HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2435 of 2014 Date:20.09.2014 Between:
Bommidi Buchi Reddy, S/o Late Narayana Reddy . Petitioner And:
Kandikonda Parandhama Goud, S/o Kistaiah Goud and four others.
. Respondents Counsel for the petitioner: Sri P.Ravi Shanker Counsel for the respondents: Sri Seshagiri Rao Yelamanchili The Court made the following:
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition arises out of order, dated 22.04.2014, in I.A.No.19 of 2014 in O.S.No.51 of 2008 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Vikarabad, Ranga Reddy District.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The petitioner filed the above-mentioned suit for declaration of his title and rectification of entries in the revenue records relating to the suit schedule property. The said suit was decreed ex parte on 02.02.2011 as, despite notice, the respondents failed to contest the suit by filing the written statement. Almost three years later, the respondents have filed an application under Order IX Rule-13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree. As there was delay of 1,029 days in filing the said application, they have filed I.A.No.19 of 2014 for condonation of the said delay. Though the petitioner resisted the said application by filing a counter- affidavit, the lower Court allowed I.A.No.19 of 2014 by condoning the delay.
A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.19 of 2014 would show that respondent No.2 has stated that on coming to know about the filing of the suit, the respondents have approached the petitioner-plaintiff and questioned him as to why he has filed the said suit; that later on, a panchayat was conducted in the village by the village elders; and that the petitioner was requested to withdraw the suit. He has further stated that the respondents have, therefore, not attended the suit proceedings; that on receipt of notices and summons in I.A.No.358 of 2013 in O.S.No.172 of 2013 filed by the petitioner for temporary injunction, they came to know about the passing of the ex parte decree in O.S.No.51 of 2008.
In support of the above averments, the respondents have not adduced any evidence, either oral or documentary. The respondents have not even indicated the date or at least the time around which the alleged panchayat was held or the names of the elders who held the panchayat. The lower Court without adverting to these aspects has referred to certain case law under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (for short ‘the Act’) and opined that as per the said decisions, the Court shall not show excessive attention to the "technologies” (sic:“Technicalities”). The lower Court has accordingly, condoned the delay on imposition of costs of Rs.3,000/-.
Section 5 of the Act envisages that a time barred appeal or application can be admitted, if the Court is satisfied that the appellant or applicant has shown sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or application within the period of limitation.
In State of Andhra Pradesh, rep.by its Secretary to Government, Roads & Buildings Dept., and others
[1]
v. A.Murali Madhava Rao and others , speaking for the Division Bench, I had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On a review of case law, the Division Bench held as under:
“ I n Vedabai Alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others [(2001) 9 SCC 106] and State of Nagaland v.
Lipok Ao and others [2005 (3) SCJ 558] the Apex Court made a delicate balance of the two extreme views, namely, strict approach and a too liberal attitude in considering the applications for condonation of delay. In the first mentioned case, it was held that a distinction must be made between the case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days and that in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side is a relevant factor so that the case calls for a more cautious approach, but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and the same deserves a liberal approach. The Supreme Court further held that while no hard and fast rule can be laid down, the Courts should exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause”, the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. The Supreme Court further observed that in exercising their discretion, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach.”
The Division Bench further held:
“The intendment of law in prescribing limitation is to see that persons are not vexed with the litigation for unduly long periods and their legitimate expectation of receiving the fruits of success in litigation is not defeated after a certain period by dragging him to a further round of litigation….”
While the Courts must not take a rigid attitude in considering the explanation for the delay, at the same time, they shall not show unduly liberal approach, especially, in a case where the delay is substantial. Except making half-baked averments relating to the alleged panchayat, the respondents have not substantiated the same by producing any evidence. The lower Court has made a thoroughly unsatisfactory approach in failing to deal with the explanation of the respondents and in understanding the law on Section 5 of the Act. Even taking the most liberal view, the explanation offered by the respondents does not fall anywhere in the periphery of “sufficient cause” within the reasoning of Section 5 of the Act for condoning the huge delay of 1,029 days. Therefore, the order under revision is set aside. IA.No.19 of 2014 is dismissed.
The Civil Revision Petition is, accordingly, allowed.
As a sequel to disposal of the Civil Revision Petition, interim order, dated 22.08.2014, is vacated and CRPMP.No.3405 of 2014 stands disposed of as infructuous.
20th September, 2014 DR
JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA
REDDY
[1]
2009 (3) ALT 637 (DB)