JUDGMENT V.K. Shukla, J.
1. In the instant writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the validity of the judgment and order dated 26.8.1998 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in Original Application No. 2128 of 1997, Brij Mohan v. Union of India, and has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the termination order dated 26.4.1991 and verbal order dated 7.10.1992 passed by Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal. Allahabad Bench, Allahabad.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner was selected by the Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad, on the post of driver on temporary basis in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1,500 for a period of three months. Subsequently, by means of letter dated 13.3.1990, the temporary appointment of the petitioner was extended till further orders. Subsequently, the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on 26.4.1991 by the Registrar exercising and invoking the powers vested in him under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary) Service Rules. 1965. Against the aforementioned order of termination, the petitioner claims to have submitted a detailed representation dated 21.5.1991. Further contention of the petitioner is that considering his application dated 21.5.1991, fresh appointment was given to him on 1.11.1991 mentioning therein that the petitioner was being appointed on ad hoc basis for a period of three months. It was also categorically mentioned therein that the appointment of the petitioner was absolutely fresh appointment for a period of three months without any lien on his pervious employment, and that this appointment would automatically come to an end on the expiry of the period of three months. Pursuant to the aforementioned fresh appointment on ad hoc basis, the petitioner continued to function up to 6.10.1992, and thereafter with effect from 7.10.1992, no work was assigned to the petitioner. The petitioner against this order of termination alleges to have filed various representations, the last one being representation dated 14.7.1993, and as no orders have been passed thereon, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad, through Original Application No. 1318 of 1993. During the pendency of the original application at Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad, an application was moved to the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, for transfer of the original application to the Principal Bench. The Principal Bench transferred the original application of the petitioner, and thereafter dismissed the claim preferred on his behalf. After dismissal of the aforesaid claim, the present writ petition has been filed, as mentioned above.
3. We have heard Sri A. S. Diwekar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Asthelkar for the contesting respondents.
4. Sri Amit Asthelkar, at the very outset, raised a preliminary objection in regard to jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the writ petition against the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, and in this connection, he has placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997 (3) SCC 261, particularly, paragraph 91, which is quoted below :
"It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Further more, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of first appellate court. We have already emphasized the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of the Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R. K. Jain's case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be perused. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ Jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial Jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls."
5. Sri A. S. Diwekar has opposed this argument. Placing reliance on Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, he has submitted that as the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, as such this Court is fully competent to entertain the present writ petition, and grant reliefs as claimed by the petitioner under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution being relevant is quoted below :
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs,--(1) ............
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders, or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
6. The brief background of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is necessary to be looked into. When the Constitution was framed. Article 226, as it originally stood therein provided that "every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those, territories directions, orders or writs........" Some of the decisions rendered by different High Courts during the earlier years of the post-Constitution period have given a wider perspective regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court and pointed out that a High Court can exercise powers under Article 226 even in respect of Tribunals or Authorities situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction if such Tribunal or Authority exercises powers in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights of persons residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of such High Court (vide K.S. Rashid Ahmad v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1951 Punj 74 ; M.K. Ranganathan v. Madras Electric Tramways Ltd., AIR 1952 Mad 659 ; Aswini Kumar Sinha v. Dy. Collector of Central Exercise and Land Customs, Shillong, AIR 1952 Ass 91. It was observed in M. K. Ranganathan's case that "if a Tribunal or authority exercises jurisdiction within the territories affecting such rights. It may reasonably be construed that the authority or the Tribunal functioned within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and therefore, is amenable to its jurisdiction."
7. But a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, 1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210, thus :
"The power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to its jurisdiction,"
8. It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated the Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which Clause (IA) was added to Article 226. That clause was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution Forty Second Amendment.
9. The object of the amendment of inserting Clause (2) in the Article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 (supra) and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus, the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which "the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court, The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts.
10. "Cause of action" is a phenomenon well understood in legal parlance The collocation of the words "cause of action wholly or in part arises" seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the Courts. As per that section, the suit could be instituted in a Court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or in part arises". Judicial pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to mean "the bundle of facts which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court".
11. In legal parlance, the expression 'cause of action' is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a Tribunal ; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing ; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary).
12. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, a 'cause of action' is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim ; the phrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment.
13. In 'Words and Phrases' (fourth edition), the meaning attributed to the phrase 'cause of action' in common legal parlance is existence of those facts which give a party a right to Judicial interference on his behalf.
14. The question of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Uptal Kumar Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711, and this aspect of the matter has been dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the aforesaid judgment as under :
"Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non-obstante clause notwithstanding anything in Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises Jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government. "Within those territories directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution, it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, N.I.C.C.O. must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition.
It is well-settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts, which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, (1889) ILR 16 Cal 98, Lord Watson said : ..................... the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour."
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition."
15. The above noted principle has been reiterated in the case of Navin Chandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (4) AWC 3040 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 2966, Therein the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, and the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 can as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to territories within which the "cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" and It is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment by which Clause (2) is inserted is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts. The ratio as has been laid down in the aforesaid judgment is in unequivocal terms that the power under Article 226(2) of the Constitution can be exercised by any High Court in the territories within which cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
16. Tested on the principles, as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Navin Chandra N. Majithia (supra), it is amply clear that this Court at Allahabad has full jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition inasmuch as the petitioner was appointed at Allahabad, his services were terminated at Allahabad and his original application was filed at Allahabad. Mere transfer of original application to Principal Bench of the Tribunal at New Delhi, will not oust the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the writ petition and granting the requisite reliefs. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has restored the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution while concluding that it is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned case was not considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. To the contrary, issue before the Apex Court was as to whether Clause 2 (d) of Article 323A and Clause 2 (d) of Article 323B to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32, respectively, of the Constitution are unconstitutional. The case of L. Chandra Kumar in no way limits the powers of High Courts conferred upon it under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. This Court at Allahabad in view of the provisions contained in Article 226(2) of the Constitution has full authority to entertain the writ petition and grant requisite reliefs claimed by the petitioner. The preliminary objection raised by Sri Asthelkar is thus not sustainable, and we are of the view that apart from Delhi High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal was situated, the High Court at Allahabad has full authority and jurisdiction to deal with the matter and decide the same.
17. Now coming to the merit of the case, we have perused the judgment and order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, The Tribunal, apart from holding that the original application was not well within limitation, has also decided the case on merits, and thus, we are also going into the merits of the case in regard to rights of the petitioner to continue. It is undisputed fact that initial appointment of the petitioner was temporary in nature, and thereafter, fresh appointment was given to him and that too on ad hoc basis. It is well-settled that temporary/ad hoc employees have got no right to continue on the post in question. The view which has been taken by the Tribunal records categorical finding that the appointment of the petitioner was only as stop-gap measure. Various other observations have been made by the Tribunal pertaining to the conduct of the petitioner. We are of the considered view that the appointment of the petitioner was purely ad hoc in nature. The petitioner had no legal right to claim continuation on the post in question. On merits, the petitioner has failed to make out a case for grant of any relief.
18. The writ petition falls, and is dismissed.
19. No order as to costs.