JUDGMENT Spankie, J.
1. Both the bonds were executed in 1872, and as far as the deed of plaintiff, appellant, is affected, the registration law in force at the time of its execution was Act VIII of 1871. By Section 50 every document of the kind mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 18 shall, if duly registered, take effect as regards the property comprised therein against every other unregistered document relating to the same property, and not being a decree or order, whether such unregistered document be of the same nature as the registered document or not. But Section 18 applies to documents of which the registration is optional. The registration of the deed of plaintiffs was compulsory. We need not interfere. Act III of 1877 does not, we think, apply. The unregistered document in that Act (Section 50) means one not registered under Act VIII of 1871 or that Act, although executed after the 1st July 1871. But still the Act introduces for the first time clauses both of Section 17 and Section 18, by which introduction all registered documents take effect henceforth as against unregistered documents of which under the Act the registration is optional, subject of course to the explanation in the section. Whereas Section 50 of Act VIII of 1871 gives a preference to registered documents of the kind mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 18 over the unregistered document, subject again to the explanation added to the section, so that by Act VIII of 1871 it is only the duly registered documents (though their registration is only optional) which take effect against the unregistered documents. As the documents referred to in this suit were both executed after the 1st July 1871, and before Act III of 1877 came into force, the former Act would seem to apply. We agree with the lower Appellate Court that no collusion or fraud between the defendants having been established, and the decree having been passed in favour of the first mortgagee, there was nothing to prevent the sale of the property in execution of that decree. If plaintiffs chose to satisfy the decree for their own purposes, they do not thereby seem to have any legal claim upon defendant, the decree-holder, for a refund of the money so paid by them. We affirm the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and dismiss the appeal with costs.