JUDGMENT D.S. Sinha, J.
1. Heard Sri. P.K. Mookerji, learned Counsel appearing for Bharat Pumps & Compressors Limited, the employer-petitioner and Sri K.P. Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate representing Sri Anil Kumar Das Srivastava. the workman-respondent No. 3 at length and in detail.
2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the interim order dated May 14, 1981 and the award dated August 22, 1981, passed by the Labour Court, Allahabad, the respondent No. 2. in Adjudication Case No. 113/79, under Section 10(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called the Act, are under challenge. The relevant facts are these.
On October?, 1972 the respondent No. 3 was appointed by the employer on the post of Receipt and Dispatch Clerk, on probation. While he was still on probation the services of the respondent No. 3 were terminated on October 19, 1973. This termination gave birth to a controversy. It appears that by means of an order dated December 31, 1974 the State Government declined to make a reference of the dispute relating to the termination of the employment of the respondent No. 3 as it found it to be inexpedient to do so. However, later on, by means of an order dated January 31, 1979 it made a reference to the Labour Court.
The position that the respondent No. 3 is a workman within the meaning of the expression assigned to it under the Act is not disputed. Further, it is not disputed that the termination of the employment of the respondent No. 3 was brought about without complying with the statutory provisions of Section 25F of the Act.
In view of the fact that the respondent No. 3 was workman and that his services were terminated without complying the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, the order dated October 19, 1973, terminating the services of the respondent No. 3, is clearly illegal and it has been rightly held so by the respondent No. 2.
During the course of adjudication proceedings before the respondent No. 2, the petitioner-employer had questioned the validity of the reference which has culminated into the impugned award. The challenge was based on the ground that the State Government, having once declined to make a reference, could not pass the second order making a reference without giving opportunity of being heard to the employer. The objection of the petitioning-employer was overruled by means of the order dated May 14, 1981.
3. The contention regarding the validity of the reference for the lack of opportunity to the employer, raised before the respondent No. 2, is reiterated by Sri. Mookerji, learned Counsel for the petitioner, before this Court.
4. The controversy raised before and decided by the respondent No. 2, and also sought to be canvassed before this Court, with regard to the validity of the reference for the lack of opportunity of hearing, is no longer res integra so far as this Court is concerned.
5. In the case of Indian Explosives Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in (1981-II-LLJ-159) a Division Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the question with regard to the right of employer or workman to be heard while making a reference under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is in pan materia with the provisions of Section 10 of the Act whereunder reference leading to the impugned orders and award was made. After thoroughly investigating the question in the light of various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and other High Courts, the Division Bench authoritatively held that "keeping in mind the nature of the decision, other practical consideration and the consequence on the parties as well as the community at large, we are clearly of the opinion that neither the employer nor the workman can claim any right to be heard before an order of reference is made either initially or on second thoughts"(p.l70). The Division Bench pointed out that the "nature of the power that is exercisable under Section 4-K and the objective to secure which it has to be used rules out by necessary implication the existence of any in-built procedural requirement of notice and hearing"(p. 170). In this connection the Court noticed the fact that a decision to make a reference under Section 4-K beyond causing some inconvenience not to one alone but to both parties does not by itself decide any of the issues in controversy. An order of reference, of its own force, does not affect substantive rights of the parties, which have to be ultimately decided by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court when it comes to be seized of the adjudication case.
6. The above decision of the Division Bench is binding on this Court presided by a single Judge, and in view of this decision it has to be held that the employer-petitioner was not entitled to any opportunity of being heard before passing of the order of reference under Section 10(l)(c) of the Act. The contention to the contrary has, therefore, to be rejected, and it is so rejected.
7. On the facts and for the reasons stated herein before, the Court is clearly of the opinion that the impugned order and the award are sound and perfect, and cannot be assailed.
8. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The interim order/orders shall stand discharged. There will be no order as to costs.