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Bhola Singh Gurjar vs State Of U.P. Thru' Secry., Mini. ...

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad|06 August, 2014

JUDGMENT / ORDER

Heard Sri Ram Autar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Pankaj Rai, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.
By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 30.11.2006 (Annexure-13), order dated 22.03.2006 (Annexure-10) and order dated 30.01.2006 (Annexure-9) and further prayed for a mandamus commanding the respondents to quash the enquiry report dated 31.10.2005 submitted by the inquiry officer.
Brief facts give rise to the present writ petition are that:-
The petitioner was appointed as Constable on 12.10.1998 and after successful completion of 11 months training in 1999, he was posted at police station Chakar Nagar, Beehar Thana, Etawah.
It is relevant to mention in the month of December 2001 the gang of Chhota Rajan group in dare devil manner killed three persons including police sub-inspector. The petitioner was also involved in chasing and arresting them and for the said bravery, he had been recommended for President Award. In the year 2003, he was posted in S.O.G. Etawah and was working under direct supervision of S.S.P. Etawah, the then S.S.P. had constituted task force for nabbing Nirbhay Gurjar and the petitioner was also included in the said task force. It also transpires from the record, that in the month of December 2004 one person, namely, Ramesh Katiyar was abducted by some bandit gangs. The Superintendent of Police, Kanpur Dehat was pleased to constitute S.O.G. to trace hide outs of bandit gangs. It is stated that at that point of time there was height of dacoity in the said region.
In the meanwhile, some preliminary inquiry was made and in which it was found that some police constables were in touch with bandit Nirbhay Gurjar and they had talking relations. The preliminary inquiry was conducted and report had been submitted on 02.06.2005 (annexure-3 to the writ petition). In pursuance to the said preliminary inquiry, the chargesheet had been served upon the petitioner vide order dated 07.07.2005. It has been alleged in the chargesheet that while he was deployed in S.O.G. to trace out the abducted son of Ramesh Katiyar instead of collecting relevant information from bandit, he gave information regarding location of police party to Nirbhay Gurjar (dacoit). The petitioner had filed the reply to the chargesheet and refuted the allegation with a case that he was entrusted a task to search the hideout of the bandits, their near, dear and associates, whatever, he did, it was in discharge of his official duty. It has also been taken as a plea while refuting the chargesheet that it is settled principle of intelligence unless confidence of opposite camp win over it is impossible to penetrate and reach in the inner circle of the bandits.
After thorough inquiry a report had been submitted on 31.10.2005. In pursuance to the said inquiry report, S.S.P. had issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 26.12.2005 and vide his letter dated 16.01.2006, the petitioner gave reply to the said show cause notice. After considering the show cause notice and reply the S.S.P. vide order dated 30.01.2006 had dismissed the petitioner from service.
Aggrieved with the dismissal order dated 30.01.2006, the petitioner had preferred an appeal before the D.I.G. Kanpur Range, Kanpur on 22.03.2006. It is relevant to mention that the petitioner had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 43136 of 2006 challenging the dismissal as well as appellate order and this Court vide order dated 17.08.2006 had pleased to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had still one more statutory remedy of revision under Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1991. In compliance, the petitioner had filed the statutory revision before the Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Zone, Kanpur and the revisional authority vide order dated 30.11.2006 had also rejected the revision of the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since his joining in the police force, the petitioner's work was commendable and it had always been appreciated by the senior officers of the police department and on account of his active participation in nabbing dacoits, time to time he had been included in the special task force which were made for nabbing the dreaded dacoits. This was the main reason for which he was recommended by the Senior Superintendent of Police for President Award.
Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that as per direction issued by the senior officers he was bound to make some conversation with the dreaded dacoits. He was given task to search the hideouts of the bandits and their associates. Whatever, he did, it was in discharge of his official duty. He has also submitted that it is well settled principle of intelligence unless confidence of opposite camp is win over it is impossible to penetrate and reach out the inner circle of the bandits. These works were assigned to him and while performing his official duty he had not made any deviation from the assigned duty, which were entrusted only by his senior officials. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that some contemporaries officers were inimical to the petitioner on account of his expertise in nabbing down dreaded dacoits. The same is reflected from the records that every time he had been made member of S.O.G. Therefore, in these circumstances, the impugned orders terminating his services are unsustainable and are liable to be quashed.
Sri Pankaj Rai, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that in the present matter the principles of natural justice have been strictly adhered and the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be entertained with the quantum of punishment unless the Court is convinced that the punishment is outrageous and pricks the conscience of the Court. He has further submitted that this is admitted fact that petitioner had been assigned certain duties for nabbing dacoits but the senior officers had never entrusted the petitioner to make any conversation with the dreaded dacoits and bandits and to pass on information regarding movement of police personnel. He has also submitted that in the present matter even the recordings have been made which clearly transpires that the petitioner alongwith his family members had very cordial relations with dreaded dacoit Nirbhay Gurjar and they used to make conversation. It has also been found through an enquiry that the petitioner was continuously providing information regarding the working and strategy of the police force and petitioner was also deliberately used to provide incorrect and wrong information to the police force regarding the whereabouts of the dacoits. It had also been found through an inquiry that the petitioner inspite of the alleged claim that he had been entrusted with such work but actually had never provided any concrete information about the location or whereabouts of the dreaded dacoits.
Sri Pankaj Rai, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submitted that the integrity of the petitioner was also at stake on the ground that it had also found that even he had supplied some cartridges to the dreaded dacoit Nirbhay Gurjar. In this regard a categorical report had been submitted by an inquiry officer that the petitioner used to talk to dreaded dacoit Nirbhay Gurjar, he was in constant touch, used to meet, supply cartridges, supply information regarding the movement of police force. Further inspite of the requisite information regarding whereabouts of the dacoits, the same were concealed from the superior officials. He has further submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, no indulgence may be made by this Court in the present matter, otherwise, it would lead to great indiscipline in the police force. He submits that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders are sustainable and the claim of the petitioner has rightly been rejected by the appellate and revisional authority.
Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and Another reported in (2011) 10 SCC 249, specially paragraph Nos. 12 & 13. For ready reference, the paragraph Nos. 12 & 13 is reproduced herein below:-
12. This Court has held in State of Andhra Pradesh and others V. Sree Rama Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1723):
"7......The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations leveled against the respondent no.1 do not constitute any misconduct and that the respondent no.1 was not guilty of any misconduct."
Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Another Vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 620, specially paragraph Nos. 13 & 14. For ready reference, the paragraph Nos. 13 & 14 is reproduced herein below:-
13. It has been time and again said that it is not open to the High Court to examine the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer as a Court of Appeal and reach its own conclusions and that power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. In a case such as the present one where the delinquent admitted the charges, no scope is left to differ with the conclusions arrived at by the Inquiry Officer about the proof of charges. In the absence of any procedural illegality or irregularity in conduct of the departmental enquiry, it has to be held that the charges against the delinquent stood proved and warranted no interference.
14. The Single Judge of the High Court in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the judgment observed thus:
"43. This Court is of the view that the so-called order dated 29.11.2000 is a mere communication without actually serving the original Order of the Disciplinary Authority. Merely transmitting the decision of the Disciplinary Authority was not sufficient since this was a matter involving the punishment of removal from service entailing civil consequences.
44. We are dealing with a case of removal from service for an alleged absence of 6(six) months. This Court is of the view that the Respondents were bound to adhere to a fair and transparent procedure by firstly serving the actual order of the Disciplinary Authority upon the petitioner and then, by giving reasons as to why they chose not to agree with what the Petitioner wanted to say qua his absence when, after admitting the absence, he gave reasons as to why he had remained absent. They were also obliged to strictly obey with the Orders of this, court. In that view of the matter, the argument of Mr. Aloke Banerjee to the effect that the Respondents were not required to give reasons, are not acceptable to this Court. Consequently the Judgments cited by him namely AIR 1987 SC 2043 and the other Judgments such as 2001 (2) CHN 632 and 1991(2) SCC 716 are held to be not applicable because in this case, it was the desire and Order of the Hon'ble Division Bench that the Respondents should deal with the matter in accordance with law. In the opinion of this Court, "in accordance with law" means and includes observing the principles of natural justice and giving reasons because the Respondents were supposed to be dealing with his pleas relating to his explanations which were so very very crucial to his case. Consequently and in the facts and circumstances of this case, none of the Judgments cited by Mr. Banerjee can be said to have any Application."
In what we have already discussed, we find it difficult to accept the view of the Single Judge.. The Division Bench like the Single Bench fell into grave error in not adequately adverting to the fact that the charges were admitted by the delinquent unequivocally and unambiguously and, therefore, misconduct of the Respondent No. 1 was clearly established. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to concur with the view of the High Court.
Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has heavily relied the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Meghalaya and others Vs. Mekan Singh N. Marak reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580 and place reliance on paragraph Nos. 13 to 17. For ready reference, the paragraph Nos. 13 to 17 is reproduced herein below:-
13. Under the circumstances the question arises whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of removal of the respondent from service and remitting the matter to the appellate authority, namely, the Inspector General of Police to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment, short of removal from service, commensurate with the gravity of the proven misconduct of the respondent. A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges.
14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.
15. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental inquiry, the court should also take into consideration, the mental set up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision making process. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are in-built requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands.
16. The respondent belonged to a disciplined force. He was supposed to carry out instructions given to him by his superior. Not only he flouted the instructions but conducted himself in such a manner that he caused loss of part of pay to be deposited with the exchequer and loss of service revolver with ammunition which could be misused. When a statute gives discretion to the administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The proved charges clearly established that the respondent, who was a police officer failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the exchequer and society.
17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the Appellate Authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.
In view of above, specially in the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment is very limited and cannot be exercise without sufficient reason. In the present matter, the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority does not lead to any unreasonableness. The petitioner belonged to the discipline force. It was expected from him to carry out instruction by his superiors and as per inquiry report it clearly revealed that he had flouted the instructions, the charges which were proved against him were grave in nature and fully established against him. The petitioner who was Constable in the police department failed to discharge his duty with utmost integrity/honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were pre judicial to the society. The competent authority had rightly passed the removal order against the petitioner and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the proven misconduct and the orders impugned are sustainable.
On the facts and circumstances as referred hereinabove, I do not find any reason to interfere in the matter. Accordingly, this Court declines to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Order Date :- 06.8.2014 Jaswant
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Title

Bhola Singh Gurjar vs State Of U.P. Thru' Secry., Mini. ...

Court

High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad

JudgmentDate
06 August, 2014
Judges
  • Mahesh Chandra Tripathi