ORDER K.C. Bhargava, J.
1. This special appeal is directed against the order dt. 13-10-1995 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court. The facts stated in brief are that the petitioner Yamini Shukla who is respondent 1 in the appeal has preferred a writ petition for quashing the selection of respondents 3 to 16 in the petition to the Master of Computer Application full time Degree Course 1995-96 (hereinafter referred to MCA) and to direct respondent No. 2, namely, the Birla Institute of Technology, Ranchi, to admit the petitioner in the MCA course of 1995-96. According to the petitioner she appeared in the qualifying examination for admission to MCA Full Time Degree Course 1995-96 of Birla Institute of Technology which was held at Lucknow in the month of June, 1990. The petitioner has also appeared in Part-Ill examination of B.Sc. from the Lucknow University in the same year. On the basis of the written examination, the call letter was issued to the petitioner for interview dt. 1-8-1995 which was received by her on 8-8-1995. The petitioner's rank in the written examination was 26. An interview was held on 16-10-1995 at Ranchi in the campus of the Institute. The petitioner appeared in the interview on 16-10-1995 and submitted the original certificates. On 17-10-1995, alist of candidates who were admitted to the MCA course was displayed on the Notice Board of the Administrative Department of the Institute at Ranchi. The petitioner's name was missing from that list. It is alleged that the candidates who ranked below to the petitioners have been admitted to MCA course while the petitioner has been deprived of the admission without any cause being shown to the petitioner. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of opposite party No. 2, namely, the Birla Institute of Technology, alleging therein that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification at the relevant time for admission to the MCA course of 1995-96. It has been mentioned in the brochure which was supplied to the applicants that the candidate must be a graduate with mathematics/ statistics as one of the subjects and obtaining at least 50% marks in the aggregate. Later on, it has been alleged, that at the time of applying for admission to the MCA course, the petitioner had not acquired the requisite qualification. It is further alleged that in order to accommodate the petitioner, she was allowed to appear in the written examination at Lucknow as it was specifically mentioned in the brochure those who are appearing in their qualifying examination can also apply subject to publication of their result by July-August, 1995. It is further alleged that the petitioner having not been duly possessed of the graduation degree at the time of interview had no locus standi to file the present writ petition. The petitioner could not produce the graduate degree certificate at the time of interview and, therefore, her application was rejected and she was not given admission to the MCA course. It is submitted that the petitioner had cleared well both in the written examination and interview. Therefore, she got 13th position in the merit list but the admission was refused as stated above on the ground that she did not possess the qualification for admission at the time of interview. A rejoinder affidavit was filed by the petitioner mentioning therein that she had applied to the University of Lucknow for an early result. This application was moved on 12th August, 1995, a copy of which is Annexure RA-1. As per the brochure, the petitioner was allowed to file the mark-sheet by the end of July-August, 1995 and the candidature of the petitioner could not have been rejected oil 17th of August, 1995 when the result was displayed on the notice board of the Institute. The appellant had received the result of the graduate degree examination of the petitioner in a sealed envelope addressed to Sri B.B. Misra, Controller, Entrance Examination, Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, Ranchi. As the petitioner had fulfilled the requirement of the appellant, she could not have been refused admission on this ground. The petitioner had also indicated to the Selection Committee that her result of B.Sc. Part III examination is likely to be out in a week or ten days' time. After the declaration of the result, the petitioner further met Dr. P.K. Mohanti, Professor and Head of the Deptt. of Computer Science Engg. and asked him the reason for her not being included in the merit list. According to the petitioner, in another similar case admission has been made in spite of the fact that the result of B.Sc. Part-III Examination had not been declared and the mark-sheet was not produced at the time of interview. It has also been mentioned that in the previous year 1993-94 admission was given to a candidate whose mark-sheet was not available at the time of interview and even the results were not declared by that time. When the petitioner's father met the Vice-Chancellor on 19-8-1995 it was not disclosed or indicated that the petitioner had not been admitted because she had failed to submit her qualifying examination result at the time of interview. The petitioner received a communication dt. 1-9-1995 which was received by her on 8-9-1995 and by this communication for the first time the petitioner was informed that although she was eligible on the basis of merit, she was not admitted to the course as the result of B.Sc. IIIrd year examination had not been declared by that time.
2. A reply has also been filed to the rejoinder affidavit by the appellant-opposite party No. 2. It is denied that father of the petitioner ever met the Vice-Chancellor on 19-8-1995. It is also denied that information in respect of sending the mark-sheet was ever communicated to the appellant. The sealed envelope was never received by the Institute from the Lucknow. University. It is further alleged that with respect to the case of Miss Ritu Agarwal from the Garhwal University it has to be mentioned that she appeared in the B.Sc. Part-III examination, and she gave a written undertaking at the time of interview that she will submit her B.Sc. Part-III examination shortly. The Controller of Examination had received the confidential mark-sheet shortly. It is further alleged that at the time of interview, the petitioner was told that the mark-sheet was not submitted by her at that time. When this fact was disclosed to the petitioner, no request was made by the petitioner to the Interview Board nor any undertaking was given that the mark-sheet will be furnished in a sealed envelope by the Controller of Examinations.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for respondent No. 1 at length.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has in the first instance, raised the preliminary objection as regards maintainability of the writ petition in this Court. According to the learned counsel, the entire cause of action took place at Ranchi and the Court at Lucknow had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Only the court having the territorial jurisdiction at Ranchi could entertain the petition. Learned counsel appearing for res-pondent No. 1 has argued that a part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court at Lucknow. Therefore, the petition is maintainable. According to him, the preliminary examination, namely, the entrance test, was held at Lucknow in the month of June, 1995. Therefore, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain this case. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, mere holding of entrance examination at Lucknow will not give jurisdiction to this Court to entertain and decide the writ petition. Learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance on certain case laws.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on (1995) 4 SCC 153 : (AIR 1995 SC 1766), Angile Insulations v. Dayyashmore India Ltd. wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where two Courts having the territorial jurisdiction over a matter and a part of cause of action has arisen in one of the Courts and the parties have agreed to vest jurisdiction in one of such Courts to try the dispute which may arise between them, then only that Court of which jurisdiction has been agreed upon by the parties will only try the dispute even if a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction. This case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Here there was no agreement between the parties that the dispute which would arise out of the selection shall be held only at Ranchi. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P.) Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 710. In that case the contract was executed and the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh and the contract between the parties provided that all the cases shall be tried at Aligarh Courts alone. On the facts of the case, it was held by the Hon'ble apex Court that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta where the writ petition was filed. This case also does not apply to the facts of the present case. The third case relied on is Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 : (1994 AIR SCW 3287). In this case, it was not disclosed in the writ petition that even a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta, Therefore, it was held that Courts at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. It was further observed in that case that the advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders shall be submitted to EIL at New Delhi, that those will be scrutinised at New Delhi and the final decision would also be taken at New Delhi. The execution of work of the contract was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely, the party read the, advertisement at Calcutta, submitted the offer from Calcutta, made representations from Calcutta, sent fax messages from Calcutta and also received replies thereof at Calcutta will not constitute the facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. Hence, the Courts at Calcutta will have no jurisdiction to decide the controversy.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has placed reliance in Ambika Saran Singh v. Election Commission of India, AIR 1972 Pat 332. In para. 5, a Division Bench of the Court has made the following observations:
"...... It is well established that cause of action is not only the last link of the chain which leads to the filing of a case. It means the bundle of facts which is necessary to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to a decree or order. ....."
The facts of the case goes to show that the term cause of action will not mean that only the last link of the chain is to be taken as to confer jurisdiction on a particular case. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the last act against which the petitioner is aggrieved was the interview which was held at Ranchi. According to him, the conduct of entrance examination at Lucknow will not confer any jurisdiction in this Court. The entire selection process commenced from the date the examination is held and to the date the result is declared. A part of cause of action will be deemed to have arisen in the Court at Lucknow when the entrance examination was held by the appellant at Lucknow. Therefore, the first link in the process of selection for admission to MCA Course started at Lucknow, like conducting the entrance test. Therefore, in view of the observations made in the above mentioned case, not only the last link of the chain will be taken as part of cause of action but the first link of the chain will also be taken as part of cause of action.
7. In the case Dr. P. S. Rao v. The Union Government, AIR 1974 Mys 39, the Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the term cause of action. After considering this term, it was observed in para. 8 as under at page 41:
"8......The meaning to be given to the said expression is well settled by judicial pronouncements in the country. 'Cause of action' means a bundle of essential facts, which it is necessary for the party seeking relief to prove if traversed by the opposite party, in order to secure the relief prayed for. Therefore, if the petitioner is able to show that at least one of such essential facts required to be proved to secure an order in his favour has arisen within the territory of this Court, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition."
This case goes on to show that if any part of the cause of action as essentially required to be proved by the petitioner has arisen within the territory of the Court then that Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
8. In the case of K.P. Govil v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, AIR 1987 Madh Pra 228, the above mention case of Dr. P.S. Rao (supra) was also considered and the observation made therein was also quoted. In that case, a Bombay case was also referred to and it was observed that the principle deducible is that in cases of orders impugned, the cause of action would arise at a place where an order is made and also at a place where its consequences fall on the person concerned, meaning thereby that where a part of cause of action also arose, the Court at that place will have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition.
9. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra), it was held in para. 5 as under:
"5 ..... On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Art. 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. ......
These observations of the Hon'ble apex Court clearly go to show that if a part of the cause of action have arisen within the territories of a particular Court then that particular Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition.
10. In U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow v. State of U. P., (1995) 4 SCC 738 : (AIR 1995 SC 2148), the observations made by the apex Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331, were quoted and they may be reproduced as under:
"....The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court...."
11. Thus from the perusal of all the authorities which have been referred to above, it is clear that a person can choose the forum where a part of cause of action has arisen notwithstanding the fact that a part of cause of action has also arisen in another part of the Court. As stated earlier, the entrance examination was held at Lucknow for selection of candidates to MCA Course by the appellant. As the process of examination started at Lucknow it can safely be said that a part of cause of action arose at Lucknow. The entrance examination can be said to be the first stepping-stone for admission to MCA course. A candidate can be called for interview only when he qualifies in the entrance examination. Therefore, a part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Reference may also be made to the interview letter dt. 1-8-1995, a copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition. This letter was issued by the appellant to the petitioner. In this interview letter, it is mentioned that the petitioner has been provisionally selected for admission to the MCA Course. The relevant portion may be quoted as under:
"With reference to your application acknowledged under Roll No. 200009 MCA, you are hereby informed that you have been provisionally selected for admission to the course subject to satisfactory, performance at, the interview to be held on 16-8-1995 at 9.30 a.m. in the Institute Main Building."
This averment in the interview letter clearly goes to show that the petitioner has been provisionally selected for the admission to the course on the basis of the written examination which was held at Lucknow within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The intention of the appellant is absolutely clear from this letter that the provisional selection has been made on the basis of the entrance examination held at Lucknow which confers jurisdiction on this Court. Therefore, this averment also supports the contention of the petitioner that a part of cause of action also, arose within the jurisdiction of this Court.
12. In view of the various decisions referred to above and the facts of the case, it is held that a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court at Lucknow has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition. The objection of the learned counsel for the appellant is overruled.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in accordance with the terms of admission, the petitioner was permitted to submit mark sheet of the qualifying examination of B.Sc. by July-Aug., 1995. This position is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. According to the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 when time up to Aug., 1995 was given for furnishing proof of having passed the qualifying examination, the candidature of the petitioner could not have been rejected on 17th Aug., 95 when the result of entrance examination for admission to MCA Course was pasted on the notice board of the Institute at Ranchi. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it was a condition precedent that the petitioner should have cleared the qualifying examination before she appeared for interview on 16th Aug., 1995. She having failed to obtain the requisite qualification, her candidature was rejected and another person from the merit list was inducted.
14. Now we shall verify this fact from the material on record.
15. Annexure-1 to the writ petition is a copy of the brochure which was issued by the appellant. On page 2 under the heading "Application for Admission" it has been mentioned as under:
"....Students who are appearing in their qualifying examination can also apply subject to publication of their result by July-August, 1995. Incomplete applications are liable to be rejected."
16. In the brochure, it has not been mentioned as on which date the candidate must obtain the Bachelor Degree. Generally, it is mentioned in the brochure that the degree which is required for appearing in the entrance examination must be acquired either on the date of the application or on the date of interview or on any other relevant time. But in this case, there is no such indication that the Bachelor Degree should have been acquired by a candidate who has taken the entrance examination either on the date of application or on the date when the candidate appears for interview. The above quoted portion clearly goes to show that those students who have not even acquired the degree of the qualifying examination can also appear subject to the publication of qualifying result by July-August, 1995. This means that the qualifying examination could have been passed by a candidate by any date before the end of July-August, 1995. It does not mean that the result of the qualifying examination should have been published or the candidate should have acquired the Bachelor degree by the date on which he appears before the Interview Board. The interpretation put by the learned counsel for the appellant to the contrary cannot be accepted. The students who have not acquired the qualifying examination could also sit and produce their qualifying examination mark sheet in order to show that they have cleared the qualifying examination by the end of August, 1995. No other interpretation can be put on the words which have been used under the heading 'Application for Admission'.
17. There is no other document on the record to show, besides the interview letter which will be referred just now, that the petitioner should have cleared the qualifying examination by the date on which he appears before the Interview Board. In Annexure-3, which is the interview letter, at Sl. No. 3 it has been mentioned that the following documents have to be submitted in original at the time of interview. Mark sheet of the qualifying examination is one of such documents. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, mark sheet of the qualifying examination was not submitted by the petitioner at the time of interview even though this fact was brought to the notice of the petitioner by the selection committee. When once the Brochure gives an option for submitting proof of qualifying examination by the end of Aug., 1995 that facility cannot be curtailed by the interview letter. The candidates who have taken the entrance examination for MCA, at the time of applying, took it for granted that they can submit the qualifying examination proof by the end of Aug., 1995. Once a candidate acts on this assurance it cannot be curtailed by any other subsequent act of the respondent. Therefore, mere mention that the mark sheet of the qualifying examination has to be furnished at the time of interview will not mean that if documents are not furnished at the time of interview then the candidate, even though he is within the merit list, can be ignored and no admission can be given to him. The action of the appellant in not including the petitioner in the merit list even though it is found that she was entitled to admission on the basis of the rank obtained by her in the entrance examination cannot be approved. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that in the brochure it is mentioned that the courses will start in the month of August after the result is published in the second week. It is correct that the course wilt start according to the Brochure in the second week of Aug., 1995 but that does not mean that the qualifying examination proof has to be submitted on the date of interview. As seen in the earlier part of the judgment, the interview letter goes to show -that on the basis of the entrance examination provisional admission has been granted to the petitioner. Similarly, if the proof of qualifying examination has not been submitted at the time of interview, still the admission remains to be provisionally granted subject to cancellation if proof of qualifying examination is not submitted by the end of August, 1995 as mentioned in the Brochure. Therefore, the non-inclusion of the petitioner even though she has secured position in the merit list shows the arbitrariness of the appellant in cancelling the candidature of the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner had "improved her position during interview. She got 24 marks out of 26 marks in the viva voce test. In the merit list which was prepared after the written examination, the petitioner was shown at Sl. No. 26. In the final merit list which was prepared on the basis of the written examination and the viva voce test, the petitioner ranked 13th. The petitioner has cited an instance of one candidate Miss Ritu Agarwal who was at Sl. No. 72 of the merit list prepared after the written examination. According to the petitioner she has also not submitted the qualifying examination proof at the time of interview but she has still been granted admission to the MCA course. The reply to this contention on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant is that at the time of interview she had given an undertaking to furnish proof of qualifying examination within the prescribed time. This argument, on the face of it, does not appear to be correct. In the brochure, as mentioned above, it has been clearly provided that the proof of qualifying examination can be submitted by a candidate by the end of August, 1995. If it is so, there is no reason for taking an undertaking from Miss Ritu Agarwal for submitting the proof of qualifying examination by the end of August, 1995. Once an option was given in the Brochure, no undertaking was required to be taken from a candidate. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be approved. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner has specifically mentioned this fact. There is no clear denial of this fact by the appellant. In para. 15 of the reply to the rejoinder affidavit, the appellant has mentioned that in the case of Miss Ritu Agarwal from Garhwal University she appeared in B.Sc. Part III examination and she gave a written undertaking to the Interview Board that she will submit mark sheet of B.Sc. Part III Examination shortly. No copy of the undertaking has been filed before the Court in order to show that if any such undertaking was given by Miss Ritu Agarwal and what were the terms of the undertaking and whether the undertaking mentioned the fact that the proof of the qualifying examination will be submitted by the end of August, 1995 or by a later date. It has not been mentioned in this para up to what time the interview board asked for furnishing proof of the qualifying examination by Miss Ritu Agarwal. In the final result which was pasted on the notice board of the appellant there is no indication that the selection of Miss Ritu Agarwal is dependent on the submission of result of qualifying examination which she has to submit by a particular date. When Miss Ritu Agarwal was given time to furnish proof of qualifying examination, the petitioner should also have been given sufficient time to submit the proof of qualifying examination. This action of the appellant shows the arbitrariness which the appellant has practised in the matter of these two candidates, namely, the petitioner and Miss Ritu Agarwal. The fact is that both of them had not submitted the proof of qualifying examination on the date of interview, but Miss Ritu Agarwal was included in the merit list and was given admission. On the other hand, the petitioner was discriminated and her name was struck off from the merit list. This action on the part of the appellant cannot be approved by this Court.
18. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the petitioner had applied to the University of Lucknow on 12th Aug., 1995 for early declaration of the result as she has to submit the same before the appellant, a copy of the letter to the effect is Annexure RA-1 to the rejoinder affidavit. A perusal of the letter goes to show that the petitioner had applied to the Lucknow University for early declaration of result and on the basis of the letter, according to the petitioner, a sealed cover was given for the appellant. According to the learned counsel for the appellant this fact was not disclosed by the petitioner at the time of interview and the sealed cover which was received by the petitioner was also not supplied. It is not necessary for this Court to consider this aspect of the case as it is of academic importance at present in view of the facts of this case, It is an admitted fact that the result of admission test for the MCA course was pasted on the notice board on 17th Aug., 1995 and in that result, name of the petitioner was not there. This means that the petitioner was dropped from the merit list for non-submission of proof of qualifying examination. Once the name of the petitioner had been dropped it was immaterial for the petitioner to have submitted the proof of the qualifying examination because on the part of the appellant it has been decided not to admit the petitioner as she has not furnished proof of qualifying examination at the time of. interview. Even at this stage, is not the case of the appellant that if the proof of qualifying examination had been submitted by 31st of Aug., 1995 the petitioner would have been given admission by the Institute. Therefore, it is not necessary for this Court to consider this aspect of the case as it would have been an exercise in futility. However, it may be mentioned that during the course of the argument, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the mark sheet was available within the month of Aug., 1995.
19. It will be useful to refer to the case of Dr. Ajay Kumar Agarwal v. State of U. P., AIR 1991 SC 498. In that case reliance was also placed on the main case of Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654 : (AIR 1984 SC 1420) and the observation at page 673 of that judgment was quoted in para. 10 of the report. It may also be reproduced as under at page 1430 of AIR:
"The philosophy and pragmatism of universal excellence through equality of opportunity for education and advancement across the nation is part of our founding faith and constitutional creed. The effort must, therefore, always be to select the best and most meritorious students for admission to technical institutions and medical colleges by providing equal opportunity to all citizens in the country. .... Moreover, it would be against national interest to admit in medical colleges or other institutions giving instruction in specialities less meritorious students when more meritorious students are available.
Similarly in the case of Dr. A. Franklin Joseph v. State of T. N., (1994) 2 SCC 387 : (1994 AIR SCW 2891) the observation made in the case of Pradeep Jain (supra) was approved. Thus, these cases go to show that it is a specialised course and the authorities concerned must always endeavour to select the most suitable and meritorious persons. If these persons are not given admission and persons of lesser merit are given admission in technical institution or medical colleges then it will be against the national interest. In the present case the petitioner is more meritorious than the candidate who has now been inducted in her place from the waiting list.
20. In view of what has been observed, the Court comes to the conclusion that the petitioner has been denied admission without any basis and her candidature could not have been rejected by the appellant merely on the ground that she failed to furnish proof of qualifying examination by the date of interview. The petitioner is entitled to admission in MCA Course as indicated above.
21. The sealed envelope which was issued by the Lucknow University was opened in the Court by the learned single Judge and it was found that the petitioner has cleared the qualifying examination with more than 50 per cent marks which was a condition precedent for admission to MCA course. That envelope along with a letter was delivered according to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, to the Registrar of the University, opposite party No. 2 in the writ petition, The appellant should not be deprived of her legitimate claim,
22. The Special Appeal is dismissed and it is directed that the appellant shall admit the petitioner Yamini Shukla within a period of one week from today since the academic year has commenced and the course is in progress. The appellant is directed to accommodate the petitioner according to her position obtained in the merit list in the first semester of Master of Computer Application full time Degree Course 1995-96. The appellant shall not refuse admission to the petitioner on the ground that now there is no seat available in the above said course and they shall do whatever may be necessary in that regard, The petitioner shall be afforded reasonable facilities as may be possibly available so that the petitioner may cover the lost period in the first semester.
23. Appeal dismissed.