Court No. - 18
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 6742 of 2018 Petitioner :- C/M, Kisan Junior High School, Mahdeiya Bhagwanpur,Nautanwa, Maharajganj And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Bhagwan Dutt Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Mohd Shere Ali
Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.
Heard Shri B.D. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for State/ respondents and Mr. Mohd Shere Ali, Advocate appearing for respondents.
Committee of Management, Kisan Junior High School, Mahdeiva Bhagwanpur, Nautanwa, Maharajganj and Another challenging the order impugned dated 11.10.2017 passed by the first respondent whereby the representation of the petitioner in pursuance of the order of the writ court dated 15.11.2016 has been rejected and further has refused to take the primary institution in grant aid list, in view of the law laid down by Apex Court in case of State of U.P. Vs. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi and others.
At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioner apprised to the Court regarding judgment and order dated 19.5.2015 passed in writ petition no.34634 of 2004 (Committe of Management Sri Moti Lal Inter College Thru. Manager & Another) and as such this aspect to be contained in the order impugned passed in contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3989 of 2006 (State of U.P. & others Vs. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi and others) and the same has been followed by the Division bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.745 of 2014 (Nagendra Ram and another Vs. State of U.P. and others) and as such request has been made that the respondents may revisit in the matter taking into consideration the aforesaid judgment. So far as the local and factual aspect is concerned the same has not been disputed.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in para 43 and 44 of law laid down by Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3989 of 2006 (State of U.P. & others Vs. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi and others)(supra) and it would be relevant to extract aforesaid paras 43 and 44 as under:
"It is important to notice here that recognised Junior High Schools can be of three kinds: (one) having Classes I to VIII, i.e., Classes I to V (Junior Basic School) and so also Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School), (two) a school as above and upgraded to High School or intermediate standard and (three) Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School) initially with no Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) being part of the said school.
As regards the first two categories of Junior High Schools, the applicability of Section 10 of the 1978 Act does not create any difficulty. The debate which has centered round in this group of appeals is in respect of third category of the schools where Classes I to V are added after obtaining recognition to the schools which are recognized and aided for imparting education in Classes VI to VIII. Whether teachers of primary section Classes I to V in such schools are entitled to the benefit of Section 10 of the 1978 Act is the moot question. As noticed, the constitutional obligation of the state to provide for free and compulsory education of children till they complete the age of 14 years is beyond doubt now. The note appended to clause (xxvi), para 1 of the Educational Code (revised edition, 1958), inter alia, provides that Basic Schools include single schools with Classes I to VIII. In our view, if a Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) is added after obtaining necessary recognition to a recognized and aided Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII), then surely such Junior Basic School becomes integral part of one school, i.e., Basic School having Classes I to VIII. The expression “Junior High School” in the 1978 Act is intended to refer to the schools imparting basic education, i.e., education up to VIII class. We do not think it is appropriate to give narrow meaning to the expression “Junior High School” as contended by the learned senior counsel for the state. That Legislature used the expression Junior High School and not the Basic School as used and defined in the 1972 Act, in our view, is insignificant. The view, which we have taken, is fortified by the fact that in Section 2(j) of the 1978 Act, the expressions defined in the 1972 Act are incorporated."
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances this Court is of the considered opinion that while deciding the issue in hand, at no point of time the aforesaid judgments has taken into consideration specially para 43 and 44 by the authority while proceeding to pass the order impugned. Accordingly, the order dated 15.11.2016 is set-aside the matter is remanded back to the first respondent to consider afresh in light of the aforesaid judgments.
With the aforesaid observations/ directions, this writ petition stands disposed of.
Order Date :- 28.3.2018 shiv