JUDGMENT U.S. Tripathi, J.
1. The petitioner filed this writ petition challenging his detention order, dated 18-7-2002, passed by District Magistrate, Azamgarh., respondent No. 1 under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act and had prayed for his release.
2. The petitioner was served with the grounds of detention along with the order of detention which stated that on 14-4-2002 at about 12.15 p.m. on account of previous altercation between the petitioner and Babloo, cousin brother of Rajendra, the petitioner along with his "associates, Sariq, Shamim, Sarfraj and Mumtaz armed with lathis dandas and country made pistols formed an unlawful assembly raided the house of Bhagnu Kahar and broke open his doors by kicks. Observing it Bablu ran away in the lane towards mosque to save his life. The petitioner along with his associates chased him and fired by country made pistols due to which he sustained injuries and fell down. The occurrence was witnessed by complainant Rajendra, Arvind, Bhagnu, Smt. Girija Devi and others. The above persons chased the petitioner and his associates but they ran away extending threats. The mohalla people were taking the injured Bablu to the hospital, but he died in the way. Report of the occurrence was lodged by Rajendra Kahar at 1.25 p.m. at P.S. Kotwali and on the basis of it a case at crime no. 104 of 2002 under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, IPC and Section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act was registered. The complainant also told that on account of the incident a chaos was created on the spot and the people started running helter skelter. Shopkeepers closed their shutters and a sense of terror and insecurity was created in the locality. Since the incident related to two different communities the people of both community organized and possibility of flaring up communal tension increased. Situation was however controlled by deploying police force and PAC on large scale. During investigation it was found that the petitioner and his associates were anti-social elements and they were Indulging in the activities prejudicial to the community at large. The IO interrogated Arvind Kahar, Bhagnu and Smt. Girija Devi during investigation who corroborated the incident. It was also endorsed by the Inspector Incharge of P.S: Kotwali on 16-4-2002, 18,-4-2002 and 19-4-2002 in the General Diary report that on account of incident a sense of terror and insecurity was created in the Mohalla Kundigarh (Badarka) and nearby localities. Since the incident related between two different communities, possibility to flare up communal tension had increased. The petitioner was detained in District Jail, Azamgarh in connection with case crime No. 104 of 2002 and he was trying to get himself released on bail and there was real possibility that on release on bail the petitioner would indulge in similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, the detaining authority was satisfied that detention of the petitioner under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act Was essential.
3. The detention order dated 18-7-2002 was approved by the State Government on 23-7-2002. The Advisory Board also approved the detention of the petitioner on 29-8-2002.
4. We have heard Shri Manish Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Arvind Tripathi, learned AGA for respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and Shri J. Lal learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India, respondent No. 6 and have perused the record.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following points :--
(1) The incident on the basis of which the detention order was passed related to law and order problem and it had no effect on the public order;
(2) There was no cogent material and compelling necessity before the detaining authority to pass detention order while the petitioner was detained in jail.
6. Regarding ground No. 1 it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the incident in question was confined to only law and order as it is alleged that the petitioner and his associates committed murder of Bablu on account of previous altercation. The above incident took place on account of previous enmity as altercation had taken place between Bablu on the one hand and the petitioner and his associates on the other hand and, therefore, the detention order could not be passed on the above grounds.
7. On the other hand, the learned AGA contended that even a single act/incident is sufficient for passing the detention order provided it has effect of disturbing public order and even tempo of life of community or society. That in the instant case murder of Bablu belonging to other community was caused by the petitioner and his associates and it created terror in the atmosphere and there was possibility of giving rise to communal riot.
8. The Apex Court held in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 : 1970 Cri LJ 1136 that the public order is said to embrace more of the community than law and order, Public order is even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not different from another but in its potentiality it may be very different...... The question is thus it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount disturbance of the public order or it is which affect nearly an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed. This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from other.
9. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ishaq v. State of U. P., 1996 Cri LJ 4274 : (1996 All LJ 1701) held that it is thus clear that an order of detention can be based on one solitary act. Whether that solitary act is sufficient or not to sustain the order of detention depends upon the gravity and nature of the act and also whether the act is an organized act or a manifestation of organized activity. In the said case, murder was caused of a person belonging to another community by the accused petitioner along with several others in the main market on the public road, when the petitioner along with his associates was armed with revolver and country made pistols. When the people of the area tried to stop the petitioner and his associates they fired shots and created an atmosphere of terror which resulted in the closure of the market and stoppage of traffic and public order was disturbed. Two platoons of C.R.P. had to be summoned in view of the communal tension created. Thus, even tempo of life of the community was disturbed. The act was such that gave rise to an inference that the petitioner would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. So, in the facts and circumstances of the case the order of detention on one solitary incident mentioned in the grounds of detention was sufficient to sustain the order of detention.
10. In the instant case the detention order disclosed that on account of previous altercation between Babloo and the petitioner and his associates which was pacified by the people of locality, the petitioner along with his four associates formed an unlawful assembly and armed with lathis, dandas and country made pistols raided the house of Bhagnu, a member of other community and broke open his door. Bablu, who was inside the house ran towards mosque to save his life, but he was given chase by the petitioner and his associates and shot at in broad day light on public place as well as in public view. It is further mentioned that the incident was between the two communities and there was possibility of communal tension, which was prevented by deployment of police force and PAC on large scale. Thus, the incident in question even a solitary, was sufficient to give rise to communal tension and there was apprehension of a communal riot as alleged in the grounds of detention and in the report of Sponsoring Authority. Therefore, we are of the view that the incident in question was not confined to only law and order and it had effect on the public order.
11. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the next ground was that there was no cogent material and compelling necessity before the detaining authority to pass detention order as at the time of passing of detention order the petitioner was in jail. Reliance was placed on the Apex. Court decision in Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P., 1994 All Cri C 765 : (1995 All LJ 777 : 1995 Cri LJ 2657), Murli Prasad v. State of U. P. 1997 (suppl) ACC, 254 (All) and Virendra Shukla v. State of U. P. (1998) 36 All Cri C 664 : (1998 All LJ 1124 : 1998 Cri LJ 2873).
12. It is well settled that an order of detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenue is already in detention; (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The expression "compelling reason" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implied that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenue is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging such activities (Vide Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate Bardhwan, (1964) 4 SCR 921 : (AIR 1964 SC 334 : 1964 (1) Cri LJ 257). The above decision of the Apex Court has been followed in various subsequent decisions of Apex Court and of this Court including the cases cited above.
13. Perusal of grounds of detention shows that the detaining authority recorded his above satisfaction in following words :--
"POLICE ADIKSHAK AZAMGARH KI SANLAGNA AKHYA SE SPASHTA HAI KI AP MUKADAMA A.S. 104/02 DHARA 147/148/ 149/302, IPC, 7 CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT KE APARADH MEN JANPAD KARAGAR AZAMGARH MEN NIRUDDHA HAIN TATHA APNI JAMANAT KE LIYE PRAYATANA SHEEL HAI. JAMANAT PAR CHHUTANE KE PASCHAT AP PUNAH APARADHIK KRITYA KARENGE JISME LOK VYAVASTHA KA ANURAKSHAN KUPRA-BHAVIT HONE KE PRABAL SAMBHAWANA HAI."
14. The detaining authority has thus, taken into consideration all the circumstances including the grave and serious situation that emerged as a result of incident. In our opinion when an incident was such that it could create communal tension and the authorities were apprehensive of breaking of a communal riot, such incident in itself may be sufficient and may afford justification for satisfaction of the detaining authority for detention of the petitioner in order to prevent him from indulging in such activities prejudicial to public order, even though as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner there is no antecedent acts of similar nature and past history of commission of crime by detenue. In this connection we may refer to Apex Court decision in Ayya v. State of U. P. (1989) 1 SCC 374 : (AIR 1989 SC 364 : 1989 Cri LJ 991), in which the Apex Court observed as follows :--
"Even a single instance of activity tending to harm a "public order" might, in the circumstances of its commission, reasonably supply justification for the satisfaction as to legislative apprehension of a future repetition of similar activity to the detriment of public order".
15. We may also refer Apex Court decision in Smt. Bimla Rani v. Union of India (1989) 3 JT (SC) 737, in which a solitary incident on which there was apprehension of a communal riot as alleged in the report of Sponsoring Authority was held a sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for the detention of the detenue in order to prevent him from indulging in such activities prejudicial to public order even though there was no antecedent acts of similar nature or past history of commission of crime by the detenue.
16. Thus, there was also sufficient material for recording satisfaction by the detaining authority that after release on bail there was real possibility of the petitioner being indulged in similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
17. No other point was pressed before us.
18. In view of our above discussions and observation we find that there is no force in this writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
19. We accordingly dismiss the writ petition.