1) By these applications under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as to “the Code”), the applicants seek quashing of the first information report registered vide Navrangpura Police Station I-C.R. No. 846 of 2003 on 24th September 2003. Since both the applications arise out of common first information report, the same were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
2) The respondent No.2-Registrar of Companies lodged the above referred first information report against the applicants herein alleging commission of the offences under sections 403, 406, 415, 418, 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code. The gist of the compliant is that the accused who are directors/promoters/signatories to the prospectus by deliberately inducing the public to invest funds in their company and thereafter misappropriating the funds and by ceasing to file returns with the office of complainant and the Stock Exchange and using the funds for their personal purposes have committed the offence of cheating and breach of trust.
3) The applicants who have been arraigned as accused persons in their capacity as directors of the said company have filed the present applications under section 482 of the Code.
4) Mr. B. J. Trivedi, learned advocate for the applicants in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.2403 of 2005, invited attention to the allegations made in the first information report to submit that the entire first information report is based upon the fact that the company in question, that is, M/s. Kome- on Communications Ltd. is a vanishing company. It was pointed out that it is the case of the first informant in the first information report that the company had not filed its annual accounts and balance-sheets from the year 1999-2000 till the lodging of the first information report on 24.9.2003. It was submitted that a company can be stated to be vanishing company if the company is not found at the address stated and if the directors thereof are not traceable. Referring to the record of the case, it was pointed out that on various occasions, during the period 1999-2003, communications had been addressed by SEBI, the Registrar of Companies as well as the stock exchange to the company, which had been duly received by the company at the address stated in the cause title as well as in the first information report. It was further pointed out that the attention of the SEBI had been invited to the fact that the company in question was not a vanishing company, pursuant to which, in the meeting of the Task Force Committee held on 25.6.2007, the Committee had examined the application of the company for delisting it from the vanishing companies list. The Task Force Committee allowed the representation of the company for its deletion from the Vanishing Companies list. The same was then forwarded to the Ministry for action as SEBI had removed the name of the applicant company from the vanishing companies list. Pursuant thereto, vide communication dated 6th January 2011, the Government of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs informed that the company, viz. M/s. Kome-on Communications Ltd. has been deleted from the list of vanishing companies with effect from 8.3.2010 and, accordingly, the company would not be a vanishing company with effect from 8.3.2010. It was, accordingly, submitted that the company had never vanished and, as such, the entire basis of the first information report is without any substance. It was submitted that the company in question was always in existence at the very same address which was duly informed to the Registrar of Companies and that at no point of time, had it ever vanished.
4.1) The attention of the court was drawn to the allegations made in the first information report to submit that the basic ingredients of the offences alleged are not satisfied. It was further submitted that it is settled legal position that in case if on a plain reading of the first information report, no offence is made out, it is always permissible for the High Court to exercise powers under section 482 of the Code and quashed the same. In support of his submissions, the learned advocate placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal & Anr., (2007) 7 SCC 373, for the proposition that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but his subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, at the time when the offence is said to be committed. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh v. Mahadevappa Shivappa Danannava & Anr., 2005 (3) SCC 670, to contend that the first information report itself was barred by delay inasmuch as the prospectus was issued on 17th July 1996, whereas the first information report in question has been lodged on 24th September 2003, that is after a period of more than seven years. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Alagh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2008 (5) SCC 662.
4.2) The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All Cargo Movers (India) Private Limited & Ors. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr., (2007) 14 SCC 776, was cited for the proposition that breach of contract simpliciter does not constitute an offence. For the said purpose, allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients thereof. It is one thing to say that at this juncture, the court would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction, it is not permissible also to look to the admitted documents. It was, accordingly, submitted that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, it is permissible for the court to look into the admitted documents, which form part of the record of the public authorities.
4.3) It was contended that from the allegations made in the first information report, no offence under sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out inasmuch as there is nothing to show that there was any intention on the part of the applicants herein to cheat the public at the time when the prospectus was issued. In support of the said submission, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Kaur & Ors. v. Jagnar Singh & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 696, wherein it was observed that the High Court in the facts of the said case, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant therein had been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute, resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants therein, by non-refunding the amount of advance, the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan & Anr, (2001) 3 SCC 513, for the proposition that to deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practicing the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence. It is trite law and common sense that an honest man entering into a contract is deemed to represent that he has the present intention of carrying it out but if, having accepted the pecuniary advantage involved in the transaction, he fails to pay his debt, he does not necessarily evade the debt by deception. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it was submitted that the allegation made in the first information report is to the effect that the applicants have collected Rs.350 Lakhs from the public at the time of issuing prospectus and that the said amount has been misappropriated. It was argued that there is no basis for the allegation that the amount in question has been misappropriated by the applicants herein. Attention was invited to the communication dated 18th February 2005, addressed by the company to the Manager Listing, Stock Exchange Ahmedabad, for compliance pursuant to clause-43 of the Listing Agreement, wherein it is stated that in terms of the prospectus dated 19.6.1996, the company has paid requisite amount to parties on turnkey project as proposed in the prospectus. As the Company was not able to receive the balance call money, it could not start its project as proposed. The amount paid to the parties, against the project is reflected under the head Loans & Advances and that in a meeting held on 30.9.2003, a resolution had been passed for investing the funds of the Company by recalling the advances given for turnkey project so as to enhance the networth of the Company by making investment fetching higher benefits to the Company and its share holders. That the management was able to get only fraction of advances so given and is still in the process of further recalling the advances so made by the company from the parties. That the advances made for the turnkey projects were subject to condition that the entire amount would be paid within the stipulated time. Unfortunately, the company was not able to get the call money in time and therefore many parties backed out of the project due to failure in contractual obligations and now it has become difficult for the company to recover the advances so made as the parties have already expended and committed on job contract capital expenditure against the advances paid by the company. The learned advocate accordingly submitted that the amounts in question had been paid for achieving the object of the Company. However, due to the aforesaid reasons, the object could not be achieved. Thus, it is apparent that there was no dishonest intention on the part of the applicants to cheat the public or to misappropriate the funds recovered from the investors.
4.4) Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2000) 4 SCC 168, wherein it has been held that for the purpose of invoking section 415 IPC, which defines cheating, there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place, he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test.
4.5) It was, accordingly, urged that the first information report which is merely based upon a report of the SEBI, listing various companies as vanishing companies, without making any due inquiry as to whether or not the offence in question has actually been committed, deserves to be quashed and set aside.
5) Mr. P.M. Thakkar, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the applicant in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.12430 of 2005 reiterated the submissions advanced by Mr. Trivedi. It was contended that insofar as the applicant herein is concerned, there is an additional factor in his favour, namely, that he was not a director at the relevant point of time. It was submitted that the applicant herein had resigned as Director of the Company from 26th December, 1996 and he had also requested the Company to send his resignation to the Registrar of Companies but unfortunately the Company did not bother to send his resignation to the Registrar of Companies as required under the Companies Act. Therefore, the petitioner had filed Form No.32 to the Registrar of Companies on 26th March, 1997, in his personal capacity. It was argued that no specific averments have been made against the applicant in the entire first information report as to what part he has played in the commission of the offences alleged. It was urged that the applicant has neither signed any prospectus, nor has he attended any meeting and, therefore, inclusion of the applicant in the first information report is ex facie illegal. It was submitted that the applicant having resigned as Director of the Company evidently did not take an active part in the conduct of the affairs of the company and as such has been wrongly arraigned as an accused. The first information report is, therefore, required to be quashed qua the applicant herein.
6) Vehemently opposing the application, Mr. N.D. Gohil, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that on the allegations made in the first information report, the offences as alleged are clearly made out. It was argued that the applicants herein, who are the directors of the company, by making the false promises in the prospectus, tempted the investors to invest huge amounts of money and, thereafter, failed to abide by the promises made in the prospectus. Attention was also invited to the annual report submitted by the company for the years 1999-2000 and onwards to point out that the company had advanced loans and advances to the tune of more than Rs. 1,67,00,000/- and that no attempt had been made by the applicants herein to recover the said amount of loans and advances. It was submitted that thus the amount which had been collected from the public have not been utilized for the purpose stated in the prospectus and, as such, the offences as alleged are clearly made out.
6.1) In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Khemka & Anr. v. State of Bihar, (1993) 3 SCC 54, wherein the Supreme Court had held that the persons managing the affairs of the company cannot use the juristic entity and corporate personality of a company as a shield to evade themselves from prosecution for offences under the Penal Code, if it is established that primary object of the incorporation and existence of the company is to defraud public. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. V. Mohan Rao & Anr. v. M. Kishan Rao & Anr, (2002) 6 SCC 174, for the proposition that power of quashing a criminal complaint and the proceeding initiated on its basis under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The court in the facts of the present case found that on reading the complaint petition and the material produced by the complainant with it, in the light of the provisions of section 60, 63(1), 68 and 68-A of the Companies Act, it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint taken in entirety do not make out even prima facie, any of the offences alleged in the complaint petition and declined to quash the complaint. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Iridium India Telecom Limited v. Motorola Incorporated & Ors., (2011) 1 SCC 74, for the proposition that in exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the court cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate the evidence, if any, available on record. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in the criminal proceedings at the preliminary stage/when the investigation/enquiry is pending. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can only be where a clear case for such interference is made out. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case, the matter is still at the stage of investigation and that the correct picture would emerge only upon the conclusion of the investigation and that at this stage, when the facts are hazy, there is no warrant for intervention by this court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code.
6.2) It was further submitted that in various other cases, similar first information reports came to be filed and that in the said cases, this court was not inclined to entertain the applications under section 482 of the Code, hence, the same came to be withdrawn. It was urged that the present case, which seeks quashing of a first information report which is identical to the first information reports involved in the said cases, this court may not exercise discretion in favour of the applicants.
6.3) Insofar as the contention of the applicant in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.12430 of 2005 that he was not a director at the relevant point of time, the attention of the court was drawn to the affidavit-in-reply filed by the second respondent wherein it has been averred that the applicant had signed the prospectus issued by the Company in the capacity as a director and the fact as to whether he was a professional director does not make any difference. It is categorically averred that the applicant was director of the company on the date of issuance of the prospectus and is responsible for the offence under section 63, 68, 628 of the Companies Act and also liable to account for the money collected and utilized through public issue.
7) In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position as well as the rival submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties, the allegations made in the first information report are required to be examined to ascertain as to whether, the allegations made therein constitute the offences alleged.
8) Before adverting to the merits of the case it may be germane to refer to the contents of the first information report in detail. The second respondent in the first information report lodged by him has alleged that M/s. Kome-On Communication Ltd. had been registered under the Companies Act on 3.2.1994, and the address of its registered office is A-903 Fairdeal House, Swatik Cross Roads, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-9. The said company had defaulted in filing its annual accounts in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act since 1999-2000. Moreover, in the year 1995, the company had recovered Rs.350 Lakhs from the public at large and had also issued prospectus as per the SEBI Guidelines. False promises and assurances were given to the public and the directors/promoters and those who had signed the prospectus had, with bad intention induced the public to invest funds in their company and, thereafter, the company has either swallowed the funds or misappropriated the same, which is contrary to the statements made in the prospectus as well as the provisions of law and in contravention of their obligations, have vanished, and in this way, the directors/promoters of the company and the signatories to the prospectus have come together and hatched a conspiracy against the investors and have committed the offence under sections 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code as well as other offences mentioned therein. It is further alleged that after recovering funds from the public, the company, its directors as well as signatories to its prospectus have vanished and have stopped submitting necessary returns to that office as well as to the stock exchange. On personal inquiry/inspection, the company, its directors, promoters as well as signatories to its prospectus are not traceable and since a long time, no reply to any communication/correspondence has been received from the company, its directors, promoters as well as signatories to its prospectus. It is further alleged that the office of the first informant as well as the SEBI and the stock exchange have taken action in accordance with the relevant provisions of law and that the annual returns and balance-sheets for the year 2000 and thereafter, not having been filed under sections 159, 162 and 220 of the Companies Act, a case has been registered under sections 63/68/628 of the Companies Act for making false statements in the prospectus and inducing the public and SEBI and the Stock Exchange have in connection with the breach of the listing agreement taken steps in the interest of the investors. The company, its directors, promoters as well as signatories to its prospectus have in a dishonest manner, misused the funds collected from the public for their personal benefit, which is in breach of the legal contract between the company and its investors. By continuously remaining missing, their intention appears to be dishonest and on this basis, it is proved that the company, its directors, promoters as well as signatories to its prospectus have committed a cognizable offence which is punishable under sections 403, 406, 415, 418, 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code. The office of the first informant, SEBI and the Stock Exchange have been established for protecting the interest of the investors, and hence the first informant is an aggrieved person in respect of the offences committed by the company, its directors, promoters, as well as signatories to its prospectus under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code.
9) At this juncture it may be pertinent to refer to the averments made by the respondent No.2-first informant in the various affidavits-in-reply filed by him. In the affidavit-in-reply dated 17th March 2005, it has been stated that the applicants had collected an amount of Rs.350 Lakhs through public issue vide prospectus dated 19.6.1996 by making false commitments in the prospectus issued by the company and, thereafter, misused the funds so collected. It is further stated that under section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers the police authority to investigate a cognizable offence which cannot be interfered with or controlled by the Judiciary and thus this Court may not under section 482 of the Code, interfere with the investigation of a cognizable offence. In his affidavit dated 12th December 2007, the second respondent has categorically averred that the first information report filed is not on the issue whether the company is vanishing or not. The first information report relates to the mis-statements made by the directors of the company in the prospectus relying upon which the public had been induced to subscribe shares in the company to the said prospectus of the company. The directors being signatories to the prospectus have induced the general public to subscribe to the shares in the company and have thereby committed the offence of cheating the public by not acting as per the statements and promises made in the prospectus. Thus, the entire thrust of the allegations made in the first information report is based upon alleged mis-statements made by the directors of the company in the prospectus relying upon which public had been induced to subscribe shares in the company and that the directors and the signatories to the prospectus had not acted as per the statements and promises made in the prospectus.
10) In the affidavit dated 24th March 2011 of the second respondent, it has been contended that subsequent removal of the name of the company from the list of vanishing companies with effect from 8.3.2010 would be of no consequence. It is further stated that it has been observed from the financial results i.e. balance-sheets as on 31.3.1995 to 31.3.2000 filed subsequent to the public issue that the company has not deployed its money raised through the prospectus from the public, in the plant and machineries/other assets as projected in the prospectus and further that a huge fund has been blocked and invested in the nature of loans and advances given for capital expenditure which have not been recovered. The said activities done by the above applicants are not empowered by the said prospectus and thus, the applicants have cheated the public at large for which the first information report was lodged against the directors/signatories who authorized the issue. It may be noted that the case of the first informant in the first information report is that the amount of Rs.350 lakhs collected from the public has been misappropriated by the applicants, whereas in the affidavit it is stated that a huge fund has been advanced by way of loan and advances and no steps are taken to recover the same. Thus, it is not clear as to whether it is the case of the second respondent that the funds have been misappropriated or whether it is his case that no steps are taken to recover the funds advanced by way of loans and advances. Besides, the statement in the affidavit is self-contradictory, inasmuch as on the one hand the second respondent states that company has not deployed its money raised through the prospectus from the public, in the plant and machineries/other assets as projected in the prospectus and on the other hand says that a huge amount of fund have been blocked and invested in the nature of loans and advances given for capital expenditure. According to the second respondent the funds were to be invested in plant and machineries and other assets as projected in the prospectus. It cannot be gainsaid that such investment would be in the nature of capital expenditure. The loans and advances, even according to the first informant are given towards capital expenditure. Under the circumstances, in the absence of any specific averments as regards the nature of capital expenditure in respect of which the loans and advances were given so as to substantiate his say that the same was for a purpose other than those specified in the objects of the company, it cannot be said that the same were advanced for purposes not authorised under the prospectus. Before this court also the learned counsel for the second respondent, even after taking instructions from the concerned officer was not in a position to point out that the loans and advances given by the company were towards capital expenditure was not authorised under the prospectus. The general refrain was that these are things which would be found out during the course of investigation.
11) Adverting to the allegations made in the first information report, primarily what has been alleged therein is that the applicants by making false promises in the prospectus have induced the public to invest funds in the company and thereafter have misappropriated the same for their personal benefit and that since the year 1999-2000 annual returns and balance-sheets/accounts as required under the provisions of the Companies Act were not filed and the company has vanished and the directors/promoters/signatories to the prospectus were untraceable.
12) On a plain reading of the first information report in its entirety, it is apparent that there is not even a whisper as to what are the false statements made by the applicants in the prospectus and as to which of the promises made therein have not been kept. It appears that in respect of all companies placed on the vanishing companies list, identical first information reports have been filed without actually ascertaining the true position. Consequently, the allegations made in the first information report are very vague and general in nature. No specific allegations are made as regards the nature of the misstatements made in the prospectus and as to how the offences alleged have been committed and the roles of the individual accused. The learned counsel for the second respondent had been called upon by the court to pinpoint the false averments made in the prospectus. He, however, was unable to point out any mis-statement therein. It appears that the entire case of the respondents is based upon the fact that SEBI had declared the company to be a vanishing company and had listed the company in the list of vanishing companies.
13) As noted hereinabove, in the affidavit dated 24th March, 2007 it is the case of the second respondent that the financial results i.e. balance-sheets as on 31.3.1995 to 31.3.2000 filed subsequent to the public issue, reveal that the company has not deployed its money raised through the prospectus from the public in the plant and machineries/other assets as projected in the prospectus and further that a huge fund has been blocked and invested in the nature of loans and advances given for capital expenditure which have not been recovered, and that the prospectus does not permit such activities. That in the annual report submitted by the company, a huge amount had been advanced by way of loans and advances and that no attempt had been made by the applicants to recover the same.
14) On a conjoint reading of the allegations made in the first information report and the averments made in the affidavits filed by the second respondent, taking the case of the second respondent at its highest, his case is that various amounts had been advanced by way of loans and advances for capital expenditure which was not authorised under the prospectus and no steps had been taken to recover the same. In this regard it may be pertinent to note that there is no assertion, either in the first information report or in the affidavits that the funds disbursed by way of loans and advances had been advanced by the directors/promoters/signatories to the prospectus, to their friends or relatives or that the said sums have travelled back to the applicants. Bald allegations are made that the funds have been misappropriated without making any verification in that regard. There is nothing on record to indicate that pursuant to SEBI placing the Company in the list of vanishing companies, the second respondent had made any inquiry in that regard to ascertain as to whether or not the Company was found at the address of its registered office and as to whether it was functioning. No attempt appears to have been made by the second respondent to ascertain as to whether the advances and loans made by the company are genuine or are merely a camouflage and that the said funds have travelled back to the directors/promoters/signatories to the prospectus. In other words, there is no allegation that under the guise of loans and advances, the funds have been misappropriated by the applicants. In the absence of any such inquiry having been made, it is apparent that the allegations are made without any basis. On behalf of the applicants the learned advocate has pointed out various correspondence, notices, etc. issued by SEBI, the Stock Exchange as well as the second respondent to the company at its registered office during the period when the Company is alleged to have vanished and which have been received by the company at its registered address. Thus, apparently the second respondent on the basis of instructions issued to him to lodge first information reports in respect of vanishing companies, has without any verification or inquiry into the actual affairs of the Company, has lodged identical first information reports in respect of all such companies.
15) Upon the court calling upon the learned counsel for the second respondent to point out the material on the basis of which the allegations were made in the first information report, the standard refrain was that the material would be found upon investigation being carried out. Thus, the first informant seeks to put the cart before the horse, viz. that on the allegations made by him in the first information report, it is for the investigating agency to investigate and find out if there is any material to substantiate the allegations levelled by him. In effect and substance, according to the second respondent, the Investigating Officer is required to make a fishing inquiry and ascertain as to whether or not any offence as alleged has been committed.
16) As noticed earlier the offences alleged to have been committed by the applicants are under sections 403, 415, 418, 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code. Before examining the allegations made in the first information report to ascertain whether on the allegations made therein the said offences are constituted, it may be germane to refer to the legal position in this regard.
17) The Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Kaur v.
Jagnar Singh (supra) has while dealing with the provisions of section 406 IPC, which defines criminal breach of trust and section 415, which defines cheating, held that an offence of cheating would be constituted when the accused has fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. A pure and simple breach of contract does not constitute an offence of cheating. The court was of the view that the High Court should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant therein has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. In Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan (supra), the Supreme Court has held that to deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practicing the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence.
18) The first offence alleged is under section 403 of Indian Penal Code, which bears the heading “Dishonest misappropriation of property” and lays down that whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any movable property, shall be punishable as prescribed under the said section. In the facts of the present case, except for vague and general allegations that the applicants herein have misappropriated the funds invested by the public, there is not even a whisper as to how the same have been misappropriated. Besides, as noted earlier, in the affidavit filed by the second respondent it is his case the a huge amount has been advanced by way of loan and advances for purposes other than that authorised under the prospectus and that no steps are taken to recover the same. Thus, on the allegations made in the first information report, no offence under section 403 IPC can be stated to have been committed.
19) Section 406 IPC makes provision for punishment for criminal breach of trust. Criminal breach of trust is defined under section 405 IPC and insofar as the same is relevant for the present purpose reads thus:
“405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropri- ates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be dis- charged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the dis- charge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.”
As noted earlier in the context of the offence under section 403 IPC, the allegation in the present case is that the funds recovered from the public have been misappropriated and that a huge amount has been given by way of loans and advances and no steps are taken to recover the same. As the cost of reiteration it may be stated that no specific averments are made as regards how the funds have been misappropriated. Besides, not taking steps to recover advances cannot be equated with misappropriation, in the absence of any other allegations that the loans and advances were disbursed to the applicants or their family members and that the said funds had actually travelled back to the applicants. If no steps have been taken to recover the amounts advanced by way of loan, the same may amount to failure on the part of the applicants to perform their duties under the Companies Act, attracting the penal provisions under the said Act, however, the same would not constitute an offence under the Indian Penal Code. Thus, on the allegations made in the first information report the offence under section 406 IPC is clearly not made out.
20) Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code defines “cheating” and section 420 deals with “Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property”. It is settled legal position as held by the Supreme Court in the above referred decisions that an offence of cheating would be constituted when the accused has fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. A pure and simple breach of contract does not constitute an offence of cheating. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed. Examining the facts of the case in the light of the aforesaid legal position, there is no allegation made in the first information report that the applicants had an intention to cheat the public right from the inception at the time when the prospectus came to be issued. As held by the Supreme Court in All Cargo Movers (India) Private Limited v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain (supra) for the purpose of constituting an offence the allegations in the complaint must disclose necessary ingredients thereof.
21) Section 418 IPC bears the heading “Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect”. As discussed hereinabove the ingredients for constituting the offence of cheating are woefully lacking in the first information report and as such no offence under section 418 IPC can be stated to have been made out. Insofar as commission of the offence under section 424 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, an offence under the said section is constituted when a person dishonestly or fraudulently conceals or removes any property of himself or any other person, or dishonestly or fraudulently assists in the concealment or removal thereof, or dishonestly releases any demand or claim to which he is entitled. On a plain reading of the first information report, it is apparent that there is not even a whisper as regards dishonest or fraudulent concealment or removal of any property by the applicants. The bald allegation of misappropriation, without anything more, would not satisfy the requirements of the said section.
22) On a reading of the first information report, it is apparent that though the first informant has used the choicest expressions such as misappropriation, cheating, criminal breach of trust, he has not made any concrete allegations against the applicants suggesting commission of any of the said offences. In this regard it may be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Rao v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2005) 7 SCC 69, wherein it has been held that mere reference to the expressions mentioned in the provision would not disclose commission of an offence, when the ingredients constituting the offence in question are conspicuously lacking. Adverting to the facts of the present case, even if the allegations made in the first information report are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, the same do not constitute any of the offences alleged. Under the circumstances, continuance of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law warranting invocation of the inherent jurisdiction of this court under section 482 of the Code.
23) It has been contended on behalf of the second respondent that though loans and advances have been made to several parties, no effort has been made to recover the same or that the same have not been expended for the object of the company. In this regard, apart from the fact that there is nothing on record to indicate that the second respondent has made any inquiry as to how the loans and advances have been made, on behalf of the applicants it has been stated that the same have been made to various parties for the purpose of implementing the objects stated in the prospectus. However, for the reasons which have been noted hereinabove, the object could not be achieved.
24) Another aspect of the matter is that in the affidavit dated 12th December 2007 of the second respondent it has been categorically averred that the first information report filed is not on the issue whether the company is vanishing or not. The first information report relates to the mis-statements made by the directors of the company in the prospectus relying upon which the public had been induced to subscribe shares in the company to the said prospectus of the company. The directors being signatories to the prospectus have induced the general public to subscribe to the shares in the company and have thereby committed the offence of cheating the public by not acting as per the statements and promises made in the prospectus. In this regard it may be germane to refer to certain provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.
63. Criminal liability for mis-statements in prospectus.—(1) Where a prospectus issued after the commencement of this Act includes any untrue statement, every person who authorised the issue of the prospectus, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both, unless he proves either that the statement was immaterial or that he had reasonable ground to believe, and did, up to the time of the issue of the prospectus, believe, that the statement was true.
(2) A person shall not be deemed for the purposes of this section to have authorised the issue of a prospectus, by reason only of his having given—
(a) the consent required by Section 58 to the inclusion therein of a statement purporting to be made by him as an expert, or
(b) the consent required by sub-section (3) of Section 60.
68. Penalty for fraudulently inducing persons to invest money.—Any person who, either by knowingly or recklessly making any statement, promise or forecast which is false, deceptive or misleading, or by any dishonest concealment of material facts, induces or attempts to induce another person to enter into, or to offer to enter into—
(a) any agreement for, or with a view to, acquiring, disposing of, subscribing for, or underwriting shares or debentures; or
(b) any agreement the purpose or pretended purpose of which is to secure a profit to any of the parties from the yield of shares or debentures, or by reference to fluctuations in the value of shares or debentures;
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 628. Penalty for false statement.—If in any return, report, certificate, balance-sheet, prospectus, statement or other document required by or for the purposes of any of the provisions of this Act, any person makes a statement—
(a) which is false in any material particular, knowing it to be false; or
(b) which omits any material fact knowing it to be material;
he shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.
25) In the first information report it has been alleged that untrue statements are made in the prospectus; that on the basis of such untrue statements the public was induced to invest huge amounts of funds in the Company. Thus basically the offences alleged would fall under sections 63, 68 and 628 of the Companies Act. As averred in the first information report, in respect of the aforesaid offences a complaint has already been lodged against the applicants herein being Criminal Case No.58 of 2003 in the Court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of Ahmedabad, on almost identical accusations alleging commission of the offences under sections 63, 68 and 628 IPC. In paragraph-4 of his affidavit dated 17th March 2005, the second respondent has categorically stated thus;
“That the Capital market witnesses a boom during the period from 1992 to 1995. During this period many new companies tapped the capital market and collected funds from the public through the public issue of shares by issuing Prospectus. Many of these companies did not keep their commitments with the investors and have thereafter disappeared. Since such companies had collected funds mainly from the innocent and small investors their defaults and disappearance had affected by very large section of the public. In this connection a joint mechanisms between SEBI and Ministry of Company affairs, Government of India has been formed for taking action against unscrupulous promoters who raised money from investors and misused them while action under the Companies Act, 1956 was going against the companies and their directors/signatories to the Prospectus under section 63 of the Act, that is, for Criminal liability in Prospectus, under section 68 of the Act for penalty for fraudulently inducing persons to invest money and under section 628 of the Act for false statement in prospectus, the promoters/directors/signatories to the Prospectus committed criminal offences under IPC also. Therefore, Criminal Complaint under the Companies Act, 1956/FIR has been lodged under IPC.”
26) As noted hereinabove, it is the categorical case of the second respondent that the first information report is not filed on the issue whether the company is vanishing or not, whereas the entire thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the second respondent was that the Company after inducing the public to invest in it had vanished. Thus, if the first information report is not filed on the issue of vanishing company, the only other offences that remain would be under the provisions of the Companies Act, in respect of which a criminal complaint has already been lodged in the court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. In Radhey Shyam Khemka v. State of Bihar (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the second respondent, the Supreme Court after holding that the persons managing the affairs of such company cannot use the juristic entity and corporate personality of the company as a shield to evade themselves from prosecution for offences under the Penal Code, if it is established that primary object of the incorporation and existence of the Company is to defraud public, has held thus:
“6. But, at the same time, while taking cognizance of alleged offences in connection with the registration, issuance of prospectus, collection of moneys from the investors and the misappropriation of the fund collected from the shareholders which constitute one offence or other under the Penal Code, court must be satisfied that prima facie an offence under the Penal Code has been disclosed on the materials produced before the court. If the screening on this question is not done properly at the stage of initiation of the criminal proceeding, in many cases, some disgruntled shareholders may launch prosecutions against the promotors, directors and those in charge of the management of the company concerned and can paralyse the functioning of such company. It need not be impressed that for prosecution for offences under the Penal Code the complainant has to make out a prima facie case against the individuals concerned, regarding their acts and omissions which constitute the different ingredients of the offences under the Penal Code. It cannot be overlooked that there is a basic difference between the offences under the Penal Code and acts and omissions which have been made punishable under different Acts and statutes which are in nature of social welfare legislations.
For framing charges in respect of those acts and omissions, in many cases, mens rea is not an essential ingredient; the concerned statute imposes a duty on those who are in charge of the management, to follow the statutory provisions and once there is a breach or contravention, such persons become liable to be punished. But for framing a charge for an offence under the Penal Code, the traditional rule of existence of mens rea is to be followed.” (Emphasis supplied)
27) As held in the above decision for prosecution for offences under the Penal Code the complainant has to make out a prima facie case against the individuals concerned, regarding their acts and omissions which constitute the different ingredients of the offences under the Penal Code. In the facts of the present case allegations as regards the acts and omissions of the applicants, individually, which constitute the different ingredients of the offences under the Indian Penal Code, are clearly missing. Under the circumstances, when no offence under the Indian Penal Code is disclosed on the allegations made in the first information report, further proceedings cannot be permitted to continue in pursuance of the same.
28) On behalf of the second respondent, the learned counsel has contended that the nature of the offence alleged and the fraud committed would be disclosed after the investigation is carried out. This in the opinion of the Court is putting the cart before the horse, namely that investigation is required to be carried out pursuant to an offence having been disclosed and not vice versa. In other words, investigation by the police cannot be carried out in the manner of a fishing inquiry to inquire as to whether any offence has actually been committed. The first information has to be lodged by disclosing commission of an offence and not to inquire as to whether or not an offence has been committed.
29) Thus, it is apparent that the sole object in lodging the first information report was to set the machinery of criminal law in motion against the applicants without verifying the truth or otherwise of the allegations before levelling the same against the applicants herein and that the second respondent is solely depending upon the fishing inquiry which may be undertaken by the police in the course of its investigation, without being himself possessed of any knowledge or any material or documents forming basis for the allegations made in the first information report as regards misappropriation of the funds collected from the public.
30) In the light of the fact that the court has found that no offence as alleged in the first information report is made out against the applicants, it is not necessary to delve into the contention as to whether or not the applicant in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.12430 of 2005 was a director at the relevant time when the offence is alleged to have been committed and as to whether in the light of the resignation tendered by him, his name was required to be deleted from the first information report.
31) For the foregoing reasons, the applications succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The first information report registered vide Navrangpura Police Station I-C.R. No.846 of 2003, is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly in both the applications.
(HARSHA DEVANI, J.)
Vahid