JUDGMENT J.C. Mishra, J.
1. This revision has been filed against the order passed by 1st Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aligarh holding that the court fee paid is insufficient and directing the plaintiff to pay ad-valorem court fee at Rs. 94,41,000.
2. The opposite party has filed copy of the plaint along with counter-affidavit. The revisionist filed suit with following reliefs :
(a) By passing a decree for mandatory injunction the defendants be directed to prepare the OCC account of plaintiff after giving due credit to the damages, caused to the plaintiff and strictly in accordance with the circulars issued by R.B.I. from time to time within the time specified by the Court.
(b) Cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendants.
(c) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Court may deem fit under the circumstances of the case be also given to the plaintiff and against the defendants.
3. The plaintiff's case is that he had suffered damages on account of the action, inaction, negligence and violation of rules to the tune of Rs. 94,41,000. The details are furnished in paras 18 to 29 and some other paragraphs. Cause of action has been stated in para 23 of the plaint. It states that the plaintiff asked the defendants to prepare the O.C.C. account of the plaintiff after giving due credit to the damages caused to the plaintiff and strictly in accordance with the circulars issued by R.B.I. from time to time but on 10th October, 1998. they finally refused. Thus the relief claimed is of mandatory injunction directing the defendant-bank to prepare the O.C.C. account of the plaintiff after giving due credit to the damages caused to the plaintiff.
4. So far as the opening of the account is concerned as indicated in para 4 of the counter-affidavit, there appears to be no dispute. It has been stated that the bank has already sanctioned an open cash credit limit to the extent of Rs. 35 lacs. The real controversy appears to be regarding damages. The defendant may not accept that the plaintiff has suffered damages as stated in the plaint. It ts also apparent that before granting relief as prayed, the Court will have to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
5. The defendant filed objection in the trial court stating, that the court fee paid is insufficient and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. The trial court held that the relief claimed by the plaintiff involves declaration that the defendant has suffered damages to the tune of Rs. 94,41,000 and the defendant is liable to accept this liability and adjust It by incorporating it in the account. He, therefore, held that the real intention of the plaintiff is to exonerate him from the liability of payment of Rs. 94,41,000, i.e, he is liable to pay only the balance amount, if any, after adjusting the damages. He held that. in fact, the suit is for declaration with consequential relief and, therefore, the defendant is liable to pay the court fee ad valorem.
6. Aggrieved with the order directing the plaintiff to make up the deficiency in court fee good by 30th November. 1998, the plaintiff has preferred this revision.
7. I have heard Sri Vibhav Bhushan Upadhyaya, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Manish Goyal. learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri A. K, Roy, learned counsel for the opposite party.
8. The learned counsel for the revisionist contended that the plaintiff has sought relief of mandatory injunction only and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to require the plaintiff to pay court fee on the relief of declaration which was not asked for. He challenged the correctness of the decisions relied on by the learned civil Judge.
9. The learned counsel for the opposite party relied on a decision of single Judge, decided by Hon'ble R. R K, Trivedi, J. in Dinesh Kumar v. Additional District Judge, Roorkee. district Haridwar and others, (1991) 1 CRC 197. In the said case, only the relief of injunction was asked for. In view of para 6 of the plaint, it was held that the real grievance of the plaintiff was that of auction and in view of the assurance given by Sub-Divisional Officer, the plaintiff desired remission in the agreed amount. It was held that the real relief sought in the suit was to avoid the payment of Rs. 33,400, the balance of contract money, which being recovered from him and. therefore, the relief has a definite value. Under the circumstances, it was held that the payment of fixed court fee for the relief of injunction alone was not sufficient. The relief of injunction in the facts and circumstances of the case was a consequential relief and not the main relief. Reliance was placed on a decision of Delhi High Court in M/s. Ratlam Straw Board Private Ltd. v. Union of India and another. AIR 1975 Del 270. The following observations contained in para 7 are reproduced below :
"7. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Delhi High Court. The cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable. In the case in 1983 ACJ 648, which shows that all the dues had already been paid by plaintiff and nothing was due from him and even though the dues were cleared, defendants were threatening to disconnect the supply of the electricity. Thus, for grant of injunction, the determination required was to see whether the amount has been paid or not. The quantum of the amount showing liability of plaintiff was not to be gone into by the Court. In such circumstances, the Court rightly held that the court fee payable will be under Section 7(iv-B)(b) of the Court Fee Act. Similarly before Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works, the question involved for determination was whether an Act passed by the Central or the State Legislature can be said to be an instrument and. if so, an instrument securing money or other property having such value. In that case payment sought to be avoided on the ground that the Acts passed by the State Legislature were invalid and void for diverse reasons. The Court found that in such a case the Act could not be treated as instrument and the court fee payable shall not be ad valorem on the amount sought to be recovered. In case AIR 1975 All 368, dispute was with regard to valuation of suit and jurisdiction of the Court to hear the same. In my opinion, all the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable. In the present case petitioner cannot say definitely and specifically that he is entitled for remission of the amount. It has to be established by adducing evidence which may or may not be accepted."
10. The learned counsel for the revisionist placed reliance of a Supreme Court decision in Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief inspector of Stamps, U. P., AIR 1968 SC 102, which was quoted in para 2 of the judgment decided by Seven Judges Full Bench in Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Mahant Laxmi Narayan and others. AIR 1970 All 488 (FB). The quotation reads as follows :
"It is clear from the, plaint when read as a whole that though the appellant-company alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The plaint proceeds on the footing that the said Acts were void and that, therefore, the State of U. P., or its authorities had no power to realise the said tax and the said cess. It may be that, while deciding whether to grant, the injunction or not the Court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Act. But that, must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the Court might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction, all suits where injunction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under clause (a) of Sub-section (iv) of Section 7 and in that view clause (b) of subsection (iv-B) of Section 7 would be superfluous."
11. Reference may be made to para 8 of the judgment of the 7 Judges Full Bench which indicates that if only substantive relief is prayed for, it is not open to Court to add or read a declaratory relief also into it and treat it as declaratory relief with consequential relief. The observations are quoted below :
"For purposes of court-fee, the Court must look at the reliefs as prayed for in the plaint. In order to ascertain the real nature of the reliefs claimed, the substance of the plaint has to be considered. If a declaratory relief alone has been prayed for. the Court cannot super add a consequential relief which it thinks the plaintiff ought to have prayed for and treat it as a consequential relief. See Bishan Sarup v. Musa Mal. AIR 1935 All 817 (FB). Likewise, if only a substantive relief is prayed for, it is not open to a Court to add or read a declaratory relief also into it and treat it as a declaratory relief with a consequential relief. See Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P.. AIR 1968 SC 102. court fee has to be determined on the relief as prayed for in the suit. At the initial stage of determining court fee on a plaint, the question whether a declaratory suit is liable to be dismissed either because it does not fall within the purview of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (now Section 34 of 1963, Act), or because the plaintiff has failed to sue for a further relief which was open to him or for some other reason docs not arise ; nor does the question 'arise whether the suit can succeed because only a substantive relief has been prayed for. The question of the applicability of Section 7(iv)(a) of the original Act or of Section 7(iv)(a) of the amended Act arises only when a declaratory relief and another relief have been asked for either as one composite relief or as two distinct reliefs."
12. Thus, the view taken by the learned single Judge in Dinesh Kumar v. Additional District Judge, Roarkee, district Haridwar and others, (1996) CRC 197, is apparently in conflict with the seven Judges decision of this Court and Supreme Court decision in Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps. U. P., AIR 1968 SC 102. Since this judgment was pronounced on January 4, 1996 much after the view taken in the aforesaid decisions, it would be proper that the matter may be considered by a larger Bench. The controversy is formulated as follows for reference :
"Whether in a suit where only relief sought is award of permanent injunction in mandatory form and no declaration is called for, the Court can in view of real intention contained in the plaint require the plaintiff to pay the court fee on declaration with consequential relief."
13. The record be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of larger Bench.
14. Till further orders, the operation of the order and consequential dismissal of the suit under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. be stayed.