IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT WRIT PETITION NO.51271 OF 2019 (GM-CPC) BETWEEN:
M/S. BPL LIMITED, HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFFICE AT NO. 64, CHURCH STREET, BANGALORE-560 001.
…PETITIONER (BY SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. DHANANJAY JOSHI, ADVOCATE) AND:
M/S MORGAN SECURITIES & CREDITS PRIVATE LIMITED, A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 53, FRIENDS COLONY (EAST), NEW DELHI. REGISTERED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. ARVIND KAMATH, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR MS. DIMPLE A.R., ADVOCATE FOR C/R) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUNGED ORDER DATED 05.11.2019 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE XXXV ADDL. CITY AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE IN EXECUTION PETITION, EP NO.4621/2018 ON IA 2 VIDE ANNEXURE-A; AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARIANG THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER Petitioner-Company being the judgment debtor in Execution Petition No.4621/2018 is knocking at the doors of writ court for laying a challenge to the order dated 05.11.2019, a copy whereof is at Annexure-A, whereby its application filed u/s.33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act,1957 seeking impoundment of the arbitral award dated 14.12.2016 on the ground of deficiency of stamp duty, has been rejected by the learned XXXV Addl. City Civil Judge, Bengaluru. The respondent-decree holder Company having entered caveat through its counsel, opposes the writ petition.
2. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the petition papers, this Court declines to grant indulgence in the matter because:
(a) Section 23 excludes levy of stamp duty on the interest component of an instrument which includes arbitral award and therefore the stamp duty is leviable under Article 11(b)(iii) of the Act is confined to the principal amount comprised in the award; an argument to the contrary cannot be sustained without straining the language of the section;
(b) petitioners reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of HYDER CONSULTING vs. GOVERNOR, STATE OF ORISSA, (2015) 2 SCC 189 paras 27 & 28 for the purpose of stamp duty on an award is untenable inasmuch as the said paragraphs or any other paragraph does not speak of even one single word about the dutiability of an arbitral award; the Apex Court was only construing the expression “…the Arbitral Tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest…” and held that there is no distinction between a “sum” with interest and a “sum” without interest and that the original sum and the interest component not being separable, the interest after loosing its character as such, takes the colour of “sum” for which the award is made; it has been a long settled position of law of construction of statutes that the expressions used in one Act cannot be ordinarily resorted to for construing a provision of another Act which is not in pari materia;
(c) the above apart, more than a century ago Lord Halsbury in the celebrated case of Quinn v Leathem (1901) A.C. 495, 506 has observed as under:
“Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, (1898) A.C. 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”
Thus a decision is an authority for the proposition/norm that it actually lays down in a particular fact matrix and not for all that, that may logically follow therefrom. Therefore, the decision cited for the petitioner is of no avail to him.
(d) The law relating to stamp duty is a fiscal legislation; it has the effect of drilling the hole to the pocket of a citizen which may impoverish him, unless construed strictly as held by the Courts in a catena of decisions; where there is doubt as to dutiability of an instrument, ordinarily it should enure to the benefit of citizen and not to Caesar, unless law indicates to the contrary, as rightly contended by the counsel for the respondent.
In the above circumstances, the writ petition being devoid of merits, stands rejected.
No costs.
Sd/- JUDGE DS