumbrance Certificate by holding transaction covered by a registered instrument is illegal or void, does not arise”.
(underlining by me) 16. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the very same paragraph and argued that as per the observation made there, only court of law had jurisdiction to declare a document to be void or cancel such document. I do not think that this observation is helpful to the appellant in the factual context of this case. Because the court of law gets jurisdiction to declare a document void or cancel it when a document comes into existence between two private parties and one of them seeks cancellation of it under the circumstances found in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. In fact this is the observation of this Court in WP No.5918/2010. Here in this case what is found is actually the BDA did not allot the schedule property to the sixth defendant and did not execute sale deed in his favour, but a document was brought into existence by a mischievous official in the name of the BDA. So there was no allotment and sale in favour of sixth defendant. This transaction was void and non est in the eye of law and BDA could have ignored it as has been held by this Court in the case of Ramakrishna Reddy (supra). It proceeded to take action to cancel it as all the documents stood in its name. In a situation like this section 31 of the Speific Relief Act is not applicable. There was clear case of fraud. As has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P.Changalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by his LRs. vs. Jagannath (Dead by LRs) and others [1994 SCC Page 1] fraud vitiates everything. Therefore the conclusion to be drawn is that the BDA was not expected to take recourse to file a suit seeking cancellation of sale deed that was executed in favour of sixth defendant fraudulently.
Point No. (iii):-
17. It was very emphatic argument of Sri S.N.Ashwathnarayan that the suit was bad in the absence of BDA being a necessary party. To substantiate his argument he has referred to quite a good number of case law, to quote a few, they are -
(i) Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia vs Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar and Another [1963 Supp (1) SCR 676] (ii) Sri Vardhaman Stanakvisi Jain Sravak Sangh vs Chandrakumar and Another [1984 SCC Online Kar 55] (iii) State of Himachal Pradesh vs Milkhi Ram (Dead) By Lrs and Others [(2007) 15 SCC 750] (iv) M.P.Venkatachalam and Another vs Govindan and Others [2010 (4) CTC 318] (v) Vidur Impex and Traders Private Limited and Others vs Tosh Apartments Private Limited and Others [(2012) 8 SCC 384] 18. The conspectuses of all these decisions are that the court can implead any party whose presence helps decide a case effectively and completely; that such an impleadment can be made either suo moto or on the application of a party; that plaintiff is the dominus litis is not always an absolute rule and the court is required to exercise its discretion and decide whether in the absence of a party, it will be in a position to adjudicate issues before it. Sri S.N.Ashwathnarayan focused his argument slightly differently, in that, presence of a party to a suit becomes necessary even if no relief is claimed against him; it is enough if he unravels certain facts which are helpful for adjudication of a suit. Needless to say that he argued in this way keeping in view that if the BDA had been made a party, the background of cancellation of sale deed in favour of sixth defendant could have been brought forth. Before examining this aspect, given a reflection as to how decision can be taken whether a person is a proper party or a necessary party, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Udit Narain Singh (supra) comes handy.
“7. To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled : it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding”.
(emphasis supplied) 19. Now if it is examined whether BDA was a necessary party, the answer is obviously in the negative. To substantiate this, the analysis is that already in the Writ Petition 5918/2010, this court has dealt in detail that has been discussed under point No. (i) & (ii). The order in Writ Petition has attained finality. In fact the seventh defendant cannot defend himself on the very same contentions which have not been appreciated by this court. In this view, even if BDA was made a party, it would have put forward the same facts before the court. The judgments in the Writ Petitions are produced and marked as exhibits. There is nothing for the plaintiff to claim any relief against BDA in these circumstances. It is not a necessary party for this reason. Of course it could have been a proper party if the plaintiffs wanted the same facts to be placed before the court, but it was unnecessary as they are setout in the judgments of this court in the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal. Therefore, point No. (iii) is answered in negative.
Point No. (iv):-
20. The discussion on points (i), (ii) and (iii) takes me to conclude that appeal is devoid of merits. The plaintiffs being purchasers from K.N.Krishna Murthy have every right to seek deletion of entries standing in the name of persons unconnected with schedule property. Judgment of trial court requires confirmation. Hence, the following order: -
ORDER Appeal is dismissed with costs. Judgment of the trial Court is confirmed.
Sd/- JUDGE ckl/sd