JUDGMENT Ojha, J.
1. This first appeal from order has been preferred under Section 83 of the Lunacy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order dt. 16th July, 1983 passed by the District Judge, Gorakhpur appointing Smt. Panna Devi, respondent 1 and Parasu Ram, respondent 2 who are the wife and son respectively of Rajbanshi Singh, respondents as guardians of respondent 3 and managers of his property on the finding that Rajbanshi Singh, respondent 3 was a lunatic. The appellants were not parties to the proceedings before the trial court nor do they claim any blood relationship with the respondents. They assert to be transferees of some property in pursuance of a sale deed said to have been executed on 26th Sept. 1983, by Rajbanshi Singh respondent 3. The sale deed aforesaid had apparently been executed after about two months of the passing of the order appealed against. It was not executed by the guardians and managers of Rajbanshi Singh but as seen above, purports, to have been executed by Rajbanshi Singh himself. We are informed by counsel for the appellants that on 22nd Dec. 1983 a suit was instituted by the respondents for cancellation of the sale deed aforesaid.
2. A preliminary objection has been raised by counsel for the respondents that this appeal is not maintainable as the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order appealed against dt. 16th July, 1983. Having heard counsel for the parties we are of opinion that there is substance in the preliminary objection. The appellants were admittedly not parties to the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed. In reply to this objection counsel for the appellants pointed out that Section 83 of the Act under which the present appeal has been preferred provides. "An appeal shall lie to the High Court from any order made by a district court under this chapter." On its basis, it was urged that since the order appealed against had been passed under Chapt. V of the Act in which Section 83 occurs, any person aggrieved by the order could file an appeal even if he was not a party to the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed. That a person aggrieved by an order can file an appeal even if he is not a party, unless the right of appeal has been confined to a party alone, admits of no doubt. In Jatan Runwar v. Golcha Properties AIR 1971 SC 374 on a report of the Official Liquidator under Section 457 of the Companies Act the Company Judge ordered sale of lease hold rights of a company under liquidation but no notice of the proceedings was given to the landlord either by the Official Liquidator or by the Court. It was held that the landlord was entitled to appeal under Section 483 against the order of sale.
3. The crucial question which, however, falls for consideration is as to whether the appellants, can be held to be 'persons aggrieved' by the order appealed against so as to entitle them to prefer this appeal. A person aggrieved is a person who has been prejudiced on account of the order appealed against. Before a person can be said to be aggrieved or prejudiced by the order appealed against, he has to show that on the date when the order appealed against was passed he had some right which has been adversely affected by the order appealed against. Prejudice cannot be in the vacuum. On the other hand it implies the existence of some right which is affected by an order and it is only then that the person whose existing right has been affected by the order can claim himself to be a person aggrieved. As seen above, in the instant case the appellants did not have any right whatsoever either with regard to the guardianship of respondent 3 or with regard to the management of his properties. He had not even purchased any property belonging to respondent 3 prior to the order appealed against which may have been affected by the order appealed against In this view of the matter it cannot be said that any preexisting right, whatsoever, of the appellants was affected by the order appealed against. As a necessary corollary it is difficult to take the view that the appellants are even then persons aggrieved by the order appealed against so as to entitle them to prefer an appeal against the said order.
4. Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the observations of Hon'ble Sarkaria, J. in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, AIR 1974 SC 994 to the effect that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it. That was a case where the question arose as to whether the State of Punjab had a right of appeal against an order passed under Section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act in proceedings to which the State was not a party. The majority view was that the right of appeal could not be availed of by the State. The observations of Hon'ble Sarkaria J. relied on by counsel for the appellants represented the minority view.
Even keeping in mind the minority view, referred to above, it is not possible to hold a right of appeal against the order appealed against. We have already pointed out that the appellants cannot be said to be either aggrieved by the said order or prejudicially affected by it. Counsel for the appellants, however, urged that since after the passing of the order appealed against a sale deed of the properties of respondent 3 could, in view of Section 75 of the Act, have been executed only by the managers appointed by the order appealed against and that too with the permission of the Court, the sale deed executed by respondent 3 personally in favour of the appellants on 26th Sept. 1983 was likely to be held invalid and consequently the order appealed against comes within the purview of an order by which the appellants are bound. Nothing has been shown to us as to how on the facts of the instant case the appellants who were not claiming any right to be appointed guardian of respondent 3 or manager of his properties were bound by the order appealed against on the date when it was passed. Simply because they claimed to have got a sale deed executed from respondent 3 personally more than two months after the passing of the order appealed against they cannot obviously take the stand that by the subsequent event for which they themselves are responsible the appellants have either been aggrieved or prejudicially affected by the said order or that they were bound by the said order when it was passed. What would be the effect of getting a sale deed executed by respondent 3 in their favour by the appellants more than two months after the passing of the order appealed against is a question with which we are not concerned inasmuch as the same is not relevant so far as the locus standi of the appellants to prefer this appeal is concerned.
5. Counsel for the appellants urged that according to the appellants the order appealed against was obtained as a calculated measure in order to defraud the appellants. On the view which we have taken, namely, that the appellants have no locus standi on the facts of the instant case to prefer an appeal against the order appealed against, we have refrained from going into the merits of the aforesaid submission. As seen above, a suit has already been instituted for cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the appellants and obviously it would be open to the appellants to raise all pleas available to them in defence to that suit.
6. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of opinion that this appeal at the instance of the appellants is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.