Appellant – original accused has preferred this appeal under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and challenged the Judgment and Order of acquittal passed by the learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Surendranagar on 15.4.2008 in Criminal Case No.1007 of 2000. 2. According to the complainant, accused No.1 is a partnership firm and accused Nos.2/1 to 2/4 are the partners of accused No.1 partnership firm and doing the business of tea in the name of Tea Processors Private Limited. The accused purchased tea on credit and an account was kept in his Books of Account. The accused purchased tea worth Rs.32 lacs on different dates on credit and bills in respect of the same were given to the accused. On making demand of the outstanding amount, accused No.2/1 gave cheque drawn for accused No.1 firm for Rs.20 lacs on 29.8.2000 being cheque No.2157839 drawn on Bank of India, Rajkot. On presentation of the cheque in the bank, it returned unpaid on account of “Insufficient Fund”. Therefore, notice through advocate was served to the accused on 12.9.2000, which was received by them and in reply to the notice, accused Nos.2/2 to 2/4 gave evasive and false reply on 25.9.2000, but did not pay the amount of unpaid cheque. Therefore, complaint under section 138 of the Act was filed in the Court of learned CJM at Surendranagar and it was registered as Criminal Case No.1007 of 2000.
3. The trial Court issued summons. Pursuant to the summons, the accused appeared and denied having committed the offence. Therefore, the prosecution adduced evidence. At the end of recording of evidence, further statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 of the Code. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties, the trial Court by impugned judgment acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the complainant has preferred this appeal.
4. I have heard learned learned advocate Mr. Champaneri for the appellant, learned advocate Ms. Meghana Patel for learned advocate Mr. Dagli for the accused at length and in great detail. I have also perused the impugned judgment and record and proceedings of the trial Court.
5. Learned advocate Mr. Champaneri submitted that the present case was tried as summary trial and the evidence was recorded by two different Magistrates. Therefore, the trail is vitiated and hence, the impugned Judgment is required to be set aside and the case is required to be remanded to the trial Court. Learned advocate Mr. Champaneri relied upon decision of Nitinbhai Sevantilal Shah and another Vs. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal and another reported in (2011) 9 SCC 638.
6. Learned advocate Ms. Patel submitted that it is not in dispute that the evidence was recorded by two learned Magistrates, but the learned Magistrate, who recorded the evidence, was justified in recording acquittal and therefore, no interference is warranted in the impugned Judgment.
7. On perusal of the record and proceedings of the trial Court, it emerges that plea of the accused was recorded by the learned CJM, Surendranagar and thereafter, the case was transferred to the Court of learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Surendranagar, who recorded the evidence. It also emerges that the Magistrate who recorded the evidence did not decide the case and his successor, relying upon the evidence adduced by his predecessor, delivered the judgment acquitting the accused. In the decision of Nitinbhai Sevantilal Shah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“17. The mandatory language in which Section 326 (3) is couched, leaves no manner of doubt that when a case is tried as a summary case a Magistrate, who succeeds the Magistrate who had recorded the part or whole of the evidence, cannot act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor. In summary proceedings, the successor Judge or Magistrate has no authority to proceed with the trial from a stage at which his predecessor has left it. The reason why the provisions of sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 326 of the Code have not been made applicable to summary trials is that in summary trials only substance of evidence has to be recorded. The Court does not record the entire statement of witness. Therefore, the Judge or the Magistrate who has recorded such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate the evidence led before him and the successor Judge or Magistrate cannot appreciate the evidence only on the basis of evidence recorded by his predecessor. Section 326 (3) of the Code does not permit the Magistrate to act upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, the obvious reason being that if succeeding Judge is permitted to rely upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, there will be a serious prejudice to the accused and indeed, it would be difficult for a succeeding Magistrate himself to decide the matter effectively and to do substantial justice.”
8. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, it is clear from the record of this case that the learned Magistrate, who recorded the evidence, did not deliver the judgment, but his successor, relying upon the evidence adduced by his predecessor, delivered the judgment. Therefore, the successor Magistrate, who delivered the judgment could not appreciate the evidence properly and hence, serious prejudice is caused to the complainant, as the Court has acquitted the accused. Therefore, the learned Magistrate, who decided the matter, failed to decide the case effectively and to do substantial justice. Therefore, the impugned Judgment is required to be set aside and the case is required to be remanded to the trial Court for retrial in accordance with law.
9. In view of above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and Order of acquittal passed by the learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Surendranagar on 15.4.2008 in Criminal Case No.1007 of 2000 is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial Court for retrial in accordance with law.
10. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 2.4.2012. If the accused fails to appear before the trial Court as directed by this Court, learned Magistrate trying the case is at liberty to take appropriate action to secure their presence.
11. R & P be sent back to the trial Court forthwith.
(BANKIM.N.MEHTA, J.) shekhar*